




ESSAYS IN ISLĀMIC AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES

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“ISLĀMIC STUDIES AND THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS”

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In this presentation a polarity will be set forth, and attempted to be held together, between narrow detail and broad principle; between on the one hand the meaning of the two Arabic words, in a classical formula of Islāmic theology, and on the other hand considerations of the most general sort that pertain to the academic study of religion, specifically the history of religion. The particular detail, from a small corner of Islāmic studies on which I happen to have been doing some work, will not engage us technically; but will perhaps serve to anchor empirically the theoretical observations that appear to me to be involved in all our work, and whose validity as generalizations will not be proven, certainly, yet perhaps illumined, by the specific.

The specific is a question of the meaning of my two Arabic words, both of which are in fact slightly ambiguous, so that the issue of how to translate them correctly in a particular context and a given passage requires some care, and sensitivity — and repays them.

You may perhaps feel that my particular question is hardly a matter of mere detail when I say that the realm of inquiry has to do with faith. For this, surely, is a mighty matter. Faith is man's most decisive quality, according to various of the world's cultural traditions. The Day of Judgement, for those who resort to that formidable metaphor, is envisaged primarily as a determining of whether a person has or has not had it. Heaven and Hell are felt to be not too stupendous characterizations of the cosmic significance, for man, of the question involved. It is, indeed, many have averred, the ultimate human question. Those of you who may chance to know my *Meaning & End* ... and other writings will perhaps recall that I personally (and professionally) regard faith as a virtually universal human quality

underlying the human side of all the world's traditions, informing all religious activity and constituting meaning for human life. Further, at another level, those of you interested in Nixon and Watergate will recognize that faith or lack of it, or anyway faithfulness, is a matter, if not cosmically of Heaven and Hell, at least mundanely of social and historical import.

If faith, then, be a massive human issue, small wonder that the subordinate question of how to define, to delineate, faith has itself been a matter of debate. Muslims and Christians, for example, agree that faith is the final criterion for man's destiny, and is the human shape of the primary link between the Divine and man; although they have disagreed as to that link's divine shape for man's life. They disagree, some would say, as to the "object" of faith — although I myself am coming to find that formulation unhelpful, even uncouth.

Now it is not the task of the academic historian of religion, many would affirm, to address himself to the question, What is Faith? — though again I myself, I may remark as an aside, am not sure that anyone else on earth is so well equipped to deal with it; or at least with the hardly unrelated question, what *has* faith *been*, as a quality of human life, individual and social, across the centuries and across the world. However that may be, no one in this audience, probably, would deny that it *is* the business of the Religionsgeschichtler, if his special field be Islāmic studies, to report what the Muslim tradition has affirmed faith to be. The orientation of all our university heritage would surely be that he need not himself *believe* the answers, but in any case he should be able to tell us what answers significant Muslim thinkers have in fact given to the question, What is Faith?

Now I have two observations to report on this matter. They are, I think, related.

The first is that remarkably few Western scholars have given heed to this problem. Discussions in modern academic literature on Islāmic conceptions of faith — despite the centrality of this issue in Muslim thought and life — are strikingly few. In the literature of Religionswissenschaft, as distinct from that of Islamistik as a sub-heading of traditional orientalism, they are perhaps non-existent; although *a priori* one might have expected a contrary ratio. My second observation is that among such accounts as have been given, most, I find on careful investigation, are wrong. Casually wrong. They err on the side of being superficial, insouciant. Where an Arabic word has two possible meanings, they rather inadvertently choose the one that is more glib, less trenchant, less existentially demanding.

I have said that the two matters are probably related. Few scholars have attended to this issue, because most have not taken the question

seriously. Those that have written on it (it seems to me), have not taken the answers seriously.

Now the writers concerned are excellent Arabists, and are among our very best scholars. The work that they have done is imposingly thorough, systematic, refined. It would be churlish to question the general quality of their investigations — far more meticulous and comprehensive than anything of mine, certainly. Yet at the level of religious interpretation, I am suggesting, and only this, they have proven inadequate.

Let us look at the matter more closely.

It is well known that some Muslims have held that faith is overtly doing something; some, that it is overtly saying something; and some, that it is internal. Roughly: faith is works; and/or, is confession; and/or, is an act of the heart.

The first view, that faith is works (sc., good works) tended to become emphasized by the early, and presently heretical, sect called Khārijī. The second tended to become adopted pragmatically by the majority community for everyday purposes in mundane and social life, and in law: he is a *mu'min*, a man of faith, who recites the *shahādah*, the famous Muslim so-called “Creed”. The third view, that faith is an inner matter (*al taṣdīq bi-l-qalb*) tended to become dominant in theory among the most recognized theological schools. Yet, no single position but was felt to be vulnerable alone. Various refinements were in order; and especially, various combinations and correlations of any two, or of all three.

A neat wording established itself as summing up the all-three position: namely, that faith is

iqrār bi-l-lisān

wa taṣdīq bi-l-janān

wa ‘amal bi-l-l-arkān

— that faith has internalized, and verbalized, and practical or operationized, aspects.

Now in this formula, which became rather widespread, either as it stands or in two, especially the first two, of its three clauses, apart from the definite and indefinite articles, the conjunction, and a preposition, there are in the definition of faith six Arabic words. When one begins to look into the matter attentively one discovers that two of these six have been regularly mis-apprehended.

The renderings usually given are plausible, of course. They are not egregious errors. As I have said, it is a question of casually choosing the less engaging of two possible meanings; but with significant results, we shall presently see. With the lesser renderings one can get by, so long as one does not examine contexts closely, does not compare and scrutinize

arguments rigorously, does not wrestle seriously and perhaps intimately, personally, with what is being said. Once one begins to do any of these things, however, or especially all of them, the superficial interpretations break down, and the true import of what is being affirmed begins to emerge.

Of the three affirmations, I leave aside the one about faith as "saying"; except to note negatively that not much has been made of the point that the issue here is not merely verbal; rather, it is a matter of a person publicly taking on a commitment to live as a member of a given community with its rights and responsibilities. It is the performative utterance, as the philosopher Austin would say, of overtly engaging oneself — by announcing oneself as engaged — as a participant in a highly systematized, highly dynamic, enterprise. It is like the "I do" of the marriage ceremony. There is further an element of missionary activity: the proclamation to the world as to the validity and incumbency of the moral.

This clause, then, I should characterize as having been underestimated rather than misunderstood; certainly, then mistranslated. I focus not on it but on the other two clauses. The word *taṣdīq* has regularly been taken as "believing", so that truth has been seen here as being envisaged by Muslims intellectually as believing the Islāmic doctrines. Similarly, the word *al arkān* has been taken as "the pillars" — sc. the five pillars of Islām —, so that faith is seen as being envisaged as performing the Islāmic rituals. The interpretation in both cases is consonant with the watered-down understanding of the verbal-confession level, where faith is seen as being envisaged as pronouncing the Islāmic Creed. Faith is seen as a relating oneself to certain Islāmic forms.

Taṣdīq, however, in addition to possibly meaning "regard as true", and hence roughly "believing", more substantially means, and can be shown to mean here, rather "to recognize sincerely as true" or "to appropriate to oneself what one recognizes as true". *Arkān* are supports; and the word may mean the tent-posts or the supports of a building or the so-called five pillars of Islām, or it may mean the limbs of the human body. I believe that it can be shown to have originally the latter meaning here, so that *'amal bi-l-arkān* (or, an alternative reading: *'amal bi-l-jawāriḥ*) in this formula means that faith is acting bodily, is overt behavior.

With these interpretations, the formula comes out then as saying that faith (i) is joining with others in promising to live in terms of the true and good, and proclaiming to others that this is the right way for all of us to live; and/or (ii) it is sincerity, in existentializing for oneself inwardly what is recognized externally as true and good; and/or (iii) is the actual

doing of one's duty, the carrying of the right and the good out in practice. As I have said, various schools of Islāmic thought espouse one or other of these three interpretations of faith, or more usually some two of them or, fairly often, all three.

The evidence in favour of this way of reading the passages I do not adduce here. On one of these terms I read a paper at an international conference of Arabists two years ago, which will soon be published; and I am currently preparing an article on the other. The evidence in each case is elaborate and technical, and I think in both cases overwhelming. So far as I can see, no one has ever thought of these things before; but once one raises the point and looks into the possibility carefully, it becomes inescapable. Here I wish rather to develop the implications for the general history of religion as an academic study.

I have said that the more superficial translations are at first blush plausible linguistically; but what they really are is plausible religiously, as it were, or emotionally — I mean, for those who are religiously negative to what they are studying: who subtly disdain, or reject, or anyway do not take seriously, the religious position here at play. In effect, these renderings formulate, or anyway make it easy to continue to hold, the preconceptions with which Westerners approach Islām in the first place, and merely make the Muslims appear to be saying what outsiders already supposed *before* they ever read the passages: namely, that Muslims are special folk, folk who believe certain doctrines (which of course a normal person does not believe), who recite a particular creed (which of course the rest of us do not recite), who perform certain peculiar rituals ("peculiar" in the sense of special, idiosyncratic, peculiar to them).

What has happened here is that between two superficially possible interpretations, that one has unwittingly been chosen by outsiders that enables them most comfortably to remain outsiders; that present an interpretation of faith pertaining not to man as such, but to Muslims who are thus presented as, if not a queer, at best an alien group.

What has happened is that an Islāmic analysis of faith has been subtly distorted into appearing to be rather an analysis of Islāmic faith. By conceptualizing it as Islāmic faith it can then be dismissed; or quarantined, as it were; set aside as the definition of the faith of a people who believe certain things which more rational people do not believe, or anyway that we do not believe and therefore it does not really concern us. And because it does not really concern us we do not have to pay close attention to it — not even, it turns out, to the point of noticing that we have in fact misunderstood what the analysis is saying. By conceiving it as Islāmic faith, we insulate ourselves from it. The concept 'Islāmic faith', by the way, could not be translated into classical Arabic. It is not

something that Muslims could think about or talk about. The modern West has invented the concept, and does like to think about it so, because in this way it can contain it as psychologically remote. This has religious consequences; as all serious study of religion must have, I would hold. Yet at the moment I am showing that it has also academic consequences. By insulating ourselves psychologically, I am arguing, we distance ourselves even linguistically, and fail even as scholars.

The validity of what I am endeavouring to say can perhaps be demonstrated fairly simply by my asking this question. How many of you in this room, not yourselves Muslims have ever seriously entertained the thought that Islāmic doctrines might be true?

I do not know whether any of you is personally interested, as I happen to be, in the question as to what faith is as a human characteristic. If you are, has it ever occurred to you that Muslim views on this matter might conceivably be more profound, more penetrating, more *right* than any others that you have so far come across, in Christendom or chez Freud or in Buddhist teaching; or than you yourself have been able to think up or in the Buddhist teaching — or than you yourself have been able to think up on your own? And not necessarily *more* right with new insights and perspectives; that here are some highly intelligent and experienced people who have thought deeply on this subject and might conceivably therefore have something significant to contribute? If you by chance are not personally interested, one might rather ask whether, if a colleague on your faculty were writing a book on faith, would you call his attention to Muslim writing on the subject on the grounds that he might be expected to learn something on the matter from it?

Have you? (Show of hands?)

Now perhaps you feel that I am becoming too *engagé* here, and have left the purely academic. If you feel that, then I have altogether failed to get across what I am trying to say. I have not left the academic issue. The point is that if you feel that you have nothing to learn from someone, you will not really listen to what he is saying. And if you do not really listen, then you cannot be a good scholar. To be a historian of religion means to listen, very deeply — more deeply than in the case of any other sort of scholar, I suppose. And although my particular illustration this afternoon comes from the realm of texts, the reading of documents, exactly the same principles operate if you are looking at a painting or a mosque, watching a ritual or a dance, observing an election. No one can understand, as a scholar, mediaeval Muslim theories of the relation between religion and government, or the office of Caliph, if he is not open to the sheer possibility that conceivably that view of what we call political science might, at least in part, be an improvement over our notions of the proper separation of religion and politics and our

commitment to the secular state.

Unless one approaches others' religious life feeling that one can learn something — something about man, something about oneself — probably one will not learn very much.

In the past, most outside students have approached Islām thinking that in so doing they might learn something about Islām. But one has to realize that this religion is not about Islām, it is about man, about truth and goodness, about the universe, about the destiny of all of us. Islām is about you and me. It may be wrong in what it says about us. Yet if we are sure that it is wrong before we start, we shall not listen, and shall therefore never find out whether it is wrong or not. Furthermore, if we fail to realize that, right or wrong, whenever it says anything it is talking about us, then too we shall misunderstand. In both cases, we shall not be listening, carefully, seriously. And therefore we shall never be good scholars.

PRAYER AND INTENTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JUDAISM AND ISLĀM

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In this paper, I wish to emphasize the importance of *intention* in prayer in Judaism and Islam. It appears to me that because of the constant stress on Divine Law by both Judaism and Islam, which present us with a very demanding God, these two monotheistic faiths have been downgraded by influential scholars of the comparative study of religions. IT is my contention that a study of prayer with a concomitant stress on intention such as is found in Jewish and Muslim sources can give us a deeper understanding of the spiritual nature of these Semitic religions. Let me explain.

In a very fine article, "On Teaching Islām to Undergraduates," Sheila McDonough explores some of the problems confronting the teacher of Islām. She writes:

Religious studies is generally a discipline in which student interest is strong. Unfortunately, however, one area where the interest is weak is Islam ... The relative lack of interest in Islam seems to us the result of the inadequacy of the books available. Teaching Hinduism and Buddhism is made much easier by the ready availability of many excellent paperbacks by Western, Hindu, and Buddhist scholars. We have a notion that Islam could become just as popular as the other traditions, if better material was accessible.¹

Professor McDonough addresses one aspect of the situation; I would like to suggest that the problem lies deeper and is due in large measure to the negative reaction by some of the most influential writers

¹Sheila McDonough, "On Teaching Islam to Undergraduates", *Humaniora Islamica*, (1973) Vol. I, p. 262.

on the comparative study of religions to the all-encompassing nature of the Divine Law in Judaism and Islām. Professor Goitein in his book *Jews and Arabs* explains the similarity between Judaism and Islām with regard to the crucial ideal of the Divine Law.

Islam, like Judaism, is a religion of *Halakha*, in Arabic *Shari'a*, that is, a God-given law which regulates minutely all aspects of life: law, worship, ethics and social etiquette *Halakha-Shari'a* is the very essence and core of both religions.²

In a later work, Goitein continues to expound on the special affinity between Judaism and Islām with regard to the Divine Law.

Islam, like Judaism, is a religion of commandments, in which the minute observance of ritual and ethical injunctions is intended to sanctify every moment of the believer's life and to make him continuously aware of his being but a servant of God.

These commandments are incorporated in God's law, which consists of two parts: the Scripture given directly through revelation, the written Torah (called *Kitāb*, corresponding to the Hebrew *tōrā shebi-Ketāv*, the written Torah), and an oral law (*Hadīth*, literally 'something told,' the equivalent of *tōrā shebe'al pē*, the oral Torah).³

The demanding nature of the Divine Law in Judaism and Islām has been clearly discerned by those outside the Jewish-Muslim tradition. Charles Adams captures the demanding aspect of the Muslim tradition in the following succinct statement.

Islam, it has been said many times, is essentially a religion of law.

The basic content of its religious teaching is a series of commands and prohibitions, *dos* and *don'ts*, that form the substance of the way a Muslim is to follow ... Muslims thus perceive the character of ultimate reality and of human life as being a series of demands.⁴

Jewish and Muslim scholars do not deny the demanding all-encompassing nature of the Divine Law, in fact they stress it. Abraham Heschel, one of the most respected Jewish thinkers of the 20th century, writes: "To the biblical mind, man is above all a commanded being, a being of whom demands may be made. The central problem is not: What is being; but rather: What is required of me."⁵

²S.D. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs: Their Contacts Through the Ages* (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), p. 59.

³S.D. Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966), pp. 20-21.

⁴Charles J. Adams, "Islamic Faith," *Introduction to Islamic Civilization*, ed. R. M. Savory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 41.

⁵Abraham J. Heschel, *Man's Quest for God* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), pp. 107-109.

Sayyid Ḥusayn Naṣr makes the following observation with regard to the problems that face the contemporary student when he confronts the all-encompassing, demanding nature of the Divine Law.

The lack of understanding of the significance of the *Shari'a* in the Western World is due to its concrete and all-encompassing nature. A Jew who believes in Talmudic Law can understand what it means to have a Divine Law whereas for most Christians, and therefore for secularists with a Christian background, such an understanding comes with difficulty.⁶

In my judgment, the real problem is not so much the inability of the Christian scholar to understand the all-embracing, demanding nature of the Divine Law but rather their reaction to this idea.

R. C. Zaehner certainly understands the special affinity between Judaism and Islām when he claims that "...the God of Mohammad is the God of the Old Testament rather than the New."⁷

Professor Zaehner's reaction, however, to the demanding biblical and Qur'ānic God is somewhat astonishing to Jews and Muslims.

The God of the Old Testament is what Aurobindo calls a "bully and a tyrant"...hence it is Hinduism and Buddhism (and Taoism) that have attracted post-Christian man, not Islām because the Allah of the Qur'an is in his "divine savagery" barely distinguishable from Yahweh; and there is a mordant irony in the fact that this God should be fighting himself to the death in Palestine today.⁸

Such negative statements about Judaism and Islām are easily found in the works of numerous other influential students of the comparative study of religion. Albert Schweitzer, in *Christianity and the Religions of the World*, which has been reprinted numerous times since its first appearance in 1923, writes:

There is also no need for a comparison of spiritual values as between Christianity and Islam....It (Islam) lacks spiritual originality and is not a religion with profound thoughts on God and the world....A comparison between the religion of Israel and Christianity is unnecessary because the latter has taken over the most vital ideas of the former and developed them.⁹

The views of Hendrick Kraemer, Professor of the History of Religions at the University of Leiden, are perhaps even more

⁶Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 94.

⁷R.C. Zaehner, *The Comparison of Religions* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 160.

⁸R.C. Zaehner, "Religious Truth", *Truth and Dialogue in World Religions: Conflicting Truth-Claims*, ed. John Hick. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974), p. 6.

⁹Albert Schweitzer, *Christianity and the Religions of the World*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), pp. 34-35.

derogatory. He writes: "Islām in its constituent elements and apprehensions must be called a superficial religion."¹⁰

In my view, however, the most serious charge against Judaism and Islām is found in the following statements by R. C. Zaehner.

It can be maintained that the strictly monotheistic religions do not naturally lend themselves to mysticism; and there is much to be said for this view. Christianity is the exception because it introduces into a monotheistic system an idea that is wholly foreign to it, namely, the Incarnation of God in the Person of Jesus Christ.... Judaism, on its side, never developed a mystical tradition comparable to that of the other great religions.... In Islam, too, we cannot help feeling that sufism is so radical a distortion of the orthodox doctrine as to constitute almost a separate religion. Neither the Torah nor the Qur'ān naturally lend themselves to a mystical interpretation: both emphasize overwhelmingly the complete otherness of God..."¹¹

I have mentioned just a few of the scholars who seem to minimize the spiritual significance of Judaism and Islām and whose influence on the academic study of religion is considerable. They seem to suggest that since Judaism and Islām are not sufficiently spiritual, they do not warrant serious academic study. We have already noted Schweitzer's prompt dismissal of Judaism and Islām. His suggestion is that we devote our time to Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism.¹²

In my understanding, Professor Zaehner seems to support the views of Dr. Schweitzer. Zaehner's statement that Judaism and Islām are not open to mysticism, is in fact saying that the most spiritual dimension of religion, the mystical element, is not really present in these Semitic traditions. His reason for making such a statement is that both Judaism and Islām "emphasize overwhelmingly the complete otherness of God."¹³ Zaehner's charge that Judaism and Islām have placed such an undue stress upon God's transcendence, that His immanence has been completely neglected, is a very pervasive view.

In his classic work on Rabbinic Judaism, George Foot Moore explains a most common Christian view on the Jewish concept of God. He writes: "In the endeavor to exalt God uniquely above the world, Judaism, it is said, had in fact exiled him from the world in lonely majesty, thus sacrificing the immediacy of the religious relation."¹⁴

¹⁰H. Kraemer, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World*, (Michigan: Kregel Publications, 1963),

¹¹R.C. Zaehner, *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism* (London: The Athlone Press, 1960), pp. 2-3.

¹²Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

¹³R.C. Zaehner, *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁴George Foot Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) Vol. I, p. 423.

In my opinion, this understanding of the Jewish and Muslim concept of God as utterly transcendent is one of the important reasons for the lack of appreciation of these two traditions. However, the major difficulty confronting the non-Jewish, non-Muslim scholar is the stress on the Divine Law in these religions. Heschel helps us to understand why the Divine Law presents such an obstacle to Christianity.

Paul waged a passionate battle against the power of law and proclaimed instead the religion of grace. Law, he claimed, cannot conquer sin, nor can righteousness be attained through works of law. A man is justified by faith without the deeds of law.¹⁵

Thus the lack of popularity of Judaism and Islām in departments of religion does not seem to be due to simply a lack of good books. I do not think that there are any easy solutions. I would like to suggest that through an intensive study of prayer with a particular emphasis on intention, the immanence, the nearness of God in both Judaism and Islām may emerge more clearly. Such a course may also help us to understand that for the Jew and Muslim the Divine Law which commands prayer is not seen as an obstacle to spirituality, but on the contrary a way to enhance the spiritual nature of the human being who feels commanded.

First I would like to show how an exploration of prayer may help us understand that the God of Judaism and Islām is not only transcendent but also immanent. According to the Islāmic tradition, "He who prays holds intimate converse with his Lord."¹⁶ This is precisely the view of Judaism which considers prayer to be a major path through which man approaches the divine. Judaism sees prayer as "a divine conversation with the Most High."¹⁷

In his major study on the life of Muḥammad, M.H. Haykal speaks of prayer as "communion with God"¹⁸ and brings a passage from the Qur'ān which shows the immanence of God, a God Who is near and wants to be approached through prayer. "And if My servants ask you of Me, tell them that I am near and that I respond to the caller who calls upon Me. Tell them then to pray to Me, to believe in Me. That is the way to wisdom." (Qur'ān 2:186) The very same idea is expressed in the Hebrew Bible in the following words, "The Lord is near to all who call

¹⁵Abraham J. Heschel, *God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1955), p. 293.

¹⁶James Robson (trans.), *Mishkāt Al Maṣābīn*, (Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1965). Vol. I, p. 175.

¹⁷William B. Silverman, *Rabbinic Wisdom and Jewish Values*, (New York: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1971), p. 57.

¹⁸Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, *The Life of Muḥammad*, trans. Isma'īl Rāgī A. al Fārūqī (American Trust Publications, 1976), p. 529.

upon him, to all who call upon him in truth." (Psalms 145:18)

A study of Islāmic prayer will reveal that one of the most important prayers which is repeated many times during the day is *Al Fātiḥah* which is the opening sūrah in the Qur'ān. I quote the first few lines. "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Beneficent. Praise belongs to God, the Lord of all Being, the All-merciful, and All-Beneficent" (Qur'ān 1:1-2). I find it difficult to imagine that the Muslim who says this prayer many times during his waking hours can see his God as "excluded from the world in lonely majesty."

The statement found in the Talmud, that "The Holy One seems to be far away, but nothing is nearer than He,"¹⁹ brings to mind the Qur'ānic statement that God is "nearer to him than his own jugular vein." (Qur'ān 50:15).

We must now come to grips with the Jewish and Muslim concept of Divine Law and center in on the specific command to pray. An examination of the commandment to pray will serve as a concrete example why that commandment which is most precious for Muslims and Jews presents great difficulties for those outside Judaism and Islām. First, it must be pointed out that, "the foremost religious duty of a Muslim is prayer, *ṣalāṭi*."²⁰ According to a tradition from al Bukhārī, the action which is most precious to God is "prayer at its appointed time."²¹

A study of Judaism reveals that the highest aspect of worship was assigned to the study of the Torah. Although study takes precedence over prayer, some rabbis tended to assign an equal if not a more important role to prayer. Heschel's statement, "It (prayer) is the queen of all commandments,"²² seems to indicate that he agrees with Hasidism that prayer stands higher even than the study of the Torah.

That prayer stands at the heart of Judaism and Islām has to my knowledge not been denied. However, it is not unusual to find statements that claim that for Judaism and Islām "praying is mostly a habit or a show,"²³ or that for the rank and file prayers are mechanical. It is held that even the law of God cannot command one to pray, that prayers in Judaism and Islām which are fixed and obligatory are performed without inner intention or devotion.

Jewish and Muslim scholars are very much aware of the special difficulty entailed by the detailed specificity of the laws regarding

¹⁹Quoted by Silverman, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

²⁰Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, *Judaism and Islam* (London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961), p. 21.

²¹Āftāb-ud-Dīn Aḥmad (trans.), *Ṣaḥīḥ Al Bukhārī*, (Lahore: Ahmadiyyah Anjuman Ishaat Islam, 1973), Vol. III, p. 412.

²²Heschel, *Man's Quest for God*, p. 69.

²³Quoted by Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions*, p. 73.

prayer. Yet at the same time one must perform the requirements of prayer with inner devotion. This is a problem not just with regard to prayer in Judaism and Islām but with all aspects of worship. Erwin Rosenthal points out, "the first essential in prayer is *niyyah*, intention, exactly corresponding to the Jewish *kavanah*.... without it prayer is useless."²⁴ One is commanded not only to pray but also to experience inner devotion in the act of praying. The Qur'ān states, "Observe strictly the prayer, and stand up to (worship) Allah devoutly" (Qur'ān 2:238). To worship God devoutly is of fundamental importance in Islām. Bukhārī starts his collection with the following traditions: "Actions shall be judged only by the intentions and every person shall have only what he intends...."²⁵ This tradition is found throughout the canonical collections. The Qur'ān makes a specific warning against those who worship for their own glory rather than for God. "So woe to those that pray and are heedless of their prayers, to those who make display" (Qur'ān 107:4-6). The idea that without *Kavanah*, the performance of the commandments are worthless is found throughout the classical sources of Judaism. In the Talmud we find the extreme view that "...the Rabbis call a person who performs a commandment without the proper intention a transgressor."²⁶

Jews and Muslims are certainly aware that the requirement to pray with inner devotion at all times is a challenge that demands constant effort. It is not always possible to fully carry out the Divine Law. Yet they believe that the commandment was given in order to enhance the spiritual nature of man, and they insist that they are grateful for the opportunity to take up the challenge. In the commentary to his English translation of *Ṣaḥīḥ Al Bukhārī*, *ʿAṭiāb-ud-Dīn-Aḥmad* writes:

Some thinkers have objected that the appointment of time takes away the spiritual position of the prayers, meaning that left to the mood of a man, the prayer is more natural.

God, however, who knows the nature of a man has very rightly prescribed a time-table for prayer because He knows that without some such time-table, man fails to attend to any regular duty.²⁷

Heschel speaks in a similar vein when he writes,

How grateful I am to God that there is a duty to worship, a law to remind my distraught mind that it is time to think of God, time to

²⁴Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

²⁵Aḥmad, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 1.

²⁶Heschel, *God in Search of Man*, p. 408.

²⁷Aḥmad, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 407.

disregard my ego for at least a moment! It is such happiness to belong to an order of the divine will. I am not always in a mood to pray... But when I am weak, it is the law that gives me strength; when my vision is dim, it is duty that gives me insight.²⁸

In this paper, I have argued that an intensive study of prayer with its stress on intention in Judaism and Islām may help to illuminate its spiritual dimension, that the Divine Law and spirituality are not mutually exclusive in the actual lives of Jews and Muslims.

²⁸Heachel, *Man's Quest for God*, p. 68.

ISLĀM AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANISM

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Like the terms culture and civilization, "humanism" is a pluralistic umbrella which covers a diffuse variety of human thought and behavior and its products.¹ It embraces all arts and sciences, including historiography, philosophies, and in a judgment debated by many, thought-systems of purportedly religious inspiration. A satisfactory consideration of humanism's challenge, therefore, either *to* Islām or from *within* Islām to humanity at large, cannot exclude the torches which its adherents passed on or extinguished in *any* of those areas. However, since a brief survey must narrow its focus, its operative definition of humanism will be restrictively teleogocial (goal-defined) and largely ethical. Reluctantly, it limits humanism to that single dimension called ethos, the distinctive complex or *gestalt* of values which inspires human beings to aesthetic, utilitarian, and altruistic action. In this context, the question arises: what is the humanistic ethos of Islām?

In a CROSS CURRENTS article of 1973², I attempted to summarize

1. For one of the Renaissance humanists, Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) the supreme virtue or love which binds human beings into one species is "*humanitas*". See his *Platonic Theology*, trans. by J.L. Burroughs in J.B. Ross and Mary M. McLaughlin, ed., *Portable Renaissance Reader* (New York: Viking, 1953), p. 391. On the influence of Greek thought on Muslim and Jewish and Christian humanism, see Vernon Bourke, *History of Ethics*, Garden City, (New York: Doubleday/Image), I, 9-126. The Italian equivalent of "humanism", related to the root of *umanita* and *umano*, already carries the moral notions of kindness, friendliness, and love of humankind.

2. Roderick Hindery, "Muslim and Christian Ethics", CROSS CURRENTS XXII, 4 (Winter, 1973), 381-397.

Islām's ethos in terms of life – and world-affirmation (a construct whose most immediate stimulus in my case was the thought of Nietzsche, Scheler, Schweitzer, and Marcuse). From Islāmic sources I built a position that the professed ideals, if not always the actual performance, of Islāmic believers stood in contrast with Christian and Brahminic other-worldliness. Abstracting from the concrete and widespread practice of those who became fear – (*taqwā*) and fate-ridden or hashish – and *taqlīd* (tradition) – ridden, bracketing these and other abuses criticized by Muslims themselves, aspirations of Islām seemed more positive toward this secular world, taken as such. Most affirmative was the Islāmic assent to power, action, social organization, and law (*shari'ah*) — and to other human values like justice, love, pleasure, and wealth. Signs of respect for autonomous reason, for vicegerency (i.e. responsibility), and for free and individual conscience coexisted with a sense of self discipline, altruistic social-mindedness, sharing (*zakāt*), racial equality, and economic fairness (no usury). In Islām the nomadic virtues of courage, loyalty, and generosity came alive.

Although I was confused by Islām's seemingly life-denying commitment to empire by way of holy war (*jihād*), troubled by what Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) described as Islām's religious obligation to world sovereignty³ "either by persuasion or by force,"⁴ I conjectured that a discussion of that issue would be more profitably deferred for the future.⁵ Even from the most critical viewpoint, it was hardly clear that Muslim conquests were uniquely out of line when compared with the military and economic power commanded by previous and other empires and by present military-industrial complexes. The issue seemed to concern a theoretical attitude for the future more than judgments about past performance.

Lastly, I felt that the ethos of Islāmic life-affirmation was most closely specified when it was contrasted with the pervading consciousness of original sin, sinfulness in general, and with other

3. See Charles Issawi, trans., *An Arab Philosophy of History: Selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun of Tunis (1332-1406)* (London: John Murray, 1950), p. 137.

4. Ibid., 136. "Now in the Muslim religion, which is all-inclusive in its appeal and seeks to convert all by persuasion or by force, the Jihad (Holy War) against infidels is obligatory. Hence, in (p. 137) Islam, Caliphate and Kingship are enjoined in order to unite all efforts toward a common end. The appeal of religions other than Islam, on the contrary, is not all-inclusive, nor is Holy War permissible for their adherents except in self-defense ... their religion as such, however, does not impose any sovereignty on them seeing that it does not demand of the dominion over other peoples, as is the case with Islam, but merely the establishing of their faith among themselves ..." (from Vol. I, p. 415).

5. For similar views on *jihad* see Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955) and Dwight M. Donaldson, *Studies in Muslim Ethics* (London SPCK, 1953).

Manichaeism and negatively foreign elements within Christianity.

Subsequently, I have seen the humanistic argument of Muḥammad Kāmil Ḥusayn: dread of evil-doing is not extrinsic to Christianity at all. As an unwarranted apprehension, guilt is endemic to Christianity. It stems from the immoral, tragic, and still unconfessed failure of the followers of Jesus to prevent his execution. Soteriological confidence in Christ's expiatory death merely veiled a repressed self-reproach.⁶ In a more verifiable and demythologized form, Ḥusayn's evaluation was extended by Muḥammad Agha Khān (d. 1957).⁷ Broadened beyond Christianity to humanity at large and bolstered by historical and psychological evidence, it became a humanistic challenge in the widest sense: does not the Nazi-like, Wagnerian death-wish for self-accusation and self-destruction threaten every human individual and collectivity? Should this failure of nerve not be met with the humanistic "great refusal" and transposed into a positive and unequivocal will to life and to survival?

In the humanistic process of seeking the Islāmic view about the sources which inspire human beings toward authentic life-affirmation, three further humanistic questions arise — two only to be listed here, the final one to be summarized as a conclusion to my observations. Their answers would encapsulate a humanistic program both by and for the abode of Islām and the world beyond.

Question one. Since the ethos of life-affirmation rises and falls in concrete issues, where does one go to hear Islāmic messages about the burning social issues of our times, like structural and military violence, authoritarianism, propaganda, overpopulation, economic exploitation and inequitable distribution of goods?

Question two. Who speaks for Islām? Who interprets and applies the Qur'ān and the Sunnah to contemporary problems? Only Sunnīs? Or the consensus (*ijmā'*) of Sunnī scholars or interpreters of the *shar'īah*? Or also Shī'īs, Ṣūfīs, Muslim peoples in general, — or some plurality of these and other groups? Is there a normative synthesis other than the morally passive one of al Ghazālī?⁸

The third and concluding question. In other cultures one finds, in addition to revealed or formal literatures, magnificent popular classics which sound the dominant pulse of a civilization. If the voices of the

6. Excerpts from Ḥusayn's novel on the passion of Christ. *The Unjust City (Qaryah Zālimah)* are trans. by Kenneth Cragg (into English) in James Kritzeck (ed.), *Modern Islamic Literature from 1800 to the Present* (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 270-75. See esp. p. 274.

7. See Khān in *ibid.*, p. 253.

8. See Donaldson, *Studies in Muslim Ethics*, pp. 134-65 and Bourke, *History of Ethics I*, 115.

people are not to be wholly excluded, barred from speaking for humanism if not also for Islām, who are their heroes? And what classical and modern poets and literary artists have expressed popular aspirations in the most universally communicable terms? Even with the help of standard non-Arabic anthologies and histories,⁹ one cannot determine if the list would include, for example, the classical ghazals of Jamīl (d. 701 C.E.) or the troubadour poetry judged humanistically problematic by Arthur J. Arberry and Denis de Rougement.¹⁰ Are there perhaps clearer classical affirmations of life and love to be found in al Jāhiz (d. 869)¹¹, in al Mutanabbī (d. 965), in al Harīrī's (d. 1122) *Maqāmāt*, in the popular *Romance of 'Antar*,¹² or in that masterpiece which is also a treasury of Islāmic folklore, *Alf Laylah wa Laylah* (*A thousand and One Nights*)?¹³

The modern period should not be neglected for the classical. Its annual production is quantitatively greater than that of several previous centuries and it is more widely representative of Arabic peoples. What other modern philosopher-poets speak of life, individuality; and sharing as eloquently as Iqbāl¹⁴ or Gibrān?¹⁵ What other folklore, what

9. Besides Kritzeck's collection one may confer other references or selections in 1) Charles J. Adams, "Islam", in Adams', *A Reader's Guide to the Great Religions* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 287-325; 2) C.G. Campbell, trans. and ed., *From Town and Tribe, and Told in the Market Place* (see Kritzeck, *Modern Islamic Literature*, pp. 202-25; 3) H.A.R. Gibb, *Arabic Literature: An Introduction* (2nd rev. ed.; Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1963); 4) Ignace Goldziher (1850-1921), *A Short History of Classical Arabic Literature*, trans. and rev. by Joseph Desomogyi (Hildesheim; George Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966); 5) Mounah Kouri and Hamid Algar, (ed. and trans.) *An Anthology of Modern Arabic Poetry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); 6) Reynold A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs* (Cambridge University Press, 1930, 1941); 7) Annemarie Schimmel, *Islamic Literatures* in Jan M. Gonda's, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. VII (Wiesbaden: Otto Harassowitz, 1973); and 8) articles in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, New Edition: "Alf Layla wa-Layla", I, 358-64; "Arabiyya", ("Arabic Language and Literature") I, 561-603; "al Andalus", I, 486-503; and "Ibn Hazm", III, 790-99.

10. For Arberry's view see his trans. of Ibn Ḥazm's *The Ring of the Dove* (London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1953), p. 12.

11. See his *The Book of Animals* (*Kitāb al Ḥayawān*) (Engl. trans.).

12. Composed at the time of the crusades. *Siratu 'Antar* was trans. from the Syriac version by T. Hamilton as *Antar, A Bedouen Romance* (London: 1820).

13. Period of composition, c. 11-15th centuries; see Goldziher, *A Short History*, p. 92. Complete English trans. by J. Payne, 13 vols., London, 1882-89. Selections trans. by A.J. Arberry, *Scheherezāde, Tales from the Thousand and One Nights* (New York: Mentor/New American Library, 1955).

14. See esp. Muḥammad Iqbāl's *The Mysteries of Selflessness* (Rumuz-i Bekhudi) by A.J. Arberry (London: John Murray, 1953); *The Secrets of the Self* (Asrār-e Khudī), trans. R.A. Nicholson (London: Macmillan, 1920); and *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore, Ashraf; reprinted 1954).

15. Khalīl Gibrān, *The Prophet* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).

theatre,¹⁶ what fiction, what *adab*, are sources of humanistic inspiration in these times when neither rational persuasion nor force seems adequate, nor religious faith widely visible? In short, if *īmān* or faith can condition the humanization only of believers, what besides the Qur'ān and the Sunnah are the humanistic sources within Islām which might galvanize the rest of humankind in whom religious faith is either anonymous or absent?

Assume that the unique power of Arabic poetry and language is not circumscribed to the literal word, but extends to the symbol, in *adab* as well as in more religiously formal literature. Assume in turn that it is concrete symbols and models which, as Scheler contended, are humanism's best last hope for human transformation. It would follow, then, that the location and universal communication of these symbols in Islām is a most promising and challenging adventure for the future.

16. Tawfīq al Ḥakīm, *Theatre Arabe* (Paris, 1950).

11a. Trans. in 1867 by T. Chenery as *The Assemblies of al Harīrī* (see Nicholson, p. 328) (London, 1867); and see Fr. Dieterici's edition of Mutanabbī (Berlin, 1858-1861), no further data in Nicholson.

THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF THE CRUSADES BY TWELFTH CENTURY CHRISTIANS

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The towering scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages — Peter Lombard, Aquinas, Bonaventure — seem not to have thought it a part of their duty to deal with the legitimacy or illegitimacy of crusading. Is this a silence that gives consent to the theological grounds on which those wars were launched?

Since the Crusades are held by most modern Christians to have been a scandal, their absence from *Sentence* commentaries and *Summae* can be disturbing to us. One says 'modern' inadvertently; here is the way a 19th century Christian historian of the first rank saw the *casus belli* of the First Crusade:

...The Council of Clermont remains famous for having given impetus to the great movement of the Crusades. It is no surprise if those who do not believe in the historical Christ have adjudged those expeditions a folly, a deplorable instance of rapture, or even a means contrived by popes to extend their domination. Today, as eight hundred years ago, every Christian worthy of the name feels a profound anguish over the loss of the Holy Land and the Musulman domination that weighs upon towns sanctified by the presence of the Saviour...¹

Hefele, the author of these lines, was corrected by his 20th century editor:

1. Karl Josef von Hefele (1809-1893) inaugurated a monumental collection of conciliar documents on which he commented freely; this work is available in a French translation improved and extended by Dom Henri Leclercq O.S.B. as *Histoire des conciles d'après les documents originaux* (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1907-1921) 16 vols.; passage cited is to be found Vol. 5, partie 1, p. 406.

This is one point of view; is it that of the historian? A movement, a whirlwind comparable to that which shook Europe periodically for almost two centuries — Is it traceable to the respectable and limited preoccupation that the author assigns to it? The matter must be taken from a more elevated perspective...²

Finally, John Oesterreicher, a *peritus* at Vatican II, writes:

...Crusaders' mentality, a mentality contrary to the gospel and the spirit of the Second Vatican Council...³

This hiatus in the writings of the major theologians of that time must be disturbing in another way to the Muslims of our day, religious and cultural descendants as they are of those against whom the Crusades were directed. Nor can we forget the descendants of those victims of incidental crusading indiscipline: the Jews of towns on the crusaders' routes, the Jewish community of Jerusalem itself, and the Byzantines, in theory if not always in practice, the allies of the Western knights.

Thomas Aquinas, above all others, might have been expected to deal with crusading in his great *Summa theologiae*. For his elder brother Aimone had joined the Crusade of his feudal overlord, the Emperor Frederick II; in 1232 Aimone was captured — by Christians — on Cyprus, held for ransom, and was redeemed at the instance of the reigning Pope, Gregory IX, in 1233.⁴ Thenceforth Aimone and another brother, the troubadour Raynaldus, supported the popes against the Emperor. Raynaldus was to pay with his life for the family's shift of allegiance.⁵ In addition to these family reasons for an interest in crusading, Brother Thomas undertook as a mature scholar, a study of kingship for the benefit of the Latin King of Cyprus, who may be identified with considerable plausibility as Hugh II of Lusignan.⁶

Yet a search of the *Summa theologiae* discloses not a single article and much less a whole question devoted to this issue that seems to us so worthy of scrutiny. The single reference to crusading that I can cite from

2. Ibidem, p. 406, n. 2 (note is signed 'H.L.').

3. *Jerusalem* (New York: The John Day Co., 1974), p. 257.

4. See letter from the Pope to the Patriarch of Antioch enlisting his intervention with the King of Cyprus for the release of Aimone: *Fontes vitae sancti Thomae Aquinatis* (Toulouse, first published as supplements to *Revue Thomiste* 1911-1934, edited by M. -H. Laurent O.P.) fasc. VI. *Documenta*, V., p. 537.

5. The death of Raynaldus by execution, apparently after torture, and the family tradition that he was a martyr is included by the biographers of Thomas Aquinas: Peter Calo, cap. 20, *Fontes* p. 40, Bernard of Gui, cap. 21, ibidem p. 188, William of Tocco, cap. 37, ibidem pp. 110-111 and cap. 42, ibidem pp. 114-116, Bartholomew of Capua, *Canonization Inquiry* testimony no. LXXVIII, ibidem p. 375.

6. *St. Thomas Aquinas on Kingship to the King of Cyprus*, tr. G. B. Phelan, revised by I. Th. Eschmann O.P. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp. xxvi-xxx.

that immense work takes for granted the legitimacy of crusades. In the course of asserting the Christian propriety of the military monastic order, Knights Templar, Knights of the Hospital, Thomas defended their right to exist on the ground that the Church was accustomed to impose upon penitents the obligation of 'campaigning in aid of the Holy Land,' *ut militent in subsidium Terrae Sanctae*.⁷ In one quodlibetal question.⁸ Aquinas provided us with hard-nosed reasons for holding that it is spiritually preferable to die on the return from a crusade, with all vows fulfilled, than to die on the way out — *caeteris paribus*, well understood.

But not all theological writing in the Middle Ages was in the form of school texts such as the *Summae* and *Quaestiones quodlibetales*. A culture in which the characteristic academic writing is the disputed question will not surprise us by the mass of polemical writing it produced on the issues of the day. If in the green wood of school or university the adversary situation of *opponens* and *respondens* seemed normal, what should we expect in the dry wood of public life and on an issue that was literally one of life and death?

For to go on a crusade was to put one's life in jeopardy from brigands and from Byzantine military police, from feuding fellow-crusaders, and from formidable Saracen armies; hunger, fatigue, thirst, exposure — all were the inevitable consequences of distant campaigning. Mediaeval society, even in times of peace, lived on the edge of subsistence; and mediaeval transport arrangements could hardly guarantee the long supply lines. Beyond the jeopardy of the individual crusader, the safety of Latin society itself seemed to be at stake. Were the Crusades not, in the end, 'defensive wars' against the perennial threat from the East, one long moment in the military and cultural dialectic that begins at least as long ago as the Greek-Persian wars? Without adopting the sweeping over-views of, say, Christopher Dawson or Arnold Toynbee, we may profit from a perspective that puts the crusades into the setting of East-West rivalry. Until Western technology began to overtake that of the Islāmic East in the 16th and 17th centuries, the outcome of a test of arms between them was always in doubt. We shall do well to remember that Islāmic armies threatened Vienna in 1529 and in 1683, that as late as the period 1801-1804 the Muslim states of the Mediterranean — Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia, and Tripoli — could challenge the new United States of America in a naval war provoked by demands for ransom and for safe-conducts that absorbed one fifth of America's national revenues.⁹

7. *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 188, a. 3, ad. 3.

8. *Quaestiones quodlibetales* 5, q. 7, a. 14; Paris ed., vol. 15, p. 471.

9. This astonishing statistic is given by Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Oxford History of the American People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 363.

the reports of chroniclers, reinforced by what became conventional preaching themes, allow us to conclude that the First Crusade was proposed by the Pope as a fraternal duty to rescue the Christians of the East from the Seljuk Turks and this despite the mutual excommunications of Pope and Patriarch in 1054. To this fraternal duty was added the motivation of a literalistic reading of the gospel injunction to 'take up the cross' (Mtt. 10:38; 16:24; Lk. 14:27) under pain of being found unworthy of Messiah — hence the wearing of a cloth, cross on the shoulder by crusaders. The first such crosses were distributed by Pope Urban himself. But more impelling yet was the crusade indulgence, proclaimed to replace any penance that might have been imposed. Whether this indulgence had to do with the remission of the guilt of sin or with the remission of the penalties due to sin is by no means clear and, given the audience, likely irrelevant.¹⁴ Abelard was to be a dedicated opponent of the crusade indulgence on the ground that there can be no equivalence in indulgences, although, traditionally, there could be equivalence in alternative penances. Yet no one distinguished more clearly than Abelard between the guilt of sin (*culpa*) and the penalty (*poena*) due to sin. The theologians and canonists of the 13th century would work out a theory of the Church's 'Treasury of Merits' that meets Abelard's challenge; but it is a case of theory coming to terms with practice, for Urban himself in his letter to the Flemings late in 1095 had used the ambiguous expression *remissio peccatorum* — remission of sin, or of the penalties due to sin? — rather than the circumspect formulation of the Council of Clermont in its second canon:

Whoever shall have gone forth to Jerusalem out of devotion alone, not for the sake of gaining honor or money, in order to liberate the Church of God, for him that pilgrimage will be considered to be a substitute for every penance.¹⁵

To these properly theological attractions must be added various economic and social guarantees, for the goods and families of those absent on the crusade: All came under the protection of the Church. Popes were to continue the preaching of Urban for five hundred years, but not all Christians responded with alacrity. Laymen, especially those in high places, easily found reasons to resist the papal summons; some few clergy protested in the name of Christian ideals. Theologically grounded protests by clergy and the equally theological reasons of the

14. Mayer, *op. cit.* p. 25 sqq.

15. Quicumque pro sola devotione, non pro honoris vel pecuniae adeptione, ad liberandam ecclesiam Dei Ierusalem profectus fuerit, iter illud pro omni poenitentia reputetur. See Mayer, p. 32, footnote: Quicumque pro sola devotione, non pro honoris vel pecuniae adeptione, ad liberandam ecclesiam Dei Ierusalem profectus fuerit, iter illud pro omni poenitentia reputetur.

Not all anti-Crusade writing by mediaeval Christian theologians is a matter of individual polemic. Gregory X, Pope from 1272 until 1276, solicited reports in preparation for the Second Council of Lyons (1274) and one item on the agenda of that Council was the Crusade. Material submitted in response to this papal request is so abundant that it has furnished the documentation for an important study on the growth and influence of public opinion; it is so generally negative that the modern scholar who has studied it, P. A. Throop, called his work: *Criticism of the Crusade*.¹⁰ Today it is not inappropriate to mention that Brother Thomas Aquinas was on his way to the Second Council of Lyons when death overtook him at Fossanova.

Hence, although a prejudice endemic to our guild might lead us to assume that if adverse views on the Crusades were serious they must show up in texts begotten by school and university teaching, the precise contrary seems to have been the case. In the 12th and 13th centuries, as in our own, the lecture hall was closed to all but students and they had preoccupations other than those of public policy. Where academics such as Peter Abelard or Gilbert of Poitiers could move their students, Bernard of Clairvaux moved Pope and King, raised armies from all classes of the population and, to his undying credit, intervened effectively to stop anti-Jewish rioting in the Rhineland towns by crusaders on their way to the East.¹¹ Is it necessary to say that Bernard invoked, as Urban II had done, motives that can only be termed 'theological' when he spoke out for the crusade? A world in which learning and literacy were primarily in the hands of clerics spoke the language of theology whether the spokesmen were academically qualified theologians or not.¹²

The First Crusade

As is well known, the precise words of Urban II at Clermont where he raised the First Crusade in the fall of 1095 are not accessible to us.¹³ But

10. P. A. Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda* (Amsterdam: 1940).

11. For Saint Bernard's defense of Jews during the Second Crusade see my *The Popes and the Jews in the Middle Ages* (New York: MacMillan, 1965), pp. 74-79.

12. Bernard, for instance, did not qualify in the estimate of Bonaventure as notably well-qualified: Unde beatus Bernardus parum sciebat, sed quia in Scriptura multum studuit, ideo locutus est elegantissime — his achievements were rhetorical rather than theological and this thanks to his immersion in the Bible; In Hexaëmeron 19, 8; *Opera Omnia* (Quaracchi, PP Collegii a S. Bonaventura, 1882-1902), vol. 5, p. 421.

13. The classic essay on this problem is that of D.C. Munro, 'The Speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont,' *American Historical Review*, 11 (1906), 231 sqq. but see also: H. E. J. Cowdrey, 'Pope Urban II's Preaching of the First Crusade,' *History*, 55 (1970), 177 sqq. and the critique of this by H. E. Mayer, *The Crusades*, tr. J. Gillingham (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 290, n. 6.

popes and their supporters that those dissidents attacked are the issues with which we shall be concerned.

A motive of the first order that is difficult to fit into a category is the magnetic attraction of Jerusalem. Ought this to be classified as 'theological' or as an instance of merely popular religious psychology? The aspiration formulated in the Passover liturgy of the Jews, 'Next year in Jerusalem!',¹⁶ spoke to Christians as well as to Jews and if Christians were fond of 'spiritualizing' the Holy City and its implications, to go on pilgrimage to the geographical Jerusalem was an ancient Christian custom. Historians have raised the question of whether Urban II intended his crusade primarily to aid the Greek Church or to capture Jerusalem.¹⁷ Although Jerusalem is mentioned in the second canon of Clermont cited above, the account of Urban's great oration closest to the event (that of Fulcher of Chartres) does not mention the Holy City. Against this, Urban himself did name Jerusalem in his letter to the Flemings before the year 1095 was out and by October 1096, not quite a year after Clermont, the capture of the Holy City is the explicit objective of the campaign. Was there a shift of emphasis by the Pope and, if there was, has it importance? As to the fact there is no probability that we shall ever have conclusive evidence as to whether Urban did or did not propose at Clermont the capture of Jerusalem as the goal of his crusade. With regard to the importance that might be attached to this, it seems right to think the point one of minimal significance. Bracketed by the explicit mention in the second canon and by those in the Pope's letters less than a year later, a failure to name the Holy City in Urban's oration would carry little weight.

In any case, the theological or quasi-theological motivations proposed at the time of the First Crusade seem to have been received with universal enthusiasm. Even a historian who doubts that Urban 'made much of Jerusalem while at Clermont'¹⁸ speaks of 'the explosive force' of the crusading indulgence when 'linked with the universally popular idea of pilgrimage to Jerusalem.'¹⁹ One source of disclaimers against the legitimacy of crusades is that of chronicles, but the First Crusade was successful as no other was to be; to find anti-crusade writing in the chronicles, those of the Second Crusade must be consulted.

The Second Crusade

The *Würzburg Annals* for 1147 inform us that:

The Western Church God permitted to be afflicted as its sins

16. This cry of hope ends the Passover Seder proper.

17. H. E. Mayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 11-15, 28-31.

18. *Ibidem* p. 11.

19. *Ibidem* p. 39.

required. For certain false prophets, sons of Belial, witnesses of anti-Christ, misguided and seduced Christians with empty words and by vain preaching compelled the whole human race to go forth against the Saracens for the liberation of Jerusalem...²⁰

Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux was the moving spirit behind the Second Crusade, acting through a former monk of his own monastery, Pope Eugene III, and the Würzburg chronicler did not fail to say so:

...the Lord Eugene, pontiff of the Roman See, by what hidden means I do not know, moved by Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, wrote to the Most Pious Prince Conrad of the Romans and of the whole Empire, to the King of France as well, to the King of England, and finally to all the Kings of Christian Faith and religion and to all the nobles and subjects of those Kings, and by writing admonished them to get ready for this pilgrimage, granting and permitting an indulgence from sins to all universally by authority of the apostolate granted to him by God...²¹

Gerhoch of Reichersberg was less a chronicler than a commentator on the events of his time. His account of the Second Crusade proceeds under the rubric: 'On that totally calamitous expedition to Jerusalem that avarice advised.' After recounting the calamities that befell both the German and the French divisions of the army, the treachery of the French and of the knights from the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem at the siege of Damascus, Gerhoch ended with an apostrophe against the earthly Jerusalem:

Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who once killed the prophets and stoned them who had been sent to you (Mtt. 23: 37-39; Lk. 13: 34-35), what did you have in mind that should add new murders to old, this time of Christians, unless it be that by doing these things you might fill up the half-measure of your fathers with the blood of Christians!²²

20. MGH SS XVI, 3: Occidentem, exigentibus peccatis, Deus affligi permisit ecclesiam. Etenim perrexerunt quidam pseudoprophete, filii Belial, testes antichristi, qui inanibus verbis christianos seducerent, et pro Iherosolimorum liberatione omne genus hominum contra Sarracenos ire vana predicatione compellerent.

21. Ibidem: ...domnus Eugenius Romane sedis pontifex, innitente Clarevallensi abbate Bernhardo permotus, piissimo Romanorum principi Cunrado et omni imperio, regi quoque Francie, regi Anglie, universis demum christiane fidei ac religionis regibus regumque optimatibus ac subditis scriberet, scribendo ad hoc iter paratos esse debere admoneret, indulgentiam peccatorum auctoritate apostolatus sibi a Deo concessi omnibus in commune dans et permittens...

22. MGH Libelli de lite III, 374: De expeditione illa Ierosolimitana tota calamitosa, quam avaricia suasit; ibidem 377: Jerusalem, Jerusalem, que occidisti olim prophetas et lapidasti eos, qui ad te missi fuerant, quid tibi visum est, ut nova christianorum homicidia veteribus adderes, nisi ut ista faciendo mensuram patrum tuorum semiplenam christianorum sanguine impleres!

Bernard himself, of course, having managed to raise the crusade was not at a loss to explain why it had turned out badly:

...the Lord, provoked by our sins, seems in some sense to have judged the world before its time, in equity to be sure, but forgetful of His mercy. He has not spared His people, nor has He spared His Name, for do not they say among the gentiles: 'Where is their God?' (Ps. 113 (115): 2).²³

The Third Crusade

Midway between the somewhat casual reasonings for and against crusading occasioned by the First and Second of those wars and the heavily systematized responses to the inquiry of Gregory X in the second half of the 13th century is the work of the English Master in Arts, Ralph Niger, *De re militari*. Written about 1189, that is, two years after the fall of Jerusalem, this treatise coincides with the recruiting for the Third Crusade and is a lonely voice raised against that project. G.B. Flahiff, to whom we owe a study and the edition of relevant passages from this extensive work,²⁴ has noted four points urged by Ralph against undertaking such a war. The first of these reasons was that heresy in Europe constituted a greater threat to the Faith than did the loss of the earthly Jerusalem in Palestine:

For what fruit if the terrestrial Jerusalem be built us and our mother Zion meanwhile dissipated, if Palestine be liberated from the Saracens and the mischief of disbelief meanwhile flourish at home, and while disbelief is attacked abroad, the purity of Faith be trodden underfoot and made a fool of at home?²⁵

The 'disbelief' to which Ralph made reference was the *haeresis Manichaeorum*, the Albigensian movement, spread westward from the Balkans largely by the Second Crusade and destined to be the target of the sanguinary domestic 'crusade' of which Simon de Montfort was the military commander.²⁶

23. *De consideratione* 2, 1; PL 182 742 C: ... Dominus provocatus peccatis nostris, ante tempus quodammodo visus sit iudicasse orbem terrae, in aequitate quidem, sed misericordiae suae oblitus. Non pepercit populo suo, non suo nomini. Nonne dicunt in gentibus, *Ubi est Deus eorum?* (Psal. CXIII, 2).

24. G. B. Flahiff, C.S.B. '*Deus Non Vult: A Critic of the Third Crusade,*' *Mediaeval Studies* 9 (1947), 162-188; this followed an earlier article by the same author, Ralph Niger. 'An Introduction to his Life and Works,' *Mediaeval Studies* 2 (1940), 104-126; all subsequent references are to the 1947 publication.

25. Flahiff, op. cit., p. 180:11 *Majori esse periculo haeresis quam dampna Palestinae. Quis enim fructus si Ierusalima terrestris aedificetur et mater nostra Syon interim dissipetur, si Palestina a Sarracenis liberetur et malitia infidelitatis interim domi grassatur, et dum infidelitas foris expugnatur domi puritas fidei conculcetur et infatuetur?*

26. See Mayer, op. cit., p. 202.

A second reason for hesitating, as Ralph read the signs of his times, was the imprudence of a Crusade in Palestine from the point of view both of the Christian inhabitants and of the Saracens living there. As for the Christians of Palestine, their moral turpitude had become proverbial, beginning with the wealth and luxury of the Patriarch himself who had come begging in the West for help against the Muslims, but who was unwilling to 'raise a finger or to use any of his heaped-up wealth' against them.²⁷ The sins of the Latin Kingdom, not excluding the sin of treacherous dealings with the common enemy, even to the point of delivering Western crusaders into their hands, had merited the loss of the Holy Places. Besides, Palestine was a place of refuge for Western criminals; it swarmed with fugitives from justice. The only element in the population of the Latin Kingdom for whom Ralph had good words were the military orders.²⁸ In short, Ralph's reasoning ran: like the Jewish people, upon whom God had visited due punishments in order that they might do penance, the Christians of Palestine deserved their calamities.²⁹

A consideration of the Saracens themselves led Ralph to the same negative conclusion on the legitimacy of crusading. They are in possession and perhaps, like Edom and Moab and Amon, whom the Lord protected against the sword of the Israelites, the safety of the Saracens may be God's will, for 'The earth and its fulness is the Lord's' (Ps. 23 (24): 1) 'To whomsoever He wishes He gives it, or takes it away, or permits him to possess it,' *cui vult eam donat vel aufert vel habere permittit*.³⁰ In a striking anticipation of Francis of Assisi,³¹ Ralph recommended that Saracens be 'struck with the sword of the Word that they might come to the Faith voluntarily,' for whoever seeks to propagate the Faith through violence goes beyond the discipline of the Faith.³² Besides, God does not desire the death of any sinner; Saracens are men like ourselves — at most, it is legitimate to repel their attacks, but even then due moderation ought to be observed.³³

27. Flahiff ed., p. 179: et digito suo neque divitiarum cumulo volebant ei obviare...

28. Ibidem p. 181: Non sugillo Christi milites Templi neque fideles Hospitalarios sed vulgus et procures terrae... Bernard too the same benign attitude toward the military orders; see his *Liber ad milites Templi ad laudem novae militiae, Sancti Bernardi Opera*, ed. J. Leclercq, H.M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963) vol. 3, p. 213 ff.

29. Ibidem p. 181, VI, for the criminal elements from the West, and VII, for the parallel with the punishment of the sins of the Jews.

30. Ibidem p. 182, X.

31. Ibidem p. 182, XI; see also discussion by editor p. 171, n. 41.

32. Ibidem p. 182, XI: Quicumque ergo per violentiam fidem propagare quaerit disciplinam fidei excedit.

33. Ibidem: ... utique repellendi sunt et expellendi a possessione nostra quia vim vi repellere omnia jura permittunt, verumtamen cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae ne medicina modum excedat.

Third, the difficulties and dangers entailed make the project unwise. Despite his honorable allies, the wicked King Achab was misled by false prophets into campaigning that God did not bless; as we have read from the pen of the Wurzburg chronicler, 'false prophets,' *pseudoprophete*, had been held accountable for the disastrous Second Crusade, Saint Bernard chief among them. Apart from this dubiety, that under-cuts the whole crusade enterprise, there is the danger to souls on the way. Here too Ralph found a parallel in the Hebrew Scriptures. Only Joshua and Caleb from among so many who had come out of Egypt survived the perils of the desert and entered into the Land of Promise.³⁴ Ralph uses here some phrases that suggest a prevalence of demons in desert places and of malign planetary influences in unaccustomed climes.³⁵

Ralph's fourth point has to do with those who might be allowed to join a crusade and those for whom such an adventure is totally illegitimate. First among those to whom crusading is forbidden are clerics; for one thing, they are useless and for another, they are a positive impediment in that they consume supplies that are rarely abundant.³⁶ As for women, Ralph conceded some force to the argument that without them a conquered land cannot be repopulated; better to wait until the conquest has succeeded and the land is at peace.³⁷ The poor too, by definition incapable of arming themselves or of providing for their own sustenance, are a hindrance and ought to stay at home.³⁸ Still, young ones, though poor, might make themselves useful, thanks to their nimbleness, courage, and speed, as messengers and porters as well as sentinels.³⁹ What of the old and retired knights? They lend an expedition honor and sometimes advice but, Ralph thought, not much else; on balance, they are less useful than the young⁴⁰ and the conclusion that they ought to stay home must have seemed too obvious for Ralph to draw it explicitly.

Clearly Ralph knew that men would go on the crusade no matter what he might write against it and having done what he could to limit the evil by excluding the more evident misfits, listed those who might be

34. Ibidem p. 184, XVI.

35. Ibidem p. 184, XVII: *Maligni spiritus om omni via hominum insidias suas tendunt.. si enim qualibet unius terrae vel parva regione qualitates aeris minus vel plus sanativi variantur, quante magis, occurrent plura pericula transituris per multa orbis climata in quibus planetae per loca diversa et tempora aerem mitius aut malitiosius distemperant.*

36. Ibidem, p. 185, XXI.

37. Ibidem p. 187, XXVI.

38. Ibidem p. 187, XXVII.

39. Ibidem p. 188: *Expeditos utique juvenes, licet pauperes, utiles fieri posse aestimem ... expediti et alacres et audaces ad onera praevalent, et ad excubias faciendas, ad bajulandum ignem et aquam et al discurrendum et ad custodias et ad alias indigentias.*

40. Ibidem p. 188, XXVIII.

useful. The task is essentially one for knights — *quod praecipue facere possit militaris conditio*⁴¹ — ‘what the military caste is especially capable of doing,’ but he included a limited number of military chaplains for hearing confessions and celebrating the liturgy.⁴² To these he would add here and there a bishop or an archbishop, provided such a prelate could justify his crusading in terms of going into the desert for one sheep while ninety-nine remain at home.⁴³

All this, of course, seems contrary to the papal promotion of crusades and Ralph was well aware of this. For had the Pope not urged the crusade upon both cleric and layman for the sake of the remission of sins? Ralph did not wish to contravene the papal judgment: *De illius iudicio disputare non praesumo*.⁴⁴ Still, he wrote, equity and justice limit the scope of even the vicar of God upon earth; sin must be rejected first, penance and satisfaction made, ‘and,’ he added, ‘perhaps the shedding of blood is not a suitable satisfaction, least of all, the shedding of human blood, nor does a journey help or correspond to any sin from the point of view of satisfaction.’⁴⁵ He did not wish to deny that the work of pilgrimage might be able to satisfy for penance — not for sin! — but he did not think it a panacea any more than he thought one key opens all locks.⁴⁶ The papal mandate must be understood correctly: *Est enim mandatum apostolicum sane intelligendum*...⁴⁷

Men of the 20th century, who have twice entered into global wars for ‘democracy,’ ‘freedom,’ or for a ‘new order’ are in a privileged position for estimating the dynamics of transcendental ideals in human affairs. True enough, the men of the Middle Ages would have been as bewildered by 20th century esteem for parliaments, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, or for a thousand year Aryan Reich as would our Nazis or Communists or liberals by indulgences, pilgrimages, clerical exemptions, and papal authority. What we have in common with our mediaeval ancestors is the capacity to be moved to periodic and terrible

41. Ibidem p. 167, n. 23.

42. Ibidem p. 185, XX: ...non est opus in expeditione nisi quatenus ad animarum consilia danda spectat in confessione et in officii divini celebratione...

43. Ibidem p. 186, XXII: Archiepiscoporum et episcoporum peregrinationem non accuso, si tamen eorum tam foris utilior fuerit quam domi... nonaginta novem oves deserit in deserto... cum una tantum ove...

44. Ibidem p. 183, XII.

45. Ibidem; the meaning of his assertion that a journey neither helps nor corresponds to any sin as satisfaction seems to refer to the correspondence between theft and the restitutions of stolen goods: to what in that sense does making a pilgrimage correspond? See also ibidem p. 185, XIX.

46. Ibidem p. 185, XIX:... aestimo unam clavem ad omnis serrae reserrationem non sufficere...

47. Ibidem p. 185, XIX.

violence by visions no human eye can see, for those ideals move on the planes of what is highest or lowest in us: on one level, our courage and self-sacrifice and fraternity, on another, our greed, self-indulgence, our fears. A voice such as that of Ralph Niger reconciles us to a society that launched crusades. Whatever we may make of his reasons, Ralph spoke out against his whole world at the very moment when the Third Crusade was gathering. For the first time, so far as we know, a Latin Christian produced a reasoned statement of why the 'God wills it' of 1095 was at least open to question and might, perhaps, require the re-formulation G.B. Flahiff has suggested: 'God does not will it,' *Deus non vult*.

“THE VALUE OF ṢŪFISM TO ISLĀM: A VIEW FROM THE OUTSIDE”

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Some may say that the value of ṢŪfism to Islām is obvious. Since ṢŪfī masters are exceptional persons who are irradiated by the divine light, they are the ones who most fully understand the Qur’ān and in their lives most perfectly exemplify the Islāmic way. They and their disciples constitute the very heart of Islām.

This may very well be true but it is not obvious, especially to one who stands outside the Muslim community. The non-Muslim does not know Islām from within and cannot judge whether ṢŪfism constitutes its heart. If the outsider is to assess the value of ṢŪfism he must make a more indirect approach.

I shall, therefore, ask about function. What role does ṢŪfism, the mystical dimension, play in the general pattern of Islāmic spiritual life? What distinctive contributions does it make to those who are not mystical adepts? What benefits does this essentially inward and private realm of experience confer upon Islām as a public, visible system of beliefs, laws, and observances? These are matters which an outsider should be able to assess to some degree.

As a point of departure, let us consider this poem by al Junayd of Baghdād (d. 210/910), whom Arberry calls “the most original and penetrating intellect among the ṢŪfīs of his time.” (A.J. Arberry, *Sufism* (New York: Harper Torchbooks), pp. 56-7.

Now I have known, O Lord,
What lies in my heart;
In secret, from the world apart,
My tongue hath talked with my Adored.
So in a manner we
United are, and One;

Yet otherwise disunion
Is our estate eternally.

Though from my gaze profound
Deep awe hath hid Thy Face,
In wondrous and ecstatic Grace
I feel Thee touch my inmost ground.

The basic themes of Ṣūfism are stated or suggested here: the inwardness of the relation to God, the deep individuality or the encounter, the intimacy of the relation, the ineffability of what is revealed, the union between the divine and the human during the mystic moment, the painful separation when the moment is past, the sense of awe-wonder-ecstasy, the feeling of groundedness and spiritual assurance. If we reflect upon these qualities of Ṣūfī mystical experience, we shall be in a position to begin to understand in a small way why Ṣūfism is precious to Islām.

1. Divine Mystery and Majesty

Notice first the reference to awe, which the poem says hides the divine face. The true mystic is continually in awe before God, aware that he cannot comprehend God's immensity, cannot cross the gulf of difference and see God face to face. This basic element of the mystic consciousness accounts for one of the several values of Islām which I wish to discuss, namely, that Ṣūfism nourishes a *proper* sense of the divine mystery and majesty. The Ṣūfī saint, who of all persons is closest to God and knows God best, is yet more in awe and thus more keenly aware than others of God's essential mystery and majesty.

The emphasis here should be placed on the word *proper*. By bringing the human spirit into intimate association with God ("My tongue hath talked with my Adored"), the Ṣūfī achieves a living and concrete sense of what God is. The other, non-mystical aspects of religion also are concerned with God as mystery and majesty, of course. However, their mode of apprehension tends to be abstract and indirect. The theologian, for example, *describes* God as "infinite", "transcendent", and the like, and these grand, negative terms do call attention to God's essential mysteriousness, but they are words. The theologian does not enter into the presence of mystery. Further, rituals and ceremonies sometimes *symbolize* the divine mystery but they do not lead the worshipper into the presence of mystery. Again, scriptures in words and images *refer to* divine mystery but they do not unite the reader of scripture with mystery. Ṣūfism, however, does precisely this. The Ṣūfī is directly acquainted with divine mystery ("I feel Thee touch my inmost ground"). The mystic directly apprehends and in his person concretely exhibits what the other forms of religious expression merely suggest.

The importance of maintaining a direct and living relation to divine mystery becomes plain if one recognizes that all religious institutions tend to become preoccupied with themselves. It is in the nature of a religious institution to be concerned with its sacred books, its laws, the true doctrine, the correct ritual; and there is a tendency to be too concerned with these things, particularly when they are understood as revelations from God. So conceived, they make take on an absolute value and, if unchecked, become surrogates for God.

My suggestion is that Ṣūfism can check the self-aggrandizing tendency of the institution. By making God more directly accessible to the believer, Ṣūfism puts the indirect channels of revelation — scripture, laws, doctrine — in their proper subsidiary place and thus protects the ultimacy of God.

This point about the worshipper's awe before the divine mystery suggests the most effective response which Ṣūfīs can make to those critics who accuse it of blurring the difference between the Creator and the creature. Properly understood, the Ṣūfī does not erase but intensifies the difference between the Creator and the creature. Even is the mystic feels himself merged with God, he never entirely loses the sense of that awe before God's mystery and majesty which reminds him of his constitutional distinction from God. Ṣūfism embodies the paradox that the closer the mystic approaches to identify with God, the more aware he is of his difference.

2. Ethics

Ṣūfism is valuable to Islām also in that it establishes a set of priorities within which ethics can find its proper place. Since to the Ṣūfī the experience of God is the highest good and ultimately all that matters, the ethical life, however important, must be secondary to the spiritual life. This can be seen in the Ṣūfī concept of the "stages", patterns of behavior such as: repentance, abstinence, renunciation, poverty, and patience, which the beginners in the Ṣūfī life must cultivate before he can become receptive to divine grace. The stages constitute an ethic of preparation. Of course, patience and the other virtues just enumerated have intrinsic value, but their chief value is in what they do to prepare the person for higher forms of spiritual sensitivity and, finally, to full awareness of God.

Once the aspiring Ṣūfī achieves the level of grace, he then exhibits another pattern of behavior which is ethical in a different sense. He lives a life of honesty, kindness, charity, and love — the "states" — which are by-products of the mystical life, an overflow into the intra-human domain of the love which the mystic has experienced in his relation to God. Thus, for the Ṣūfī the ethical life is, at one level, a form of right

behavior which may lead to the experience of God and, at another level, a form of behavior which expresses in public and social ways the spiritual attitudes which have been generated in the individual's relationship with God. This is to say, ethics plays an essential and profoundly constructive role in the total pattern of Islāmic life without dominating the spiritual side.

This is important because in ordinary institutional religion ethics tends to assume the wrong kind of importance. It tends to become the central or sole content of one's relationship to God. To be religious is to follow God's will, to carry out in scrupulous detail every directive. Although this sounds proper and pious, the results of such an understanding are, in my opinion, devastating to religion. If the religious person is extraordinarily conscientious and feels satisfied that he has done God's will, he tends to become proud and self-righteous. If, on the other hand, he feels that he has failed to do all God has commanded, he may fall into despair. When ethics is at the center of religion, it tends to produce people who think either too highly or too lowly of their attainments. In either case, giving ethics primacy tends to cut the person off from God and undermines the spiritual integrity of the self.

Ṣūfism guards against this undesirable consequence. By allowing nothing to come between the self and God, by insisting on the experience of God as the *summum bonum*, and by including ethics as both preparation for and expression of grace, Ṣūfism gives ethics the degree and kind of importance it deserves.

This point suggests the best Ṣūfī response to the charge, often heard, that the Ṣūfī saint is antinomian. Although the Ṣūfī may not always follow all of the rules in detail and may thus be viewed as lax by those who do not understand the motivations involved, the true Ṣūfī would never do anything which contradicts the love which he knows in the mystic interchange ("Now have I known, O Lord, what lies in my heart"). The Ṣūfī master can be trusted to obey the moral laws as far as they should be obeyed and then to follow God's lead into those areas which the laws do not cover. He not only is not antinomian, he fulfills the spirit as well as the letter of the laws.

3. Institutional Religion

A third benefit of Ṣūfism can be seen in what it does to vitalize the institutional side of Islām. Ṣūfīs and those influenced by Ṣūfīs radiate the divine presence, and when Ṣūfīs participate in the public rites, they add a spiritual element which would otherwise be missing. To the Ṣūfī, the *ḥajj* is not only a pious journey to a sacred place but a movement of the soul to God. The daily prayers are not only acts of public worship

but profound submissions of the spirit to its maker. Alms are not only one's physical wealth given to needy fellow human beings, but the dedication of one's total self to the other parts of God's world. In short, because of the *Ṣūfī*, who lives, as al Junayd's poem says, "in wondrous and ecstatic grace", the conventional religious observances take on an added dimension of meaning. *Ṣūfīs* participate directly in both esoteric and exoteric levels. Non-*Ṣūfīs* participate directly in the exoteric and because of the presence of the *Ṣūfī*, indirectly in the esoteric. The ordinary believer, thus, is drawn closer to God. His ordinary rites become not only a faithful performance of God's literal commands, but expressions of a mediated encounter with God.

Even if *Ṣūfism* did not exalt the external dimension in the way just described, it would still have a salutary effect in preventing the rites from becoming routine, being done thoughtlessly, or done for their own sake, which of course is the tendency of rites. Consider, for example, what the *Ṣūfī* adds to the study of the *Qur'ān*. Since the *Ṣūfī* reads the *Qur'ān* in the light of his intimacy with God, reading the *Qur'ān* is not merely a duty or a pious act which yields further information about God's will. It is a way of approaching God and overcoming that disunion which al Junayd says is the estate of all who live unconscious of the God who lies in their heart. To the *Ṣūfī*, every ceremony and duty instituted by God becomes a channel by which the soul can approach God.*

This, I think, suggests the strongest refutation of the often-heard charge that *Ṣūfism* undermines the outward forms of devotion. Not only do *Ṣūfīs* accept the proposition that the prescribed forms of devotion be performed — and performed with the correct "movements of the heart" — they approach the performance as a useful occasion when the enlightened soul can receive further intimations of the reality of God. The conventional rites are not only valid in themselves but are valuable first steps in the soul's journey toward an immediate relation to God.

4. Faith and Knowledge

A fourth benefit of *Ṣūfism* to Islām is that it helps establish a sound understanding of faith and knowledge. Since in *Ṣūfī* epistemology human nature is rooted in God, that part of human nature which we call the intellect is, whether it knows it or not, nourished by the divine truth. Intellect needs not struggle on its own, now despairing of transcendent

* What Professor Burkle is here claiming for *Ṣūfism* is certainly true, but it is not exclusive to the *Ṣūfīs*. Rather, it is the standpoint of all Muslims, of Islamic devotions as such. — Ed.

truth, now congratulating itself proudly for having made its way to the top alone. Intellect can function responsively and cooperatively, as God intended. Moreover, because in Ṣūfism God, so to speak, infuses truth into the intellect, that intellect which acknowledges and practices its intimacy with God is more rational, that is, more an intellect, than it otherwise would be. Similarly, faith will be ennobled. It will be a response of the whole self to God. Faith will be not mere submission but an accepting disposition toward God which opens the self to God and enables the intellect to receive divine truth.

Why is this important? Conventional religion, which lacks a powerful mystical component, tends to produce a kind of faith which is little more than assent to authority, conformance to tradition, and vague enthusiasm. When the soul has not yet realized its proper relationship to God, it becomes overly dependent upon its own powers or the power of those around it. It bows to the authorities it respects, or allows itself to be carried along by habit, or rides upon an upsurge of emotional commitment. Ṣūfism helps prevent this perversion of faith. The soul which has some direct contact with God possesses a strength which allows it to respect human authority without sycophancy, to defer to what is valid in tradition without blindly conforming to it, and to give expression to powerful emotion without being overwhelmed by it.

Ṣūfism helps to prevent the antithesis between conventional faith, which tends toward irrationality, and independent rationality, which insists upon finding its way to God totally by its own efforts. By grounding the self solidly in its relationship to God, Ṣūfism brings faith and reason into a fruitful synthesis. Both become responses to the divine presence. Reason sees by means of the divine light. It does not grope in the dark. Faith is the movement of the whole self in trust and acceptance toward the God who supports and solicits its upward reach.

5. Other Religions

A fifth benefit which Ṣūfism confers upon institutional Islām is that it links Islām with other religions and, thus, with all humanity. As students of the Perennial Philosophy remind us, the teachings of the mystics of the world are identical in many respects. The number of parallels that can be found between Ṣūfism and the mystics of other religions is striking. Ṣūfīs themselves are keenly aware of this and they accept this convergence gladly. To the Ṣūfī, it does not matter what creed a man professes or what rite he performs.

The true mosque in a pure and holy heart
Is builded: there let all men worship God;

For there He dwells, not in a mosque of stone.*

This alliance of Ṣūfism with the mystic dimensions of all other religions should not, I think, be viewed as a betrayal of Islām. The Ṣūfī does not deny the creed of Islām. He simply refuses to allow himself to be exclusively associated with those who explicitly profess that creed. The profession of the soul takes precendence over the profession of the lips. Moreover, in pushing past the externals to the essential core of religious experience, the Ṣūfī broadens the boundary of Islām and extends it, in principle, to include the entire human race.

The universal outreach of Islām is important to Islam because it keeps alive and furthers the Islāmic ideal of bringing all humanity within the one family of God. Ṣūfism helps realize in concrete spiritual sense the unity which all Muslims agree is the controlling concern of Islām. The God of the Ṣūfīs is One not only in the sense of being unique and undivided but in the sense of being all-inclusive. To the pantheistically minded Ṣūfī, God unifies not only by ruling over humanity in a literal sense but by including all humanity within Himself.

Without this mystical, ontological sense of unity, Islām would fall short of its own ideal. It could aspire to unify humanity by converting all human beings to institutional Islām, but such triumphalism is obviously impracticable. It could strive to unify all humanity by persuading them to accept common doctrine, but given the ineradicable idiosyncrasies of human reasoning, that is bound to fail. It could attempt to unify humanity by extending the scope of Islāmic law throughout the world, but given the heterogeneity of human needs and customs that cannot be done. Only Ṣūfism offers a realistic way of approximating to Islām's venerable ideal.

6. Conclusion

In the preceding discussion I have of course been praising Ṣūfism, but I have not attempted to evaluate it in a final way. I have not said that Ṣūfism is the highest expression of Islāmic piety, nor have I said that it is grander or lesser than the mystical dimensions of other religious traditions. I have been intent simply to argue that Ṣūfism has an indispensable role to play in Islām and, thus, is profoundly valuable to Islām, just as the mystical dimension of any religion is valuable to that religion.

At the same time, the functional approach also suggests one respect in which Ṣūfism seems to do a disservice to Islām. The Ṣūfī claim that

* Quoted in Reynold A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam* (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), p. 87.

mystical unity with God is the highest and only ultimately true and fulfilling spiritual mode gives undeserved preeminence to one facet of humanity's total relation to God. It confuses the preeminence which mystics have in their own eyes and in the eyes of their less loftily situated fellow human beings with the ultimate order of importance. It mistakenly thinks that those who express the divine beauty by living lives of ethical goodness, artistic and philosophical creativity, or humane practicality are of secondary importance and grandeur. functionally, this is not so. God's unity is expressed in humanity in all these ways, as well as in the mystic saint. All are necessary. All are valid. None excels the other. Giving the mystic preeminence over all others is like saying that because the flower is the culminating stage of the rose plant, it is the noblest and only ultimately valid part. Actually, all one has a right to say is that for those who love roses the flower seems to be the glory and the purpose of the rose plant. It draws attention and elicits admiration. However, the rose is not in and of itself better than the leaves, the branches, and the roots. It is only one part of the unity which they all compose. The beauty of the rose reflects the goodness of the rest of the plant no less that it proclaims its own glory.

If Şūfīs and those who revere Şūfīs would claim no more for the mystical union with God than this, then Şūfism would confirm the other, more conventional relations to God as equal to itself and thus give needed validation to the persons who necessarily live their religious lives in non-mystical ways. In this, Şūfism would be making still another valuable contribution to Islām.

AL GHAZĀLĪ ON SAMĀ'

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I. THE CONTROVERSY

Muslim scholars and laymen have written countless pages and participated in endless discussions to convince each other of the legitimacy or otherwise of *samā'*. Literally meaning "audition" or "hearing", the term *samā'* has had several different connotations in Islāmic history. In the narrowest of these definitions, it has stood for the musical activities of the Ṣūfī brotherhoods. As such, it has included both the recitation of the Qur'ān as well as vocal and instrumental music to praise the Prophet Muḥammad or to induce spiritual ecstasy. Loosely, the term has even been used to include the dancing (*raqs*) of these mystical *dhikr* ("remembrance" of God) sessions. In a wider definition, *samā'* has designated the appreciation of all music, i.e., all artistic organizations of tones and durations into patterns, either with or without literary element, in order to aesthetically convey meaning. Under this definition, not only the practices of the Ṣūfīs were in question in the controversy which raged over *samā'*; it was also dealt with as a problem of the legitimacy of the art of music as a whole.

Notable protagonists have lined up on different sides of the controversy: for example, Ibn Abī al Dunyā (823-894), Ibn al Jawzī (d. 1201) and Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) stood with those who condemned much of that which we would consider musical art; and Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi (860-940), the Ikhwān al Ṣafā' (flourished c. 970), and Aḥmad al Ghazālī (d. 1126)¹ were among those on the side of its defense.

¹This was Abū al Futūḥ Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad bin Aḥmad al Tūsī al Ghazālī, who was known as Majd al Dīn. He was the brother of the famous Abū Ḥāmid al Ghazālī.

Seeking to base his arguments on firm and incontrovertible evidence, each protagonist went first to the Qur'ān to determine its ruling on the subject. Actually, the Qur'ān says nothing about the question, and the terms *ghinā'* ("song") and *samā'* (either in the sense of Ṣūfī *dhikr* or of listening to music) do not occur in the Holy Book.² It was thus only by inferring a condemnation of *samā'* from passages speaking of "idle talk" (Qur'ān 23:1-3; 25:72; 28:55, 31:6) or "making jokes" (53:61) that the antagonists to music could produce Qur'ānic basis for their condemnation. Their adversaries, the advocates of *samā'*, relied on similarly weak evidence. For example, they cited as one instance of "evidence", those passages of the Qur'ān which imply praise of the beautiful voice by condemning the braying of the ass (Qur'ān 31:19). More apt arguments were based on the *āyah* which commanded the beautiful recitation of the Qur'ān (*Wa rattil al Qur'āna tartīlan*, Qur'ān 73:4), or that which condemns the negation of art and beauty (*zīnatullah*, or "the beautiful things of God," Qur'ān 7:32).

Not only the Qur'ān was probed for supporting evidence. The *ḥadīth* literature, which records sayings and events from the Prophet's life, has also been carefully investigated. Because both sides found materials in this literature to support their arguments, additional proofs were necessary to establish the authenticity of the recorded sayings or events as well as to justify the interpretations of them given by the various writers. After exhausting the *ḥadīth* sources, the debators sought confirmation of their opposing arguments in other sources: in the example of the four *Rāshidūn* caliphs and of the companions of the Prophet; in the writings of the founders and jurists of the four law schools; and in the works of various Sunnī, Shī'ī and Ṣūfī leaders and scholars. Neither side could win a consensus of the *ummah*, and Muslim society continued to exemplify a wide spectrum of contrasting views.

The tonal-durational art of the Muslims might be described as being of three major types. First among these, at the far right of an imaginary spectrum, was that category comprising the recitation of the Qur'ān (*qirā'ah*) and the call to prayer (*adhān*). These forms of religious chant have remained aloof from the controversy. In fact, they have never been given the name *mūsīqā* by the Muslims. Yet these forms of vocalization of a text were sometimes included in activities which went under the name of *samā'*, and they certainly fit the definition of music as an artistic

²Some authors maintain that it was near the end of the third century after the Hijrah that *samā'* as a Ṣūfī musical practice was established, and the problem of its acceptance or rejection arose (Taqī al Dīn Abū al 'Abbās Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al Ḥalīm ibn 'Abd al Salām Ibn Taymiyyah, "Kitāb al Samā' wal Raqs," *Majmū'ah al Rasā'il al Kubrā* [Cairo: Maṭba'ah Muḥammad 'Alī Ṣubayh, 1966], Vol. II, pp. 303-304).

and meaningful organization of tones and durations. No Muslims have wished to eliminate or condemn them, though no period failed to be on guard against the incorporation of new elements from secular music which might alter the essentially reverent character of this sound art (al Fārūqī 1974:275-281). Also generally included as legitimate and favored were the chants of pilgrimage, the *ḥidā'* or caravan songs, and military music of various types.

At the other end of the musical spectrum, at an imaginary far left, was a body of music associated with drinking, loose morals and wild living. This category too remained outside the controversy, for all the protagonists agreed that music as a stimulant of base sensual excitement was to be strongly condemned and discouraged. Between these two extremities of the sound art continuum was the large body of musical expression which was the object of actual contention in the controversy. This we shall call the median category. Included here was the *samā'* of the Ṣūfīs, as well as the *mūsīqā* or *ghinā'* performed in private or public gatherings. Neither side managed to achieve complete consensus (*ijmā'*) in regard to this median category.

II. THE CONTRIBUTION OF AL GHAZĀLĪ

Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al Ṭūsī al Ghazālī lived in the second half of the 11th century (d. 1111), primarily in Ṭūs, Nishapūr and Baghdād. His early training in Ṭūs prepared him to be a jurist. In later life he was to make contributions in theology, *kalām*, and philosophy as well. He rebelled against the legalist thinking of some of the '*ulamā'* of his time, and tried to evolve a new synthesis of the orthodox and Ṣūfī positions. He hoped to combine the good features of both without the excesses of either and thus revivify the religious commitment of the Muslims of his time.

His contribution on the subject of *samā'* was made primarily in two works. The first of these, in time as well as importance, is found in his *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al Dīn* ("The Revivification of the Religious Sciences"). The Eighth Book in the Section on Social Customs ('*Ādāt*)³ is entitled a "Book of the Laws of Listening to Music and Singing and of Ecstasy" (*Kitāb Ādāb al Samā' wal Wajd*). The second essay written by al Ghazālī on the subject of *samā'* is found in *Kīmīyā' al Sa'ādah* ("The Chemistry of Happiness"), which is considered to be an abridgement, in the Persian language, of the *Iḥyā'*. Its Chapter V is entitled "Concerning

³The book is organized in four parts: the other three being on cultic practices ('*ibādāt*), vices (*muhlikāt*) and virtues (*munjiyāt*).

Music and Dance as Aids to the Religious Life.”⁴

In both these works, al Ghazālī not only reveals his commitment to scriptural chant (i.e., the music at the right of the spectrum), but repeats the condemnations of that music which is associated with drinking and other prohibited practices (i.e., the music at the left of the spectrum). In the *Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al Dīn* he presents a defense of the legality of music as a Ṣūfī religious exercise, as a means of pleasurable aesthetic enjoyment and as an effective moral agent. In *Kīmīyā’ al Sa’ādah* he is concerned primarily with its use by the Ṣūfī aspirant to religious ecstasy. In both works, therefore, he treats music only as it falls within the median category — the music of mystical devotion and that of aesthetic enjoyment or entertainment.

The Eighth Book of the *Iḥyā’* begins with the argument that music brings out from the individual only what is already there. According to al Ghazālī, it cannot produce bad in the good heart or good in the bad heart. It is therefore neutral in itself rather than condemnable, he argues. In Chapter I of the same essay he discusses the lawfulness of listening to music and singing. In Section 1 of that chapter⁵ al Ghazālī presents statements of the ‘ulamā’ which show contradictions in their supporting evidence. In Section 2,⁶ he embarks on a thorough examination into the sources for these statements. He concludes from this investigation that there is no proof for the prohibition of music, and that only when it is associated with things that lead to immorality should it be considered unlawful. He describes later in the same section seven purposes for which singing can legitimately be used: 1) in connection with the pilgrimage, 2) in warfare, 3) to incite with courage, 4) for lamentation over evil deeds or religious shortcomings, 5) to arouse joy, 6) to arouse human love and longing, and 7) to arouse love of God. Five instances are enumerated which make listening to music unlawful: 1) if produced in a situation which would arouse unlawful temptation in the listeners, 2) with use of those instruments which are associated with drunkenness and debauchery, 3) the inclusion of corrupting poetic content in the songs, 4) when the listener is filled with lust, and 5) if the time spent on this means of recreation is unduly exaggerated. Section 3 carries a statement “of the arguments of those

⁴Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al Ghazālī, *The Alchemy of Happiness (Kīmīyā’ al Sa’ādah)*, tr. Claud Field (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), pp. 73-85.

⁵Abū Ḥāmid al Ghazālī, *Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al Dīn* (Cairo: Maṭba’ah al Istiqāmah, n.d.), Vol. II, pp. 268-270; al Ghazālī, section from *Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al Dīn*, tr. by Duncan B. Macdonald as “Emotional Religion in Islām as Affected by Music and Singing,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1901, Part I, pp. 200-207.

⁶al Ghazālī, *Iḥyā’*, n.d., pp. 270-284; 1901, 207-244.

who pronounce music and singing unlawful.”⁷ Each one of the dozen or more arguments is answered in its turn. Al Ghazālī concludes that music is sometimes permissible, and at other times condemnable. No absolute or “blanket” statement can be made, nor can a judgment be given of any specific musical performance, until the circumstances of the particular musical performance in question are known.

Chapter II of the Eighth Book of *Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al Dīn* is entitled “Effects of Music and Singing and Laws of Polite Conduct with Regard to Them.” While the first chapter, that described above, deals generally with a defense of all music of the median category, this second chapter is concerned with *samā’* as a Ṣūfī religious practice. Here al Ghazālī discusses four topics: 1) understanding of what is heard in the music, 2) the ecstasy encountered through music, 3) the external manifestations of ecstasy engendered by *samā’* (e.g., body reactions of dancing, crying out, and rending of garments), and 4) the laws of good conduct in the *samā’* gathering. As a summary, he repeats the conclusion of Chapter I — that the music which we have described as belonging to the median category is “sometimes forbidden, sometimes disliked, sometimes loved.”⁸ All depends on the time, the place and the associates — on *zamān*, *makān*, *ikhwān*.⁹ If anything in these circumstances leads to evil or immorality, it is the particular performance rather than the music *per se*, which is to be condemned.

Although many of the same ideas are presented in the shorter statement found in the fifth chapter of the English translation of *Kīmīyā’ al Sa’ādah*,¹⁰ this second work of Al Ghazālī on listening to music seems to be directed more to the Ṣūfī initiate who may participate in the *samā’* session rather than to the Muslims at large. The reader is given less of the background arguments of the controversy and more directives of how his participation can be acceptable religiously. The proper uses of music are repeated and restrictions for their use given. The participant should only participate in Ṣūfī musical devotions if given the consent of his *pīr* or spiritual leader.¹¹ Poetry and words used in this exercise are never to be used in a sensuous way.¹² The devotee should not make the mistake of thinking that God descends into a human being when the latter reaches a state of ecstasy (*wajd*). There should be no frivolous practices nor any hypocrisy in the exaggeration of bodily movements.

⁷al Ghazālī, *Iḥyā’*, n.d., pp. 284-287; 1901, 244-252.

⁸al Ghazālī, *Iḥyā’*; n.d., p. 306; 1902, Part III, p. 13.

⁹al Ghazālī, *Iḥyā’*, n.d., p. 301; 1902, p. 1

¹⁰al Ghazālī, *The Alchemy*, pp. 73-85.

¹¹Ibid., p. 77

¹²Ibid., p. 78.

The experienced Ṣūfī is described as one who is master of his feelings and body at all times. He does not expose the depth of his emotional response in extravagant actions or gestures. In this essay, al Ghazālī includes dance as legitimate aid to the *dhikr* exercise, but warns against its being used in a frivolous manner. In response to those who maintain that music and dance are novelties which arose after the time of the Prophet and therefore should be forbidden, he answers that many other things are novelties with respect to the life of the Prophet; yet, they are not forbidden. He gives the example of the *tarāwīḥ* prayers during the month of Ramaḍān which were first instituted by the Caliph ‘Umar.¹³

III. AN EVALUATION OF AL GHAZĀLĪ'S CONTRIBUTION

Al Ghazālī is to be thanked for a number of contributions that his two essays provide. First, they furnish a summary statement of contrasting views on the subject rather than the usual one-sided argument. Second, al Ghazālī effectively combats the puritan voices which have wished to eliminate all aesthetic and recreational elements from Muslim life. Third, al Ghazālī's writing on *samā'* is an effective guard against exaggeration and abuse in the use of music in Muslim life and especially in Ṣūfī ritual. Many precautionary statements are made, as well as firm prohibitions against certain practices. Fourth, as a check on exaggeration by those proponents of music who sanction all kinds of sound art and under all circumstances, al Ghazālī strongly reaffirmed the judgment of earlier writers that some types of music are indeed unsuitable and should be strongly discouraged for the Muslim community. Fifth, through this even-handed affirmation of the worthy, and condemnation of the undesirable, al Ghazālī provided a bridge between conservative and liberal segments of the society, and also between Ṣūfī and non-Ṣūfī interpretations. Sixth, al Ghazālī furnished a clear statement of the position that music is not a phenomenon which we can isolate from its performance environment and circumstances. This was an enlightened and quite "modern" view of the subject, a view which has not always been matched in more recent times.

Did al Ghazālī's statement solve the controversy for the Muslims? Unfortunately not. In fact, the problem of *ijmā'* on this issue is a source of difficulty and soul searching to this day in many Muslim communities.¹⁴ One explanation that could be offered for the

¹³Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁴Evidence for this can be found in Jamiatul Ulama, *Music, Musical Instruments and Singing* (Benoni South, Transvaal, Republic of South Africa: The Young Men's Muslim Association, 1976); and A.H. Sheriff, *Music and Its Effects* (Dār al Salām, Tanzania: Bilal Muslim Mission of Tanzania, 1974).

continuation of the problem despite al Ghazālī's masterful treatment is that few Muslims have read the arguments presented in the *Iḥyā'* and the *Kīmīyā*, or even know of their existence in these works. Second, most Muslim reform movements of recent centuries (and these are the place to look for intellectual movement in the Muslim world in recent times) were primarily anti-Ṣūfī movements. They could not have been interested in matters related to *samā'*, for to them it involved the practices of those whom they considered to be their enemies and the enemies of "the true Islām" and its adherents. A third reason why the Muslims may not have made full use of al Ghazālī's ideas on this subject stems from the fact that the last centuries have been ones of political and spiritual oppression in most parts of the Muslim world. It was not a time when a people could afford to be liberal in their views. Instead, it is in such periods that the tendency to conservatism and rigidity is most strong in order that the community merely survive and retain its identity.

The limited success of the al Ghazālī presentation may also result in part from a deficiency in the works themselves. In these two essays the author was involved with moral issues, with ecstatic feelings and with the performance circumstances of *samā'*. He showed little concern for the characteristics of the music itself, except to comment on the powerful effect of music on its hearers.¹⁵ In fact, al Ghazālī's arguments for the acceptance of *samā'* or listening to music are all external ones. He gave no attention to desirable or undesirable characteristics of musical content and structure. He glossed over the fact that there are some musical phenomena which seem to move their hearers to similar feelings and intuitions, as those engendered when they hear religious chant, while others, regardless of performance circumstances, negate such feelings and intuitions. He ignored the fact that it is sometimes as much the internal characteristics of the music as the circumstances of the performance which make one music acceptable and another rejected. It is only after an investigation and analysis of the musical content and structure of music *per se*, and the aesthetic effect of these characteristics, that al Ghazālī's arguments related to morality and performance situation would be completed. It is not enough to be concerned with *zamān*, *makān* and *ikhwān* when determining the desirability of an aesthetic product or presentation. If the Muslim is to use and regard the musical art of his heritage or his future as an expression of his most fundamental beliefs, which it should be, he must be concerned with the discovery and appropriation of those forms of musical expression

¹⁵al Ghazālī, *Iḥyā'*, n.d., p. 275; 1901, pp. 218-220; *The Alchemy*, p. 73.

which are suitable, and the setting aside of others. There must be an underlying coherence of the music with his world view and God view. In other words, if we are to settle the question of the legitimacy or not of musical expression in Islamic culture, it is necessary to define, to the best of our ability, those characteristics of music which are suitable to carrying the message of *tawhīd*. It is this difficult but crucial task which neither al Ghazālī and his contemporaries, nor those who followed him, confronted. It is this question which must be faced by the contemporary Muslim who would wish to add to the important contribution of al Ghazālī on *samāʿ*.

ISLĀM, DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICS IN MALAYSIA

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Contemporary literature on the role of religion as it affects economic and political change has become massive, and certainly Islām has not escaped intensive investigation. Theologians, economists, anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists have analyzed such diverse subjects as the impact of Islāmic law on economic behavior, the supposed compatibility of Islām with politics, the relevance of various Weberian hypotheses and particularly the relation of Islām to capitalism and the possible influence of particular sects on economic change.¹ Some authors such as J. Rosenthal have asserted that Islām has a unique impact on its adherents, while others such as C. Kessler call this the "Islāmic fallacy."² With the growth of financial power among oil-rich Muslim states and their increasing political strength, questions regarding the influence of Islām take on added weight.

¹B. Turner, *Weber and Islam, A Critical Study* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974); B. Burner, "Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Thesis," *British Journal of Sociology*, 25 (June, 1974), pp. 230-243; R. Stone, "Religious Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in Tunisia," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 5 (1974), pp. 250-273; M. Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1974); R. Bocock, "The Ismailis in Tanzania: A Weberian Analysis," *British Journal of Sociology*, 22 (December, 1971), pp. 365-79; M. Dia, *Islam, Sociétés Africaines et Culture Industrielle* (Dakar: Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1975); R. Bellah, ed., *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (New York: Free Press, 1965); Sami Zubaida, "Economic and Political Activism in Islam," *Economy and Society*, 1 (1972), pp. 324-37; D. Laitin, "Religion, Political Culture, and the Weberian Tradition," *World Politics*, 30 (July, 1978), pp. 563-92.

²E. Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern National State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965) and C. Kessler, "Islam, Society and Political Behavior: Some Comparative Implications of the Malay Case," *British Journal of Sociology*, 23 (March, 1972), pp. 33-50.

In the past dozen years Malaysia has become one of the focal points for these considerations and most particularly for a debate over the impact of Islām on the economic and political development of the Malay Muslims. In the economic field the issue has arisen as to the effect of Islām on both general development and the entrepreneurial capabilities of the Malay. In part, this interest was born out of both Malaysia's rather unique place in the Third World and its efforts to improve the position of its Islāmic population vis-à-vis other indigenous communities.

Contemporary Malaysia appears an anomaly in Afro-Asia on many counts. It has a comparatively high GNP, even when discounting petroleum revenues. It is one of a handful of developing countries that maintains a competitive political process with vocal opposition in the legislature and, until recently, at least one state government was in the hands of opponents. It retains a viable, if weak, federal system. While practicing a mixed economy of private and state capitalism, the Malaysian rulers proclaim their denial of socialist ideology. All of this in a region characterized more often than not by low living standards, authoritarian centralized regimes and socialist ideologies.

However, the area of atypicality that is the basis of this paper centers on the interaction of religion, ethnicity and economic-social policies. Malaysia is a country where the 55 percent Malay-Muslim population is primarily rural and, when compared to the 35 percent Chinese, poor. Yet, contrary to secular theory and common Afro-Asian practice, representatives of the Malay community control the political system and have used their power to institute what might be termed an "affirmative action" program for members of their community. This paper seeks to review this political-economic situation as the backdrop to a vital debate which has surrounded government efforts. The fundamental question has been why the Malay-Muslim (and to a Malay it is not possible to maintain one's ethnicity outside Islām)³ has not been as economically successful as other communities while at the same time monopolizing political power. More particularly, this paper is an effort to assess the role of Islām in molding Malay achievement, and whether government efforts to aid the Malay Muslims has affected overall development.

Prior to outlining the principal elements of the debate we must describe briefly two aspects of the situation, the economic-political role

³This close identification of religion and ethnicity is not unique to Malaysia but has been remarked upon by both indigenous and foreign observers in Indonesia, Burma, and Thailand. See F. R. von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963) and S. Siddique, "Some Malay Ideas on Modernization, Islam and Adat," Masters Thesis, University of Singapore, 1972, p. 27.

of the Malay and the government efforts to effect it. As noted, the Malay tends to be rural and poor; 63 percent of the Malays live in rural areas as against 26 percent of the Chinese and 10 percent of the Indians. Malay levels of income and amenities have been consistently below the Chinese. As of 1970, the mean income of Malay households was M\$179 while that of Chinese and Indian was M\$387 and M\$310, respectively.⁴ When comparing the availability of piped water, toilet facilities and electricity, rural areas where the Malays predominate have been consistently and markedly worse off than the cities.⁵ As well, Malays have tended to be less successful in various entrepreneurial activities. As of 1970 they owned approximately one percent of the modern corporate sector. Their percentage of share capital of limited companies was only 0.9 percent in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; 0.7 percent in mining; 2.5 percent in manufacturing; 2.2 percent in construction; 13.3 percent in transportation and communications; 0.8 percent in commerce; and 3.5 percent in banking and insurance. In 1967 Malays held but 11 percent of timber ventures, 13 percent of bus ventures, and were less than 25 percent of mining workers.⁶

If Malays have been economically disadvantaged, they have dominated the political and administrative structure. The United Front that rules Malaysia is led by the Malay monopolized United Malay National Organization (UMNO). Every Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Education, Defense and Home has been Malay since independence; the majority of Parliament are Malay; six out of ten members of the Malaysian Civil Service were Malay in 1970; and 65.4 percent of the military and most of the police were from that community in 1964.⁷ We thus have the somewhat anomolous situation of the dominant community in terms of population and political power being the poorest one economically.

To redress this imbalance in the economic sphere the government in 1971 launched a program to speed the development of the Malay.⁸ Aspects of the effort have included quotas on employment in the

⁴Malaysia, *Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1973), pp. 1-73.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁶See Tham Seong Chee, "Ideology, Politics and Economic Modernization: The Case of the Malays in Malaysia," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Sciences*, 1 (1973), pp. 41-59.

⁷For a review of the role of Malays in the bureaucracy, see R. Tillman, *Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1964); and M. Esman, *Administration and Development in Malaysia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).

⁸F. von der Mehden, "Communalism, Industrial Policy and Income Distribution in Malaysia," *Asian Survey*, 15 (March, 1975), pp. 250-63; G. Means, "'Special Rights' as a Strategy for Development: The Case of Malaysia," *Comparative Politics*, 5 (October, 1972), pp. 29-61.

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⁷For a review of the role of Malays in the bureaucracy, see R. Tillman, *Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1964); and M. Esman, *Administration and Development in Malaysia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).

⁸F. von der Mehden, "Communalism, Industrial Policy and Income Distribution in Malaysia," *Asian Survey*, 15 (March, 1975), pp. 250-63; G. Means, "'Special Rights' as a Strategy for Development: The Case of Malaysia," *Comparative Politics*, 5 (October, 1972), pp. 29-61.

modern sector, subsidies, advice, loans, training and special consideration in government contracts to "Bumiputras" (a term given to "sons of the soil"—primarily Malays but including other "natives" or those who accept the Muslim religion and Malay customs). These policies have all been directed toward the goal of raising the material level of the Malay and eliminating the "identification of race with economic function." Thus, the employment quota of 40 percent Malays is to bring that population into the modern sector; the goal of 30 percent ownership by 1990 is to do the same, while educational quotas are to give the Malay the background to compete successfully with other communities. All of this is supposedly to be accomplished in a condition of growth thereby not curbing the well-being of Chinese and Indian citizens. Obviously, non-Malays fear that, to mix metaphors, these programs will be promulgated within a zero-sum game, rather than an expanding pie.

II

The clear evidence of Malay economic backwardness combined with efforts to employ government programs to alleviate that condition has raised many fundamental questions pertaining to the reasons why the Malay has not been competitive and why he needs "special rights." One explanation prominent in the literature and popular discussion has been the alleged debilitating effect of Malay religious traditions and beliefs. Assertions have ranged from the statement of one former Prime Minister that Malays need to follow the Protestant work ethic to queries as to the economic efficiency of savings for the Ḥajj. The debate over the role of Islām has many facets which may be arranged somewhat arbitrarily into the following three categories:

1. Islāmic beliefs per se,
2. Malay Islāmic practice,
3. Malay vs. Chinese priorities in values.

I will describe briefly each of these points in turn, presenting countervailing arguments, including other factors that may be responsible for the place of the Malay and, finally, attempting to integrate the role of Islām with those factors. The central theme of this piece is that Islām as a factor in Malay economic development cannot be disentangled from a variety of other historic, social, and political forces which have molded Malay perceptions and capabilities.

1) *Islām per se* — It has been argued that Islām in Malaysia contains within its tenets various beliefs which are antithetical to modern economic systems or which inhibit its adherents in competition with other communities. Islām, it is asserted, emphasizes other-worldly asceticism and its teachers stress that this world is ephemeral and

transient, thus weakening efforts to strive for material well-being.⁹ Looking at other elements of Weber's Protestant Ethic, authors have observed that the religion does not appear to create a "compulsion to save" or the "release of acquisitive activity" and that the traditional Islāmic value system thus is not "conducive to economic development and a pragmatic-instrumentalist approach to both the political and economic problems."¹⁰ In an article which led to considerable debate, B. Parkinson stated:

The Islāmic belief that all things are emanations from God is another important force affecting the Malay's economic behavior, for it tends to make them fatalistic in their approach to life. 'The Malay is very prone, after receiving a setback, to give up striving, that it is the will of God. In economic affairs this is most clearly seen in the concept *rezeki*, a person's divinely inspired lot.' Such an attitude constitutes a significant drag on economic development....

It is also attributed to Islāmic Messianism, an adverse effect on the Malay Muslim's economic ambitions and aspirations. To those who believe in the likelihood of the coming of a 'golden age,' into which they would be led and in which all problems would be solved, there can be a tendency to sit and wait passively for change to occur rather than to become active vehicles for change.¹¹ On the other hand, discussions of the "dead weight" of religious law, divisiveness over issues of dogma and sectarian conflict have not been as important in Malaysia as in the Middle East, Pakistan or even neighboring Indonesia.¹² Recent efforts to emphasize close adherence to Islāmic legal principles may be changing this pattern, however.

2) *Malay Islāmic Practices*: Specific religious practices have been alluded to as at best economically dysfunctional. Observers have commented upon the implications of public and private expenditures on religious activities. State budgets put aside almost 5 percent of their funds for Islām at the same time of independence, and this increased in the years following. Private savings for religious feasts and the Hajj

⁹S.H. Alatas, "Religion and Modernization in Southeast Asia," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 11 (1970), pp. 270-71. This is not his position.

¹⁰G. Means, "The Role of Islām in the Political Development of Malaysia," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (January, 1969), p. 282.

¹¹B. Parkinson, "Non-Economic Factors in the Economic Retardation of the Rural Malays," *Modern Asian Studies*, 1 (1967), p. 40, 41.

¹²See, for example, F. Abbott, *Islam and Pakistan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968) and D. Noer, "Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia: A Preliminary Study," *RIMA*, 9 (July-December, 1975), pp. 50-70. The new Pakistani Islāmic Constitution is now discussed avidly by a number of Malays interested in its effort to implement Islāmic law.

have also been criticized as economically dysfunctional (the government subsidizes the Ḥajj). While some argue that saving for the pilgrimage develops habits of frugality, others complain that the relatively large sums spent on such an "economically dysfunctional activity" drains away funds that might otherwise be employed in commercial pursuits.¹³ Other areas of continuing debate have been the role of usury, the use of receipts from lotteries for government programs, the closing of offices and businesses on Sundays rather than Fridays, and questions as to whether insurance is *ḥalāl* or *ḥarām*. All of these issues have been elements of contention between the more pragmatic Federal Government and the more religiously traditional leaders of East Coast Malaysia and a growing urban fundamentalist group. While the latter have called for more orthodox interpretations of dogma, the national leadership has charged that to hold to such tenets would inhibit economic development.¹⁴ It is stated that Malay Muslims tend to be both more traditional and ritualistic than many other Muslims and thus find it more difficult to integrate Islāmic doctrine into modern society.¹⁵ Finally, note should be made of the considerable importance given local religious leaders and the perception of them as obstacles to modernization. It is charged that their efforts to maintain a heavily religious orientation in education, to protect the people against the "impurities" of the West, and emphasis on authority and tradition have made them the first line defense against modernization.

3) *Malay vs. Chinese Priorities*: This third element is one in which Islām plays a role but within an amalgam of other perceptions and beliefs. It is argued that the Malays and their chief competitors, the Chinese, have basically different value systems that structure their priorities in economic activities. The Malay priorities, based upon the aforementioned Islāmic factors, combined with traditional religious tenets, close identification with the village and the customary ways that surround it, and a traditional orientation towards political and religious goals rather than economic, have all led to a denigration of entrepreneurial goals, an unwillingness to modernize and priorities that

¹³For opposite sides on this general question, see W. Wilder, "Islam, Other Factors and Malay Backwardness: Comments on an Argument," *Modern Asian Studies*, 2 (1968), pp. 155-64, and B. Parkinson, "The Economic Retardation of Malays: A Rejoinder," *Modern Asian Studies*, 2 (1968), pp. 267-72.

¹⁴F. von der Mehden, "Religion and Politics in Malaya," *Asian Survey*, 2 (December, 1963), pp. 610-12. Refusal in Kelantan to collect taxes from liquor and pawn shops cost the state treasury heavily.

¹⁵J. Nagata, "Ethnic Differentiation within an Urban Moslem Mercantile Community in Malaysia," *Ethnicity* (1972), pp. 380-400.

do not support the Malay in competing in the modern sector.¹⁶ As for the Chinese, they are characterized as a people influenced by both their immigrant status and religious familial heritage which supposedly orient them toward entrepreneurial goals and material well-being. Self-selection brought to Southeast Asia, Chinese who were prepared to be more aggressive, willing to take chances and less bound by traditional inhibitions. Non-Chinese also charge that their religious beliefs emphasized money. Thus, Alatas asserts that the Chinese excel in commercial pursuits because: (a) money dominates Chinese religious practices; (b) the obligation to honor ancestors necessitates wealth; (c) public and private events such as New Years and funerals are associated with money; and (d) many taboos and symbols are associated with wealth and good luck.¹⁷ The end results of these conflicting values thus supposedly lead to different priorities. Parkinson has best stated this position when he wrote:¹⁸

Modern psychologists and sociologists maintain that a strong motivating force in the lives of most of us is the desire to succeed. This desire to succeed is no more absent from rural Malay society than it is from any other, but to the Malay success means something different from what it does, for example, to the Malaysian Chinese. The Chinese seem to regard success as being the improvement of their economic position even if this requires some fundamental change or innovation. The Malays seem to regard success as doing what their forebears have approved and practiced, but doing it as well as they can. Wealth and economic advancement are desired by the Malays, but not at the expense of renouncing utterly the traditions and traditional occupations of their forefathers to which they have grown accustomed, and which offer them a level of satisfaction greater than that offered by the mere pursuit of economic advancement and wealth.

The economists' maximizing postulates can be interpreted in a similar way. The Chinese and Malays, because they possess different cultures, attitudes, values and motivations, maximize different things. Neither one is necessarily superior to the other; it is simply that the maximizing postulates of the Chinese are more likely to lead to economic development in the Western sense that are the maximizing postulates of the Malays.

¹⁶For examples of this position, see Parkinson, *op. cit.*, and T.S. Chee, *op. cit.*; M. Swift, *Malay Peasant Society in Jelelu* (London: Athlone, 1965), pp. 28-33.

¹⁷Alatas, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

¹⁸Parkinson, "Non-Economic Factors," pp. 42-43.

III

Counter-arguments to these perceptions of Malay/Islām as an obstacle to economic development and entrepreneurship have been numerous and varied. Of course, there is considerable literature that emphasizes the positive aspects of Islām in encouraging economic activity.¹⁹ References have been made to its stress on personal discipline, frugality, rationality, judicial procedures and other elements of the religion itself. Rather than other-worldly, it is noted that the regulations of the Sharī'ah are about this world.²⁰ Malaysian scholars and public figures have noted that Muḥammad was a merchant and that it was the Arab traders who brought Islām to the area. The point has been made by Bellah, Geertz, Alatas, and others that within Southeast Asia, Muslim groups have been successful entrepreneurs. The abilities of Sumatra's Padangers in the commercial field are legendary, and immigrants from Minangkabau have done well in Malaysia.²¹ Muslims from India, Pakistan and the Middle East who reside in Malaysia have included many successful entrepreneurs; and, in fact, they have been accused of employing Bumiputra "special rights" to their advantage.²² One observer comments that, "the South Indian Moslems belong to the same religion, the same school of thought (Mozhab Shafeil) and the same mystical orders as the Malays. If Islām inhibits rational economic action, there is no reason why the South Indian Muslims should be otherwise than are the Malays."²³

Of course, the very success of fellow believers begs the question as to how one is to explain the undeniable fact that Malays have not been as successful as other communities. Explanations tend to be historic, sociological, and economic. It is hypothesized here that by the time of independence these forces had molded most Malays into a complex set of perceptions and attitudes that emphasized values of tradition, "race," religion, and family within a rural environment. The adherents to the legacy were suspicious of any external influence that might fracture that mold, whether it be Western education, foreign missionary activity or the advance of modernity as symbolized by growing urbanization.

It is necessary to provide some historical background to explain how

¹⁹Rodinson, *op. cit.*; Wilder, *op. cit.*

²⁰Although it is also noted that these very laws may run counter to trends toward modernization. Siddique, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

²¹A. Yūsuf, "Rural-Urban Malaysia: A Case Study in Cultural Anthropology," Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, 1976.

²²D. Nagata, "Muslim Entrepreneurs and the Second Malaysia Plan: Some Socioeconomic Considerations," *Asian Research Bulletin* (August 1-31, 1972), pp. 1139-42.

²³Alatas, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

this pattern emerged. Pre-colonial Malaysia was not a centrally unified political entity controlling, socializing, and nationalizing its population. Rather, it was a feudal society with local sultans at the apex of individual pyramids of power, the bases of which were comparatively small close-knit communities settled along rivers or the coast line.²⁴ Within this environment Islam performed the role of legitimizing local authority and further integrating the village within a pattern of economics, attitudes and obligations. It became the control element of the rural Malay and as such appears to have reinforced parochialism rather than enhanced the Malay's consciousness of the outside world. As Gordon Means suggests, Islām as it developed

became a vital social force, particularly at the village level. It performed a number of socially significant functions, frequently in conjunction with other institutions. While Islām infused new and rich cultural elements into Malay society, it appeared to make that society somewhat more resistant to external cultural influences by giving its adherents the complacency and ethnocentrism that come from a feeling of cultural and religious superiority. Before the impact of the West, Islam was a vital and expanding force in peninsular and insular Southeast Asia. Yet, Islam did not make a substantial transformation of the recipient society. Instead Islam adapted to that society in harmony with most existing institutions, beliefs, and practices. During this period, Islam can hardly be described as a religion that promoted in a discernible way the modernization of social structures, values, and attitudes of Malay society.²⁵

While the role of Islām in pre-colonial Malaysia has been somewhat romanticized by contemporary Malay spokesmen, the very idealization of the period has given ideological strength to those viewing religion as a bulwark against perceived invidious elements of Western-led modernization.

British colonial experience further reinforced the parochial and rural character of the Malay world. In part this resulted from a general policy of gradualism regarding change among the Malays. Rather than foster reforms that might "unsettle" their charges, the British sought to support the Sultans and Malay traditions as a means of placating the rural population. By sustaining the Malay elite, keeping Christian

²⁴For example, see the description by S. Husin Ali in "A Note on Malay Society and Culture," in *Cultural Problems of Malaya in the Context of Southeast Asia*, ed. by S. Alisjahbana, X. Nayagam and Wang Gungwu (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, n.d.), pp. 65-75.

²⁵Means, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

missionary activities away from Kampongs and insulating the Malay from Western influences it was hoped that colonial rule would be made easier. Considerable weight must be given the direct-indirect pattern of administration in explaining the different paths of the Malay and non-Malay communities. While settlements such as Malacca, Penang, and Singapore came under direct rule, most Malays continued to live under a classic pattern of indirect administration. Thus, the immigrant Chinese and Indian population found themselves in areas where European commercial and administrative institutions predominated and the influence of the market economy and Western values were more pervasive. Meanwhile, the Malays continued to live, at least symbolically, under traditional rulers in an environment where Islām remained the dominant value system.

Colonial economic policies also tended to lead to a separate path for the Malays. The emphasis on tin mining and plantation agriculture, which employed immigrant workers, was accompanied by a general neglect of the Malay small-holder. At the same time, the urban British and Chinese used their economic power to gain advantage over the rural Malay population.²⁶ Colonial policy also contributed to a classic case of "spatial distortion" with an inequitable distribution of government expenditures, services, and programs. Urban and commercial Malaya were the focal points of quality education, modern administration, technological infrastructure and communication. Rural Malaya in contrast provided an environment where the administrative infrastructure was weaker, schooling (particularly Western middle and upper education) was poor or absent, opportunities for commercial advancement were few and role models were either administrative or religious. In the latter situation the Malay saw in Islām a protection against the outside world, a basis for his identity and an assurance that he was a true "son of the soil," in contrast to the more affluent immigrants. Islām became a means by which the rural Malay could differentiate himself from these modern interlopers, and an idealized Islām was proclaimed as an alternate philosophy to the mundane, immediate material interest values seemingly proposed by the West.

Thus, at the time of independence the majority of Malays remained tied to a holistic view that centered on their religion, ethnicity, and rural character. Yet, even prior to the war, cracks were appearing in Malay-Muslim ranks. There had long been differences among the various immigrant groups of Indonesians, Indians, Pakistanis and Arabs; but ideological fissures developed within the Malay community as well,

²⁶This position has been most forcefully made by Ungku Aziz in his explanation of Malay rural poverty.

primarily within the more educated. The "modernist" Kuam Muda movement had begun to call for basic changes in attitudes and behavior.²⁷ The initial Malay nationalist movements were radical rather than traditional and emphasized secular political goals above religious issues. The educated Malay elite, while attempting to maintain Malay support, was itself being slowly secularized by Western influences from schooling and participation in modern administration. Finally, in rural Malaya the first elements of class division were emerging between establishment Malay landlords and land hungry peasants who used Islām as their unifying theme.²⁸

Within these cross-currents the Malay found himself buffeted by those who viewed progress as primarily moral and feared the impact of Muslim-oriented modernization and the national leadership which sought the twin goals of unity and economic development. The former position was clearly presented by a "traditionalist" politician when he declared:

The UMNO claims that we are against progress. We are not. But we are against their kind of progress. Theirs is a progress of bricks and mortar only superficial and materialistic. That is not the kind of progress which is either desirable or necessary. What is required is that sort of progress which is sought by, and which will benefit, the people as a whole — not display projects but projects directed at the needs of all the people, most especially the ordinary people who, for all the years of Alliance rule, are still ground down in hardship and poverty. For us the concept of progress is not simply an economic concept, measurable in terms of the number of factories or land schemes which have been opened. For us progress consists of uplifting a society and a people from material poverty, social oppression and a crippling backwardness. Its goal is moral, not just material. It is directed to the people and its own dignity. That, back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad, is the Muslim meaning of progress.²⁹

Against those who defined progress in more moral tones were the national elite who saw the country's needs primarily in terms of bringing together the racially diverse population and raising the living standards of the population. In order to achieve the former goals, it was necessary to downplay Malay-Muslim chauvinism while economic goals

²⁷For a discussion of these elements see Means, "The Role of Islam," pp. 276-79.

²⁸For a most challenging discussion of these developments, see C. Kessler, *Islam and Politics in a Malay State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978)

²⁹Quoted in C. Kessler, "Muslim Identity and Political Identity in Kelantan," in *Kelantan Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State*, ed. by W. Roff (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 305.

demanding overlooking supposed Islāmic restrictions on trade such as rules on Friday business, usury, and taxation. Since the dominant part of the multiracial alliance that ruled Malaysia was Malay, the rural Malay found himself called on to support a group that on the one hand proclaimed protection of his interests and on the other was attempting to lead him away from the parochial, rural ways of his ancestors.

However, it can be argued that while debates over government policies were making headlines, more important activities were taking place within the society which were challenging traditional Malay values. The growth in urbanization and modernization which has touched Malaysia more than almost any other South-Southeast Asia has begun to make profound changes in Malay life. While we cannot touch all of these developments, a brief review of the role played by education can illustrate the new pattern.³⁰

Education under the British was not conducive to rural change. Schooling for the elite was primarily directed toward inculcating humanistic values and preparing its members for administration and teaching. Studies centered primarily on Islām, history, and administration; and very few Malays entered technical areas. Education for the Malay masses was in the vernacular, and its rural bias was purposely formulated to meet local needs. Inadequate science facilities and poorly trained teachers funneled children into nontechnical interests. At the same time, many Malays entered private Islāmic schools where technical subjects were largely neglected.³¹

Since independence, major efforts have been made to encourage Malays to think in commercial and technical fields. Government funding, quotas in universities and special technical training programs have all led to an increase of Malays at the upper levels. In the rural areas as well attempts have been made to improve technical training, and this has been presented in terms of strengthening the Malay community as a whole. These programs have experienced challenges from parents and local traditional leaders who have seen Western ideas as a danger to holistic religious-ethnic beliefs and behavior. An interesting pattern

³⁰The literature on education in Malaysia is increasing rapidly. Among publications that touch upon this issue are: M. Rudner, "Education, Development and Change in Malaysia," *Southeast Asian Studies*, 15 (June, 1977), pp. 23-62; A. Wilson, *Education, Mobility, and Expectations of Youths in Malaysia* (Berkeley: School of Education, University of California, Mimeographed); C. Enloe, *Multi-Ethnic Politics: The Case of Malaysia*, Research Monograph Series, No. 2 (Berkeley: University of California, 1970); F. Kee and G. Hean, *Perspectives: The Development of Education in Malaysia and Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1972); and F. Kee and E. Hong, *Education in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1971).

³¹Often religious teaching was exchanged for agricultural work.

perhaps resulting from this opposition could be seen in the first graduating class of the Malay language Universiti Kebangsaan. Of 23 Malay graduates in science none had fathers who were Ḥājjīs. Yet, the force of change through education is bringing new values into the Kampongs and leading young Malays to think of careers other than administration, teaching, and religion. Studies show that education is weakening the hold of parental occupations on the child's attainments; and Malays, seeing the "special rights" available to them, have high expectations of what education will bring. Certainly, the government is encouraging both these changes and opportunities for those properly trained.

However, ironically this very education is now producing a backlash as young Malay intellectuals (particularly those trained abroad, and especially those educated in the United Kingdom) are demanding a return to Islāmic values. Perhaps as a reaction to Western values and culture these young people are stating that Malaysian growth must take place within Islāmic principles and the materialist programs of contemporary Malaysia must be uprooted.

IV

The final section of this paper will comment upon the implications of recent religio-nationalist attitudes as they affect economic development and Malay entrepreneurship. Previous note has been given to government programs formulated to give special aid to Bumiputra in terms of quotas, subsidies and other "affirmative action" policies. These actions have taken place against a backdrop of increased Malay-Islāmic self-consciousness, the ironic result of which would appear to be an endangering of the country's immediate overall economic growth and a strengthening of the entrepreneurial potential of the Malay.

My own annual subjective observations of ideological change in Malaysia during the past fifteen years has led to the conclusion that there is an increasing Malay-Islāmic nationalism in the polity. The period after the 1969 riots which pitted Malay against Chinese has been one of noteworthy Malay-Islāmic assertiveness. This self-consciousness combines the traditional ethnic and religious elements previously noted with the Islāmic fundamentalism of the young educated population. With rare exceptions, it does not seek to force Islāmic beliefs on others, but emphasizes that Malaysia gives a special role to Malays and their religion and customs. It has not only manifested itself in the economic programs for Malays, but in statements by members of parliament and UMNO, greater attention given to Islāmic issues in the press and publicly controlled media and Islāmic nationalist comments and behavior of Malay faculty at universities and lower echelons of the civil service. While there has been some backing and filling by the

national political leadership, the long-term trend has been one of reinforcing Malay self-consciousness.

It can be argued that this religio-ethnic ideology has become an impediment to overall economic development on five grounds.

1. Non-Malay local business interests have become suspicious of the new economic policies and there has been a resultant fall-off in domestic investment. The 200 largest Malaysian firms saw a drop in investment per quarter from M\$115 million in 1975 to less than M\$15 million in 1977. There have been other signs of caution by Chinese and Indian businessmen who have been dissatisfied with quota systems for workers and the possible loss of business due to special priorities given to Malay entrepreneurs. While this retrenchment may be temporary, reticence in developing new investment could make the economy more committed to international financing.

2. Chinese and Indian reactions to growing Islāmic-Malay nationalism have purportedly led to the beginnings of a brain drain. Difficulties in obtaining positions in local educational institutions, language requirements, job quotas, and the general ideological atmosphere has driven some professionals to seek overseas jobs. Young Chinese in particular have become more interested in foreign education and ultimately a job outside Malaysia.

3. Foreign firms have also shown some caution in entering and developing the Malaysian market because of questions arising out of new policies although overseas investment remains strong. Foreign financing is perceived as essential by the government as the Prime Minister has emphasized the need for M\$26.8 billion in such investment from 1976 to 1980. The long-term consequences of Islāmic-Malay nationalism have been emphasized particularly by larger firms.

4. There have been charges that lower level Bumiputra bureaucrats and agencies have been more biased in favor of Malays than the leadership and that this has been reflected in actions detrimental to economic growth (for example, if it said that non-Malay firms have not received the percentage of government orders available by law, due to bureaucratic favoritism).³² In 1976-77 it is reported that the government planned to spend M\$45 billion in the public sector but only allocated M\$3.7 billion, much of which was simply banked by administrative units. Allegedly the shortfall was due to the unavailability of Bumiputra engineers, contractors, and architects, and an unwillingness to use Chinese and Indians. The top leadership has recently made major efforts to educate lower level bureaucrats to the need for more flexible policies.

³² *Star* (May, 1977).

5. The more fundamentalist Muslims, both traditional and modern, have demanded that Malaysia change its outward looking economic policies and seek Islāmic solutions. While often vague on these reforms, these individuals and groups tend to be suspicious of foreign investment and the trappings of a materialist culture. While they do not make government policy, their articulate spokesmen must be listened to by a government that must placate its Malay constituency.

6. Finally, it is charged that due to the quota system in government less well-qualified Bumiputra have been employed to the detriment of national development goals. No empirical evidence is available and such comments tend to be subjective. As in all these cases it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle Malay assertiveness from Islāmic self-consciousness. As has been noted, to Malays, religion and ethnicity are an integral part of the whole.³³

Yet, while there may be some at least short-run economic disadvantages to the new policies, they also appear to be loosening the weight of tradition on Malay entrepreneurship and involvement in the modern sector. Viewing the results of government programs as positively as possible (if modernization along Western lines is to be considered desirable), the following patterns appear to be emerging:

(a) More Malays are establishing new business ventures at both the local and national level.³⁴ In many cases the high amounts of government support and protection provided have made such opportunities very low risk activities. While a number of Malay firms have failed due to poor management, the total number of companies is increasing.

(b) Due to a lack of sufficient capital in the Malay community, quasi-government joint ventures have been developed. This pattern has provided Malay bureaucrats with experience in administering commercial enterprises and made such individuals targets of offers from private sector firms seeking to implement their Bumiputra quotas.

(c) The present quota system has drawn large numbers of Malays from rural areas into an industrial environment. Past studies have provided considerable evidence as to the impact of the factory situation

³³For an analysis of problems with developing Malay personnel, see "Restructuring Society." School of Comparative Social Sciences (Penang: Universiti Sains, Malaysia, 1975, Mimeographed).

³⁴The best extended (if somewhat pessimistic) discussion of Malay entrepreneurship is in T. Chee, *op. cit.*; G. Means, *op. cit.* pp. 59-61; and R. Winzler, "Ethnic Differences and Economic Change in a Local Malaysian Setting," *Southeast Asian Studies*, 14 (December, 1976), pp. 309-33. Winzler points out that Malays now own 34 percent of the shop houses.

on workers' perceptions and behavior.³⁵ As well, since most of these jobs up to now have been in previously Chinese-Indian dominated areas such as Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Malacca and Ipoh, this has forced some change in traditional Malay lifestyles. While Malays tend to live together in cities, the close proximity to the attractions and demands of the modern sector can only have a secularizing influence.

(d) Government programs and politicians have emphasized the importance of the Malay entering the modern sector and competing with other communities. Malay business investment has been presented as both patriotic and religiously sanctioned. In some cases Malay politicians have intimated that unless the Malay could compete successfully against the Chinese, the predominant role of the Malay and Islām would deteriorate and ultimately vanish. At the same time we should note that this position runs contrary to the views of a number of Malay writers who have seen modernization as a challenge to both the integrity of Islām and Malay life.³⁶

Thus, the Malay-Muslim finds himself open to severe cross-pressures as the national leadership attempts to foster both a modern state and competitive Malay population. By tradition used to following and expecting pronouncements by the leadership, he may see these new signals as endangering the old perceived security of Malay identity with its emphasis upon religion, tradition, and local obligations. Islām which has been the symbol of Malayness is now promulgated by national leaders as the basis for change and modernity.

³⁵For example, see A. Inkeles and D. Smith, *Becoming Modern* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

³⁶T.S. Chee, "Literary Response and the Social Process," *Southeast Asia Journal of Social Science*, 3 (1975), p. 89.

TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE ISMA'ILĪS IN EAST AFRICA

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At no time were the Asians large in numbers in East Africa and the Isma'īlīs were never the most numerous among them, yet when the "Asian exodus" culminated in the sudden expulsion of the Ugandan Asians in 1972, the Isma'īlī achievements had been incredible despite their small numbers. It is our hope that this paper will show their history is worth detailed scholarly attention.¹ Though some remain in East Africa, the student of their history must now turn his or her main attention to Britain, India, Pakistan, Vancouver, Toronto, Sydney, certain towns in the United States of America, wherever the winds of diaspora have carried them. This is a partial requiem by a man of the twilight acting as a spokesperson and secretary as the darkness deepens.² It seeks to set out something of the findings, but more of the spirit, of a small informal study group which met at Makerere University in Uganda from 1964 to 1968 and has kept in touch since by correspondence.³

Islām is known throughout the world for its unity. As the first occupant of the Aga Khān Chair of Islāmic Studies in the American University at Beirut put it: "Being 'the religion of unity' Islām, in fact, displays more homogeneity and less religious diversity than any other worldwide religion. Sunnism and Shī'ism are dimensions within Islām placed there not to destroy its unity but to enable a larger humanity and differing spiritual types to participate in it. Both Sunnism and Shī'ism are the assertion of the *shahādah*, *Lā ilaha ill' Allah* expressed in different climates and with a somewhat different spiritual fragrance."⁴

The Isma'īlīs are members of the *shī'ah* or 'party' which believe that the 'succession' to the Prophet Muḥammad was continued in his family, in 'Alī who was his cousin and husband of his daughter Fāṭimah and

their descendants. 'Twelver' or Ithnā-'Asharī Shī'ism believes that the twelfth Imām became hidden during the fourth Muslim or tenth Christian century. The Isma'īlīs believe that the succession came down through Imam Isma'īl, to the present holder of the title, the forty-ninth. The Isma'īlīs of East Africa are remarkably familiar with their doctrine of the Imāmate and of how the Isma'īlīs came to power and set up Fāṭimī rule in North Africa and Egypt in the tenth century. They are proud of the Fāṭimī achievement in founding Cairo and the great University of Al Azhar, which is in some ways the mother university of the western world. They also know that after the eighth Fāṭimī Caliph the Isma'īlīs of Egypt and Arabia followed al Musta'li, while those of the East, following the lead of Ḥasan ibn Ṣabbāḥ, who used the fortress of 'Alamūt in Iran as his center, came to be known as Nizārī.⁵

In 1256 the Mongols took the Isma'īlī stronghold at 'Alamūt and destroyed the library, the observatory and the scientific apparatus the Isma'īlīs had collected there. In 1258 Baghdād itself fell to the Mongols and they carried out another of the massacres for which they are infamous to all time. Muslim civilization suffered a blow from which it took centuries to recover. The Isma'īlī center of gravity moved to Persia. It is a period of great obscurity in their history for they had to hide their real identity in the face of persecution by the Mongols and by Muslims of other groups.

For us the Imāmate emerges from the darkness of this historical tunnel in the second decade of the nineteenth century when the forty-fifth Imām was murdered at the instigation of the other party in an Iranian dispute. The King of Persia had to avenge the death and in addition honored Ḥasan 'Alī Shāh, the new Imām, with a Governorship. He was given the title Aghā Khān and the hand of a Princess. On the death of the Shah, the Agha Khān became involved in the Persian wars of succession and then in a series of court intrigues in which he suffered many insults, imprisonment and hairbreadth escapes. In 1842 he helped the British in their expedition into Afghanistan. On their retreat from Kandahār, partly because he had become implicated with them as a result of helping them, the Agha Khān left Persia for Sind, intending to return one day to take up the struggle for justice.

Whatever may have been the promises of the British officers on the spot, British 'higher policy' came to terms with the Agha Khān's enemies in Persia and did not allow the immediate counterattack which he would have liked to launch.⁶

The Khojas Isma'īlīs of India

Who were the Khojas of the Sind, Cutch, Kathiawar and Gujarat areas who so enthusiastically received the Agha Khān Ḥasan 'Alī Shāh as Imām when he came to the Bombay area? We are fortunate in

having a pretty reliable document to help us. In November, 1866, Mr. Justice Arnould delivered judgment in the Bombay High Court on the case, "Advocate General *ex relatione* Daya Muhammad, etc., plaintiffs, *versus* Muhammad Husen Husenī (otherwise called Aga Khan) and others, defendants."⁷ The learned Judge had some fairly poor European secondary sources to guide him but was critically aware of their weaknesses. At the same time, the plaintiffs and defendants put some first-rate historical and contemporary material in front of him. Arnould says the Khojas were originally Hindus of the trading class converted by Pir Saḍruddīn in Sind about four hundred years before. According to the information he had, the Pir was an Isma'īlī *dā'ī* sent by Shāh Islām Shāh, the thirtieth Imām. Arnould considered that the word *khoja* means 'the honorable or worshipful person' and 'the disciple.' As applied to Pir Saḍruddīn's community it amounts to 'the honorable converts.' From Sind, according to the evidence before Arnould, the conversion spread into Cutch, thence into Kathiawar and through Gujarat to Bombay. As far as he knew, the Khojas were all engaged either in retail trade or commerce, and doing well in both. As to numbers, there were 2,800 'houses of families' in Sind, about 5,000 in Kathiawar. Arnould had no figures for Cutch and Gujarat but was sure the numbers there 'must be considerable.' Most importantly for our purpose, he adds 'in Zanzibar there are 450 Khoja families.' In Muscat there were four hundred, and in Bombay he reckoned there were about 1,400 families of which about four hundred were on the side of the plaintiffs, the rest with the Agha Khān. In his opinion, the struggle between the Agha Khān and the plaintiffs was confined to the Bombay area, 'to take an illustration ... from the evidence of witness XXIII it appears that 445 out of the 450 families who compose the Khoja community of Zanzibar have recently signed a paper of adhesion to the Aga and to the views he is understood to represent.'

Already in 1866 the Isma'īlī Imāmī Khojas were well organized in the places where they existed. Arnould found that the basic Khoja community organization consisted of a *jamā'ah* (the adult males gathered in congregation) with a *Mukhi* (treasurer) and *Kamaria* (accountant) who held office for such time as they gave satisfaction. He found that besides local *Mukhis* and *Kamarias*, in Sind and Kaathiawar, at least, there were provincial officials who held office under the Imām. Their duty was to send contributions to the Imām; as far back as tradition took them, such contributions had been sent and pilgrimages to his seat had been made.

It is not easy to discover much from Arnould's judgement about the basic teachings of the Khoja Isma'īlī. Clearly the majority of them considered the Imām the descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad and

Ḥaḍrat 'Alī in whom special charisma rested. Its exact nature is not easy to ascertain. Arnould, basing himself on evidence put before him by the Agha Khān's supporters, says that two points are of great importance with regard to the Khojas. First, there has been 'the universal prevalence among the Isma'īlis of the practice of *takia* or concealment of religious opinion, secondly, their method of seeking to make converts by assuming to a great extent the religious standpoints of the person whom they desired to convert.' Of *takia* [*taqiyyah*] he says, it was 'mental reservation.' Its Arabic root meaning is 'fear or caution,' its full applied meaning 'concealment of a man's own religious opinions and adoption of alien religious forms.' He says a Protestant in a Catholic country raising his hat or showing 'outward respect as the more solemn processions of the Romish Church pass by' is '*takia*, outward conformity, in order to avoid giving offence, or hurting the religious feelings of others.'

In describing the teachings of Pir Saḍruddīn, Arnould mentions that the authorship or at least the introduction among the Khojas of the *Dussautar* (the Ten Incarnations) had been generally ascribed to this Pir. He speaks of it as the chief of the ancient religious books of the Khojas, read over them at the point of death and publicly read in their *Jamatkhanas* in India and the East. He asks what this book is, and answers that it has ten chapters 'containing the account of the ten *avatars* or incarnations.' The first nine deal with the nine appearances of Vishnu and the tenth is concerned with the incarnation of the Most Holy 'Alī. It is this chapter 'which is alone nowadays seriously attended to. When that chapter is commenced, the congregation ... rises and remains standing till it is concluded, making profound reverences whenever the reader pronounces the name of the Most Holy 'Alī.'

At the same time Arnould had to deal with a fact that both sides were agreed on, that in their funerals and marriages and in a number of other ways the Khojas followed the rites and practices of the Sunnīs. He explains it as part of their '*takia* in the face of Sunnī bigotry,' and compares the way in which dissenting couples often married in the established Church in England. He considered it would take all the Agha Khān's power as a leader to get these rites into Isma'īlī hands.

It would not be unfair to describe Khoja Isma'īlism in its Sindī, Gujarati, Cutchi and Kathiawari forms as originally a certain accommodation of Islām to Hindu culture and thought-forms. Young educated East African Isma'īlīs look back and admit this but say that it was a temporary compromise which though it might last centuries, was bound to end in pure Islām. They consider the process would be easier against the East African background rather than in the Indian environment with its all-pervading Hinduism. It would be easier in a

community forgetting its Gujarati, as the East African community is. But this is to anticipate, and we must return to the Khojas of the 1880s.

The Isma'īlī Imāmī Shī'ah Khoja in East Africa Before the Colonial Period

Islām must have been brought down the East African coast by traders from the Arab peninsula within a century or two of the Hijrah. A Muslim civilization was built up in places like Lamu, Malindi, Gedi, Mombasa, Zanzibar and Kilwa and was flourishing when Vasco da Gama came by in 1498. Seyyid Akhṭar Rizvi of Dār-es-Salaam points out that inscriptions on the pillar tombs of Malindi suggest that some of the Muslims settled on the coast were Shī'ah.⁸ Some may indeed have been Isma'īlīs but there is no evidence for or against. For many centuries Indians from the Malabar coast were trading with the monsoon to East Africa. As Isma'īlī trader converts moved down from Sind they might well have joined in the maritime trade; but again, of the nature of the case, there is no evidence till the nineteenth century. When Sulṭān Sayyid Sa'īd of Oman and Muscat set up his headquarters at Zanzibar in 1837 he encouraged Indians to come and settle in his domains. He gave them freedom of religion and protection. Both Hindus and Muslims seem to have responded to the conditions he created.

It is interesting that Rāi Shamsuddīn Tejpar, at that time President of the Tanzania Isma'īlī Association, remarked in an interview in 1966 that the Isma'īlīs were coming to East Africa 'about 125 years ago.' So far as Bombay Government was concerned they were persons from British India, their activities brought prosperity to British subjects, they were given some distant protection, their religion did not matter much. So far as Sayyid Sa'īd was concerned, he was an Ibāḍī Muslim, his Arabs and Swahili were Sunnī of the Shāfī'ī school, the Indians were a different cultural, social and linguistic group; it is probable that he took cognizance that some of the *wahindi* were more Muslim and less *kāfir* (unbeliever) than the others, but he was tolerant to all and promoted undoubted Hindus in his service.⁹ As for the Indians in the Sulṭān's domains, whether they were Hindu, Isma'īlī or Sunnī, they were one group with similar customs, from the same area, engaged in commerce, using the same methods. A strict Hindu finds his religion inhibited by crossing salt water; a strict old-fashioned Muslim should find his faith inhibited by the need for usury. It was the bringing by Indians of capital which enabled the Arabs and Swahili to equip caravans and begin the great journeys to the Lakes and beyond; it was the Indians who made possible the opening up of the routes from the sea through Tanganyika to Lake Victoria and Buganda, to Lake Tanganyika and on to the Congo, up the Ruvuma to Lake Nyassa. The European "explorers"

mainly followed those routes opened up by Arabs and Asians. In the circumstances the Isma'īlīs would do well.

As to their journey from the India coast to East Africa, we have not yet come upon a written description. As one prominent Isma'īlī remarked, 'our ancestors didn't write much, they even signed with their thumbs.' But there are Isma'īlīs whom we have interviewed who are old enough to have travelled by sail in boats owned by their kinsmen before the stream- and motor-ship stifled the sailing boat traffic. A boat took many days from Bombay to Mombasa. If they were lucky and the cargo was rice, they did not lack for food and water. But conditions could be otherwise.¹⁰ One can imagine that some of the voyages were not as pleasant and that many died. It must have needed no small courage to undertake such voyages.

The motives of the Isma'īlīs who faced this voyage and the unknown in Africa can to some extent be reconstructed. Their homeland was fertile, but where it faced towards the desert, it was liable to cycles of drought. Throughout the nineteenth century there was an increasing pressure of population on the land, though this was more pronounced at the end of the period. Some have suggested that there was some persecution of the Isma'īlīs in Gujarat by Sunnis and Hindus; persecution is too strong a word, there may have been social pressure on Isma'īlīs. It is significant that a few Gujarati Sunnīs (of whom in the homeland there is no lack) emigrated, and that the 'Patel' (a Hindu group) migration in force is twentieth century. It might be that the Isma'īlīs looked to Africa as a place where they could be free to be themselves, as the Puritans looked to New England. Also, it would seem that in India, East Africa is looked upon as a land of promise. 'Go west young man.' We find H.H. Sir Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh regularly recommending emigration to the inland areas of Africa to the young men; no doubt wise leaders in the community had seen the wisdom of the emigration from the beginning.¹¹

It has been possible to gather some oral biographical material regarding a few of the Khojas who lived in East Africa in these early days. A certain Jairam Shivji Bhatia was made Customs Master by Sulṭān Sayyid Sa'īd soon after he came over from Muscat to Zanzibar. Jairam already had a flourishing business on the island and he established agents in the ports of the mainland. His Cutchi relations and friends came to assist him.¹² Even though he was himself a Hindu (though one meets Sivjis and Bhatias in East Africa today who are Isma'īlī and Ithnā-'asharī), his associates included Isma'īlīs. An old Isma'īlī informant who prefers not to be named told 'Azīz Isma'īl in 1966 that in those early days it was very difficult for an outsider to distinguish an Isma'īlī. He wore the same kind of clothes, had the same

kind of names, kept *diwali*, sang *gits*, danced *garba* and *rasda* like anyone else from Cutch and Gujarat. He said that *khoja* at this time was used in the sense of 'trader.'

It looks as if the newcomers usually went first to Zanzibar and there worked in Isma'īlī firms till they had gained some experience, some capital and some Swahili. Then they moved over to the mainland and bartered for African goods brought to the coasts, and sold supplies to caravans, guns, gunpowder and shot to hunters and local potentates and leaders who could buy. Those who were really bold went further inland and we hear of the Indian merchants in places like Kaze (Tabora). Careful sifting of oral evidence at Tabora makes it reasonable to suppose that some were Isma'īlīs.

According to Rai Shamsuddīn Tejpar there is some evidence that the 'Mūsā Mzuri' who helped Burton and Speke at Tabora was surnamed 'Kanji.' If so he was very probably of the Isma'īlī-Ithnā 'asharī group. At Mombasa an old and reliable Isma'īlī gentleman told 'Azīz Isma'īl (in 1965) that Mūsā Mzuri had come from Surat about 1820 to join a business already established in East Africa by his brother: the two then penetrated inland.

Sir Tharia Topan who had worked for the firm of Shivji Jairam Bhatia took over the Customs for a time. He had great influence with Sulṭān Sayyid Barghash and helped the British to negotiate the end of the slave trade. This gentleman was definitely a follower of H.H. the Agha Khān, for he contributed richly to the legal expenses in the Khoja case and was rewarded with the title of 'Vizier' by the Imām.¹³

In the later part of the period under review, mission station records become available at places like Bagamoyo (Holy Ghost Fathers), Masasi, Muhesa, Msalibani and Korogwe (Universities Mission to Central Africa) In these we hear now and then of the local *mhindi* or Indian *duka*-keeper (shopkeeper). In one case, the U.M.C.A. books for Magila name a *mhindi* who keeps coming into the picture — Jetha. He greatly helped the mission, supplying its needs, making gifts, obliging it over questions of land. Local oral tradition has it that he was Isma'īlī.¹⁴

It would seem that as soon as a few Isma'īlīs had gathered in a place they became conscious of themselves as a *jamā'at*. They met to pray, to sing, to carry on their business and social life. They met in each other's houses or in a shelter outside, they would put aside a room as a *jamā'atkhana* then go on eventually to a building. The natural leaders among them would begin to function as *kamaria* and *mukhi*. It is difficult to establish when dues began to be sent back to the Imām, presumably a person paid the same dues as he had paid in India, if necessary, when he got back to his home *jamā'atkhana*. But no doubt local arrangements were made very early on. We saw that Zanzibar was

paying in 1865, presumably men going to the mailand sent dues to Zanzibar for forwarding and gradually a territorial organization was built up. We shall see below how the system was organized later, but we can be fairly sure that in the early days Zanzibar played a central and vital role and later arrangements were in a sense a dividing up of Zanzibar's jurisdiction. Short visits to Zanzibar in 1960 and to Bombay and Karachi in 1965 and 1971 were sufficient to show that there was a good deal of documentary evidence in both places which could give us fairly full answers to a great number of historical questions.¹⁵ A personal visit to the Agha Khān in Paris in 1965 elicited the information that the archives of the Imāmat were being reorganized and he hoped great parts of them would be made available through a study Institute he intended to set up. This Institute is at this time beginning operations in London. The Zanzibar and Kampala material has been scattered. There is also need for research and preservation work to be done at places such as Bagamoyo, Tabora, Lamu, Mombasa, Nairobi and Kisumu.

The Late Pre-Colonial and Early Colonial Period

The mention of railway and lake-port towns has already brought us forward to our next historical period. In the 1880s the European powers partitioned Africa and even the government of the Sulṭān of Zanzibar was taken under control. The colonial period brought some difficulty to the Isma'īlīs for they were not given full rights of political freedom or the right to settle where they wished. Also the colonial economic policies were not exactly framed with them in view; Europeans did not want orientals to compete with them economically or in running the colonies or in settling there. The Isma'īlīs had to make the best of each situation as it arose. On the other hand the colonial period brought security and better communications. The Isma'īlīs know the colonial system, they were already British Indian subjects, they understood its workings. They also knew Africa and the Africans. In the end the Isma'īlīs, who were there before the colonialists, managed to hold on, prosper and outlast them. It was not easy. The study of the biography of a number of leading Isma'īlīs of those days gives us an impression of the times and of the role the community was called upon to play. A fair amount of biographical material is available orally from the families of these men who still live in East Africa. Isma'īlī publications such as *Ismaili Prakash* and *Noorum Mobin* have digests of material, and various *Who's Whos* like Shanti Pandit's *Asians in East and Central Africa* (Nairobi 1963) have some historical material, though the portraits are not of the 'warts-and-all' variety. Here it must suffice just to tell the tale of Allidina Visram.¹⁶

He was a Kaira Cutchi who came to Zanzibar in 1863 and expanded the small trading business he had started to Bagamoyo. Thence he traded up to Ujiji. During his visit of 1899 Imām Sir Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh advised Sheth Allidina to pay great attention to Mombasa. He had been trading in cloves, wax and ivory in exchange for cloth and had undertaken contracts to equip and supply hunting and missionary safaris to the interior. When the railway was started Sheth Allidina Visram supplied food and other necessities to the builders. He opened shops to serve them. He even acted in places as a paymaster general. When the railway was completed he extended his operations into Uganda to such places as Entebbe, Jinja, Masaka, and Kampala. He took up cotton buying, ginning and export. He had more than a hundred shops; many Khojas came to work in them and in his other businesses. When they had saved something, they began enterprises of their own. The Agha Khān honored him with the title of 'Vazier'. Vazier Visram extended his business more and more and not all his creditors paid him back. The first World War led to great business difficulties in East Africa. The writer's father, W.H. King, who fought there with the Indian Expeditionary Force from 1915 to 1918, used to say that the whole natural line of business communication between Tanga and Mombasa, Arusha and Nairobi, Kisumu and its southwestern hinterland was broken up. He described the sufferings of the Indian *duka* keepers who were merrily raided by both sides as the battle ebbed and flowed. The Belgians coming in from the Congo into Rwanda and Burundi and then crossing the lake to push towards Tabora treated the Indian traders in the same way as they advanced and the Germans retreated. Vazier Visram was hard hit by the war and made the long and terrible journeys up to the Congo trying to build up his business again. He largely failed in this and died in 1916.

The Imāmate of H.H. Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh

In the meantime a major event was beginning to have its effect on the Isma'īlīs in East Africa. This was the accession to the *gadi* of the Imāmate of H.H. Sulṭān Muhammad Shāh in 1885 at the age of eight. His redoubtable grandfather, the Agha Khān Ḥasan 'Alī Shāh, had died in 1881 to be succeeded by his son Agha 'Alī Shāh who made a name for himself in sportmanship and holiness and died after an Imāmate of only four years. In the days of this the forty-eighth Imām and third Agha Khān, the Isma'īlīs of East Africa became the community we see today and to understand the community one must understand something of the policy of his Imāmate and its effects in East Africa. This is of course a study in itself. One of the best guides to this is to be found in his *firmāns* or commands, pronouncements. A careful analysis of some of

the *firmāns* addressed to East Africa shows that His Highness had from the time of his first visit to Africa in 1899, the idea of his community developing fully into the modern situation.¹⁷ First he needed to make clear his own position as Imām; this remained changeless. His followers had to be led into an ever purer form of Islām and their whole lives reorganized to give them the happiness, education, and welfare their *ma-bap* (mother-father) desired for them.

It is never surprising in history to find strong central policy leading to some secession. As we saw above, in Zanzibar as early as 1865 there were some five families of dissenters among the Khojas who did not support the authority of the Imām. It would be logical if they suffered the same fate as the *barhai*, the brethren in Bombay who had been in and out of excommunication for some time and who were finally outcast after the case of 1865. It appears that those outcast earlier in India joined the Sunnīs. In East Africa, according to oral evidence, the split did not come at once, and people restless about the Agha Khān's position only gradually drifted away from the Isma'īlīs.¹⁸ Rupani says that the Imām sought to unite his people and shut out dissenters. There was trouble in Bombay, Cutch, Jamnagar, and Kathiawar. Those who accepted the Imām were separated from those who believed in a hidden Imām.¹⁹ Things came to a head about the time of the Ḥajjī Bibi case in 1905.²⁰ Some of the Agha Khān's relatives were claiming that they had a share by right (rather than out of generosity) to the property of the Imam and in the offerings made to him. The legal summary quaintly and tersely puts the decision as follows:

The Aga Khan has absolute property over the offerings made to him. Members of the Aga Khan's family not jointly entitled to such offerings — succession to the estate of the Aga Khan is not joint — Khojas are Shiah Imami Ismailis and not Asnasharis (sic).

In East Africa those who could not loyally remain under the Imām joined the Ithnā 'asharī group, that is, the Shī'ah which accepted twelve Imāms. In East Africa some of those thus 'outcasted' laid claim in the courts of the property that they had all used. In 1905 the Agha Khān took a power of attorney and named his legal agents in Zanzibar. He gave his people a Constitution and they now had a defined legal existence in the face of the Law. Since then other Constitutions have followed and in each the Agha Khān's own community has been more and more closely delineated.

The Agha Khān carefully assisted his people to build up provincial, territorial, and supreme councils. This meant that they had a highly efficient organization for collecting dues and for using money for the benefit of all. This also meant that they had a voice in their own affairs and could shape policy, while at the same time they received benevolent

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central direction.

His Highness cared greatly for the education of his people, believing that education was the key to the future. An educational organization was built up which gave the Isma'īlīs one of the best systems in East Africa which incidentally was the first explicitly to insist that its doors were open to all races and to implement this. His Highness gave careful thought and direction over the years to the welfare of his people. He insisted that girls should receive equal (if not superior) educational opportunity. His remark at Mombasa in 1945 is famous but only repeats something he had said often before. 'If a father has two children, one a son and the other a daughter, if he can afford to educate only one of them, I would advise ... to educate the daughter first ... if a mother is educated she will be able to educate and bring up her children properly.'

His Highness cared greatly for the health of his people and saw to it that excellent medical and hospital facilities should be put at their disposal, and at the disposal of the other communities amongst whom they lived. At the same time he insisted prevention was better than cure: good water, mosquito nets, fresh air, good food especially milk, are among the themes of his *firmāns*. He urged his people to take healthy exercise and encouraged the setting up of sports clubs. He continually stressed the evils of alcohol, drugs, and rich food. He tried to combat luxurious and ostentatious living. Expensive feasting has been cut out. Circumcision of male babies is carried out in the western way in infancy by a medical man. Marriage takes place quietly in the *jamā'atkhana* with strict regulation of the cost of the clothing worn and the size of the reception.

It is natural that the Imām's financial and commercial policy should bulk large in any account, however brief, of his Imāmate. In Europe it is a common misunderstanding of Jesus' saying about God and Mammon to suppose that God has no dominion over finance. The Isma'īlīs do not make this mistake. Systematic use of money especially by way of offerings to the Imām is very close to godliness. His Highness saw to it that the money given to him and donated by him for the use of the community was looked after by properly constituted committees of honest men and women. He saw to it that the money was properly put to work and invested. The Jubilee Insurance Company which originated this way was a model of its kind. A building society and banking businesses were set up to enable people to own their own houses and businesses. His Highness gave advice and help not only to the great companies he set up but to individuals. He had a tremendous belief in Africa's future; he told his people to spread out, to settle down, to become fully members of their new countries and through initiative and service bring benefit to all.²¹

The Modern Period

The late Agha Khān laid down his leadership in 1957 and the Imāmate continued in his grandson Shāh Karīm al Ḥusaynī, Agha Khān IV, who was born in 1936. He was, as one of his followers pointed out, a descendant through his father of the ancient Iranian royal family and of the Prophet of Islām and on his mother's side of the medieval Kings of England, hence of Charlemagne. He knew Kenya well: his East African followers treasure the memory of how as a boy he used to lead the prayer in the Nairobi *jamā'athkana*. At the same time he was fully a member of the modern international world, he had studied at Harvard, and was contributing directly to the development of Pakistan, of various countries in Africa and of places in Europe. Various studies of his Imāmate have already been begun but years of further study are required, quite apart from the perspective of years which history demands. Here a few inadequate remarks must suffice. It was for the new Imām to carry on the work of the Imāmate under changed conditions. The situation is well stated in a quotation from the will of the late Imām. He wrote:

I am convinced that it is in the interest of the Shia Muslim Ismaili community that I be succeeded by a young man who has been brought up and developed during recent years and in the midst of the new age and who brings a new outlook on life to his office as Imam.

Accordingly every aspect of his grandfather's work was carried forward and over the years readapted to the new situation. Above all the coming of Independence which the grandfather had foreseen and welcomed had to be prepared and worked for.

The situation in the mid 1960s, the response, and the promise are well illustrated by the inaugural address and a series of public lectures given by the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs which is closely associated with the University College at Nairobi, then part of the University of East Africa. The address was given by His Highness the Agha Khān on November 24, 1966. His Highness began by pointing to the revolution of rising expectations for a full share in the world's riches which the new nations in East Africa must meet. He showed how the University and the Kenyan Ministries of Economic Planning and of Education were giving priority to technological and scientific training and he was optimistic over the outcome. But the rich nations must devote more of their resources to helping. The new nations must build up a situation in which rapid advance could take place.

The Agha Khān spoke of the need for computer science, if only to speed up efficient taxation! He showed how agriculture is likely to continue to be the backbone of prosperity in East Africa and how new

advances in its technology could make a great leap forward possible. The same kind of advances could be brought about in industry and commerce. No one must think this is impossible in East Africa. In 1945 Germany and Japan had to build from the bottom and now they have outstripped their rivals. Capital from abroad was needed both from large-scale private investors and from international bodies. Internally the greatest need was for the training of technical manpower. Groups of companies and communities inside the country could do much to assist with this; for instance, his people were seeking ways of making their educational system (which was already available to all) more effective in technological training. There was room for commercial and financial groups and development companies to contribute to the development of light industry. It was his intention, as soon as such companies were firmly established, to assist them with a specialized service to keep them up to date with the latest developments. He was confident that what the Germans and Japanese had done, the East Africans could do within the next years.

In a sense we see here the Isma'īlīs at their greatest moment in East African affairs. The vast amounts of material we collected about other matters to do with the community indicate as rosy a picture.²² The *jamā'atkhānas* were prosperous, well-organized. Their educational, social and medical services were among the best in the world. Religiously, the theology of the Imāmate, the practice of community prayer and meditation, the understanding of the Isma'īlī place in Islām and the modern world, were being discussed in a lively and constructive fashion. There were many inside the community who warned that money played too large a part, that true integration with their African fellow citizens would have to go ahead at a breathless pace if they were to overcome the tacit *apartheid* of the colonial period. Already the rumbling of the apocalypse could be heard.

The 1964 revolution at Zanzibar dispersed the last major remnants of the community from what had been in the nineteenth century the mother *jamā'at*. It is still impossible to be certain what happened to the letters, accounts, minutes of meetings, records, runs of periodicals and library which were there. When in 1971 General Idi Amin gave the Asians a few months to leave Uganda, the communities there were broken up. Again, we cannot say what has happened to material located at Kampala, Fort Portal, Arua and all the other fine Isma'īlī centers which were there. It is not easy to foresee what policy any future democratically-based Ugandan government may have towards the Asians who were expelled. One historical analogy may be to say that Mary Tudor and her husband Philip of Spain did not try to restore to the monks the position and possessions they had before

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Disestablishment. In Tanzania, Mr. Julius Nyerere's government is meticulous in excluding considerations of race. On their side the Isma'īlīs at the behest of the Imām identify themselves as citizens. However, the Muslim Welfare Society, into which the Isma'īlīs put so much effort and money, as well as various Isma'īlī development organs have been taken over. There has been no mass emigration but the government policy with regard to the sharing of wealth and *ujamaa* with regard to the setting up of co-ops and the running of *dukas* (stores, shops), to the ownership by one person of any building or land in excess of what he or she can personally use, has meant that people of many kinds, professional men, well-to-do farmers, as well as believers in various forms of capitalism and private ownership have taken opportunities to migrate. The Agha Khān has never wanted the London *jamā'at* to become a relocation center, but since so many influential members of the community initially moved to Britain and Canada and because also the refugee expertise of Prince Ṣadrud-dīn and other international members of the community could be brought into play to help those in need of advice, inevitably the *jamats* at London, Toronto and Vancouver have centers through which many East Africans were relocated and through whose records one day the old families will be traced. In the meantime in Tanzania it is not easy to know how research will go. The University is developing Religious Studies slowly. Any foreign application to do research on an Islāmic theme requires government consultation with BAKWATA, *Baraza Kuu Waislamu za Tanzania*, the Great Muslim Convention or Board concerned with Islām in Tanzania, whose Secretary is fully aware of the way in which colonialism and imperialism have used research for their own nefarious purposes. So in conclusion we can say that its East African venture is but an episode in the long history of worldwide Isma'īlism. Much work remains to be done on the history of the episode but the mainstram of Isma'īlī history has moved elsewhere. The scholar must turn his or her attention to Europe, Scandinavia, North America, Australia, wherever the winds have carried the seeds of the *diaspora*.

NOTES

¹In the matter of spelling, where there is a generally accepted usage in East African English, we have followed it without inserting diacriticals. Where the exactness of the Ismā'īlīs is necessary, it has been followed. Statistics are seldom reliable, but we may suppose that in 1970 there were about 13,000 Ismā'īlīs each in Kenya and Uganda and about twice that number in Tanzania.

²For bibliography in English, beside the works cited in this paper and the relevant articles in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, on the historical side see J.S. Mangat, *A History of the Asians in East Africa, circa 1886 to 1945*, Oxford, 1969. Dharam and Yash Ghai *Portrait of a Minority*, Nairobi, revised edition, 1970, gives bibliography for the economic and educational fields. For the literature of the expulsion, see ed., Michael Twaddle, *Expulsion of a Minority*, London, 1975; Yash Tandon, *Problems of a Displaced Minority*, London, 1973; and Mahmood Mamdani, *From Citizen to Refugee*, London, 1973.

³The main collectors of information were 'Azīz Ismā'īl, 'Azīm Nanjī and Yasmīn Kanjī (now Jamāl). Abdul Adatia, Haider A. Alidina, Rohit Barot, Zarina Bhatia, Badru Dahya, Rashmi Desai, Said Hamdun, Sherali Bandali Jaffer, Jawad al Muscati, Idrīs Rupani, Count B.K.S. Virjee and many others also assisted. They must not be held responsible for mistakes. The whole has been five times rewritten. It has been considerably shortened to adapt it to the Conference format. The utmost pains have been taken not to publish anything confidential or offensive to the Ismā'īlī community.

⁴Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam*, New York, 1967, p. 148. For excellent background reading see J.N. Hollister, *The Shī'ah of India*, Longdon, 1953; and H. Corbin, *Histoire de la philosophie islamique* II, articles in *Eranos Jahrbuch*, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1963 and *Trilogie ismaélienne*, Teheran, 1961. Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins*, London, 1967 and M.G.S. Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins*, The Hague, 1955, give a valuable account of the early days and a full bibliography. Hodgson's chapter on the Ismā'īlī state in the *Cambridge History of Iran*, Volume V, is also important. The numerous works of W. Ivanow, such as his *Guide to Ismaili Literature*, London, 1933, remain essential. For earlier works on the Ismā'īlīs as part of the Asians in East Africa in general see H.S. Morris, *Indians in Uganda*, London, 1968; L.W. Hollingworth, *The Asians of East Africa*, London, 1960; G. Delf, *Asians in East Africa*, London, 1963. Two articles by David Pocock in volume XIII (1957) of the *South Western Journal of Anthropology* also give useful discussion. Useful material will also be found in J. Spencer Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, Oxford, 1964. A.J. Arberry's *Religion in the Middle East*, Cambridge, 1969, Volume II, has an article by A.A.A. Fyze on the Ismā'īlīs. In James Kritzeck and William Lewis, *Islam in Africa*, New York, 1969, an article by Ḥātim Amijī deals with this group.

⁵During visits to San'ā' and Surat in 1975 this writer interviewed followers of Musta'li who are in the Yaman and western India. Their chief dā'ī (or representative of the Imām) lived in Yaman until the sixteenth century and then moved to India. In India and East Africa they are generally known as Bohras and though scholars know they belong to the same great branch of Shī'ism, in East Africa they are differentiated from the Ismā'īlīs.

⁶On the present Agha Khān's cordial regard for Persia, see: *Speeches of Mowlana Hazar Imam, His Highness the Aga Khan*, Part II, 1958-1963, published by the Shia Imami Ismailia Association, Mombasa, 1964, p. 6.

⁷*Bombay High Court Reports*, sub anno 1866, pp. 323ff. The reference was kindly supplied by Professor J.N.D. Anderson of the London School of Oriental and African Studies and a photocopy by the Library of that school. See also his article in *Middle Eastern Studies*, I, 1964, 24ff. The state of affairs in Bombay and their relationship with East Africa is mentioned in R.A. Gregory, *India and East Africa*, Oxford 1971 and C.

Dobbin, *Urban Leadership in Western India*, Oxford 1972. The writer is unable to use a Gujarati pamphlet in his possession by a pseudonymous author which gives an account of Isma'īlī-Ithnā'asharī affairs in Bombay and Kilwa, because it contains so much that is obviously scurrilous. The judgment is also printed in A.S. Picklay, *History of the Ismailis*, Bombay, 1940, a book fairly well known to Isma'īlīs in East Africa and probably one of their main sources of information. It is a pity that it is only the judgment itself which is readily available. This writer found a copy of the defendant lawyer's speech in the Oriental Institute in Heidelberg in 1975. Presumably a full record of the hearing and the documents produced are still to be found at Bombay.

*See also Seyyid Akhtar Rizvi's contribution to S. Hamdun and N.Q. King, *Ibn Battuta in Black Africa*, London, 1975, in which he reexamines the Kilwa chronicle, archaeological evidence and an old Swahili *Utendi* to prove a Shī'ah presence.

⁹It is interesting that Shaykh Mtoro bin Bakari of Bagamoyo in his *Desturi za Waswahili* (published at Hamburg by Dr. Carl Velten in 1903) distinguishes between *wahindi* and *wabaniani* and addresses certain merchants as *jenab* and *mukhi*. He was writing in the 1890s.

¹⁰Interviews in Hindustani with Mr. Adatia Senior and Mr. Habib Walji in 1965. Dr. Rashmi Desai, now in Australia, remarked that some Indians travelled by sail up to 1945. The records of the British India Steam Navigation Company show when they started their India-Africa service. The sinking of the 'Vigli' off Bombay around 1910, captained by a Kassam, is recorded in Gujarati folklore. Some of the last ocean-going sailing ships built in Bombay were constructed by Ramji Ladha in 1858. The sailors were usually Hindu Kharwa and the owners were Khoja, Bhatia, Lohana or Memmon. Rohit Barot points out that Mr. Nanji Kalidas Mehta, in the 1960s a leading citizen of Kampala, travelled over by sailing ship.

¹¹Many examples could be given, but see *Talika and Messages*, Mombasa, 1955, page 4 (dated 1927), page 9 (1944). Dr. Desai points out that in a feudal system traders move more easily than peasants and the more turbulent things become, the more they are likely to move.

¹²Oral information, Tejpar to Isma'īl, 1965. It is interesting to observe the connections this astute Cutchi built up with the Yankees of Salem; see C.C. Clendenen, and P. Duignan: *Americans in Black Africa up to 1865*, Stanford, 1964, pp. 33ff.

¹³Oral information collected by 'Azīz Isma'īl and partly based on *Noorum Mobin*, 1961 (fourth) edition, p. 429. This book is full of interesting information and is published by the Ismailia Association of Bharat at Bombay. The official Universities Mission to Central Africa History records that 'an Indian' bought and donated the old slave market as the site for the Cathedral in Zanzibar. The central altar stands where the whipping post stood. Was the Indian Tharia Topan?

¹⁴The U.M.C.A. records were read over by Noel King at Masasi and Korogwe in 1963 and the oral evidence collected at the same time. The Bagamoyo records were read over by Lenny D'Almeida in 1964 and 1965.

¹⁵In an interview at the Bombay Club on December 3, 1971, Dr. A.A.A. Fyze said he considered Dr. W. Ivanow would have probably known all available U.S.S.R. material. He felt some material in Persian might come to light in Iran. He felt sure that there was a lot more work to be done in the languages associated with Cutch, Kathiawar, Multan and Gujarat. Bibliographical material is being amassed in the United States of America by Isma'īl K. Poonawala and in Nairobi by A.M. Šadruddīn. The latter's periodical *African Ismaili*, published in Nairobi, has been outstanding for its scholarly yet readable material.

¹⁶This material is mainly based on information collected from his grandson and his wife and other informants in Kampala during 1963-1965.

¹⁷This is based on the study described in A.K. Adatia and N.Q. King's article "Some East African *fīrmāns* of H.H. Aga Khan III, " *Journal of Religion in Africa*, II, 1969, 180ff.

Biographical and autobiographical material on the late Agha Khān and the present Imām are by no means lacking — see for instance, Willi Frischauer, *The Aga Khans*, London, 1970. The former's B.B.C. radio talk given in *The Listener* for 1932, "Were I the Dictator of the World," is a peerless gem. Earlier works include Q. Malik, *H.H. The Aga Khan, Guide and Philosopher*, Karachi, 1954, H.J. Greenwall, *His Highness and the Aga Khan*, London, 1952; and Stanley Jackson, *The Aga Khan*, London, 1952.

¹⁹Puns on the word *barbhai* abound, ranging from 'the brethren without' to 'the twelve brethren.' The oral evidence referred to was collected over a period of years in Kampala, Nairobi, Mombasa, Mwanza, Bukoba, and Dar-es-Salaam.

²⁰See J.P. Rupani: *Hirak Mahatsav Granth, The Aga Khan Diamond Jubilee Book*, 1885-1945, Mombassa, 1946, chapters X and XV; also *Hind ane Africa na vepro*, Bombay, 1937.

²¹*The Bombay Law Reporter*, XI, pp. 409ff. sub anno 1908. 'Azīz Isma'īl points out that His Highness' own view of the seceders is well expressed in his *Memoirs*, London, 1954, p. 187.

²²For an excellent study of the policy of the forty-eighth and forty-ninth Imāms in an East African country, see Eva Kjellberg, *The Ismailis of Tanzania*, mimeographed by the Institute of Public Administration, the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, 1967.

²³A large number of interviews were recorded with Isma'īlīs of various age groups on subjects which included the nature of the Isma'īlī understanding of God, of revelation, of mysticism, of the status of women, of the equality and brotherhood of the human race and a good deal else. There is some discussion of the considerable Isma'īlī contribution to Sunnī Islām in N.Q. King's *Christian and Muslim in Africa*, New York, 1971. Files of newspaper cuttings and pamphlets on these various subjects in both English and Gujarati were started. These were deposited in the Department of Religious Studies in Kampala.

ARTISTIC ACCULTURATION AND DIFFUSION AMONG MUSLIMS OF THE UNITED STATES

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There is a rapidly growing community of Muslims in the United States of which most Americans — both non-Muslims and Muslims — have had little knowledge. It is true that scattered Muslim individuals and families have existed in the United States from very early times,¹ but it was not until the turn of the last century that other than isolated cases of Muslim citizens can be documented.² It is only in the past two decades that their numbers have become large enough to make a Muslim presence tangible to most Americans. No accurate population figures are available on the Muslims of America, but educated estimates place the number of its membership around three million. The Muslims have therefore come to form a prominent religio-cultural group in American society.

The Muslims do not make up an ethnic group in the narrow racial or nationalistic sense of the term. They in fact include people from a wide variety of racial, national, and linguistic backgrounds who instead evidence a cultural affinity and religious identity. They are a community which is composed of two main groups. The first of these includes those Muslims from various parts of the Muslim world, both the settled immigrant individuals and families, as well as students who have come

¹See Yvonne Y. Haddad, "The Muslim Experience in the United States," *The Link*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (September/October, 1979), p. 1; and Abdo A. Elkholy, "The Arab-Americans: Nationism and Traditional Preservations," *The Arab Americans: Studies in Assimilation*, ed. Elaine C. Hagopian and Ann Paden (Wilmette, Illinois: The Medina University Press International, 1969), pp. 3-4, for accounts of early Muslim contacts with the Western Hemisphere which go back prior to the voyages of Columbus.

²Nadim Makdisi, "The Moslems of America," *The Christian Century* (August 26, 1959), p. 970.

to study in American colleges and universities. The arrival of Muslim immigrants as other than individual cases did not begin until the beginning of the present century. Since that time, immigration has coincided roughly with the peaceful interims between major world conflicts, i.e., from 1900-1912, from 1930-1938, from 1947-1960, and from 1967 to the present.³ In the first two periods or "phases" of immigration, the immigrant Muslims were primarily Arabs from West Asia who emigrated for economic reasons. There were generally of a non-professional background, and they had little education before coming to the new world. As for the third phase of Muslim immigration, between 1937 and 1960, the new arrivals were still primarily of Arab descent; but they came in the aftermath of the creation of Israel, and in reaction to radical political changes in the Arab countries, more than for economic reasons. The fourth phase of Muslim immigration to the United States came after another expansion of the state of Israel caused further disruption in the Arab world, when continued pressure by Communist regimes in Europe made life untenable for their Muslim constituents, and as career frustrations grew among the newly educated professionals in many Muslim countries. After the Johnson administration eased American immigration policies in 1965,⁴ large numbers of highly qualified professionals from the Muslim communities of the Middle East, Slavic Europe (Yugoslavia and Albania), the Indian subcontinent and Africa increased the Muslim population of this country. Around 300,000 Muslims from more than 60 nations are now settled in this country, while it is believed that close to a million students from various parts of the Muslim world attend colleges and universities in this country. A good number of these marry, find jobs in this country, and eventually join the numbers of immigrant Muslims.

The second group of Muslims includes those resulting from conversions of native Americans. These so-called "indigenous Muslims" comprise over two million persons. The majority of them were earlier followers of Elijah Muḥammad's Black Muslim movement, which since its founder's death in 1975, has moved steadily toward amalgamation with the international and multi-racial Sunnī Islām. Other white as well as black Americans, in much less significant

³Elkholy, "The Arab Americans," pp. 4-5.

⁴The Immigration Act of 1965 comprised a set of amendments to the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. These amendments ended the Asian discrimination provisions of the earlier law and provided for a phasing out of the national origins quota system by 1968. Preference was to be given to professionals and to workers for whose skills the United States was in short supply (Charles B. Keely, *U.S. Immigration: A Policy Analysis* [New York: The Population Council, 1979], pp. 18-21).

numbers, have converted to Islām through the efforts of missionaries from the Muslim world (especially from the Indian subcontinent), through marriage, or through Ṣūfī (i.e. mystical) Islāmic groups. Although it has had little effect on black Americans, Ṣūfism has seemed to appeal to some highly educated, middle class Americans who are searching for alternatives to their rejected Christian and Jewish traditions.⁵

This paper attempts to answer three basic questions which affect artistic acculturation and diffusion among Muslims of the United States: 1) What are the present artistic preferences and rejections of this community? 2) What are the reasons given by members of the community for their attitudes on the arts? and 3) What is the amount of active as well as spectator participation in aesthetic activities of Muslims of different ages? By answering these questions, it is hoped that a better understanding of Islāmic aesthetic being and potential in the United States could be ascertained. The presentation deals with poetry, the visual arts, music, dance and drama.

The present study began with the preparation of a written questionnaire and its distribution to members of two active Muslim organizations. One of these is the Muslim Students' Association of the United States and Canada, an organization founded by university students from Muslim countries, but now made up of large numbers of immigrant and settled families as well as students. The other respondents were members of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, an organization of students, scholars and teachers which developed out of the Muslim Students' Association. Members of the Association are involved in social science and humanities studies and interested in the relation of Islām — the religion and cultural legacy — to their research in the various disciplines, as well as to their life in America. 91 responses were retrieved for the initial reading. Further surveys are of course necessary, in part to enlarge the sampling of

⁵For further data on the Muslim community of the United States, see Abdo A. Elkholy, *The Arab Moslems in the United States: Religion and Assimilation* (New Haven: College and University Press, 1966); Elkholy, "The Arab American Family," *Ethnic Families in America: Patterns and Variations*, ed. Charles H. Mindel and Robert W. Habenstein (New York: Elsevier, 1976), pp. 151-167; Laurel D. Wigle, "An Arab Muslim Community in Michigan," *Arabic Speaking Communities in American Cities* (Staten Island, N.Y.: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc. and the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1974), pp. 155-167; Sulayman S. Nyang, "Islam in the United States: Review of Sources," *Journal, Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer, 1981), pp. 189-198; Philip M. Kayal, "An Arab-American Bibliography," *Arabic Speaking Communities in American Cities*, pp. 181-191; C. Umhau Wolf, "Muslims in the American Mid-West," *The Muslim World*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January, 1960), pp. 39-48.

Muslims, and also to determine the degree of attitudinal and participatory stability over periods of continued residence in the North American environment. The study does not purport to be an exhaustively representative polling of all Muslims living in the United States. Instead it seeks to determine the views of those Muslims 1) who have or may have influence as leaders of the American Muslim community; and 2) who are religiously engag   and therefore can be expected to play a religiously and culturally Isl  mic role in the North American environment.

At the time the questionnaire was conceived and distributed in 1976, the outcome of the merger of the American Muslim Mission (known formerly as the World Community of Isl  m in the West, and prior to that, as the Black Muslims) with orthodox Isl  m was still not a tangible fact. Therefore the respondents were drawn more heavily from the immigrant community than their actual numbers would warrant. If the questionnaire were to be distributed in the future, it would undoubtedly involve a much higher percentage of American-born Muslims.

The two largest subdivisions of respondents were 1) immigrants from the Middle Eastern countries (the Arab states of West Asia and North Africa, Turkey and Iran); and 2) immigrants from the countries in and around the Indian subcontinent (present day Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka). Each of these two general categories is represented by 36 respondents. The third largest group (13 respondents) includes converts of American or European background. Four respondents were immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa; two came from Southeast Asia. The distribution of immigrant respondents according to the place of origin is comparable to the ratios of different ethnic groups within the immigrant segment of the community.

Approximately 85% of the immigrant Muslims polled had been living in the United States for ten years or less. The Muslims of American and European background were for the most part recent converts. Various ages (from 18 to over 60 years) were represented in the sample, as well as both sexes (69 males or 76%, and 22 females or 24%), and people of variant marital status. 67% were married, 28% were single, and the rest divorced or widowed. A wide range of careers or fields of competence as well of educational background was included. 33% were holders of Ph.D. or M.D. degrees, another 42% had one or more M.A. degrees. Most persons surveyed had received some of their education in North America, the largest group (approximately 60%) included those who had completed part of their training in their native homeland and another part of it in American universities.

The responses to the questionnaire revealed a remarkable homogeneity despite the differing backgrounds of respondents. For example, factors of age, sex, marital status, field of competence, and

educational background were found to have little or no relation to variety in responses to questions. Not only were Asian and African immigrants, for the most part, remarkably close in their views about the arts, but Western converts showed an amazing degree of Islāmic orientation despite the fact that their exposure to the religion and culture was, almost without exception, very limited in time. This should not be misunderstood to be a claim that there is absolute identity of viewpoint among the Muslims of the United States on artistic matters. But what was discovered was that there were startling correspondences in the aesthetic views of the Muslims of America which could lead in the future toward a creative American-Islāmic aesthetic tradition.

A. PREFERENCES AND REJECTIONS

The first goal of the study was to determine artistic preferences and rejections by the Muslim community of the United States. The table in Figure 1 presents the results of questions regarding the various branches of aesthetic creation in the following order: Poetry, the Visual Arts, Music, Dance and Drama. 73 of the 91 respondents (i.e., 80%) felt that involvement with poetry, whether as active or spectator participant, was "not contrary" to Islāmic teachings. Only one person (who showed his uneasiness with the response by adding a "?") said poetry was "contrary" to Islāmic teaching. There is a strong conformance of the American Muslims with the Islāmic tradition's stress on poetic or literary expression. This importance of the artistic spoken word was inherited by the Muslims from the pre-Islāmic Semitic world. It climaxed in the Qur'ān, which was both most sublime artistic product in Islāmic culture and most revered aesthetic expression of the Islāmic ideology. Evidence of that literary tradition being carried over into the American Muslim community will be evident in the section below on participation in aesthetic activities.

Of the 91 respondents, 66 (i.e., 73%) felt that involvement with the visual arts was "not contrary" to Islāmic teaching. This shows that the notion that Islām is against all art *per se* is not held by this group of Muslims representing a wide ethnic spectrum. Instead, the responses revealed a discriminating attachment to certain types of visual art and a rejection of others. Participatory incidence tended to bear this out (see Section C below). This is important information for those contemporary Muslims who have been wrongly informed that their religion proscribes art. It draws attention to the fact that Islām has urged an involvement in art which enhances its message, and condemns or discourages only that art which undermines its ideology and the morals of its adherents.

It was hoped that the survey of Muslims in the United States would provide new insights on the centuries-old controversy in Islāmic culture over the legitimacy of music and dance. The past centuries of Islāmic

history have known a waxing and waning controversy among Muslims over whether music and dance can be used as part of the *dhikr*⁶ service. For the regular prayer or *salāt*, its inclusion was never allowed — in fact, was never discussed. It was chiefly among the mystics — and only among a minority of those orders — that listening (*samā'*) involved other tonal expressions than the chanting of the Qur'ān and religious poetry. Inclusion of movement and dance was even more rare. Despite the fact that the main thrust of the controversy was one regarding Ṣūfī practice, and despite the fact that there are also some brilliant defenses of music and dance by famous Muslim scholars,⁷ the controversy had its effect on the use of music and dance in so-called secular as well as religious contexts.

In addition, because music and dance in secular settings were often put to the service of eroticism and debauchery, the Muslims found themselves confronted with a constant problem of determining whether these art forms were assisting or hindering them from following what was considered to be God's pattern. As a result of the consequent uncertainty, music and dance have often been indulged in by Muslims with a degree of misgiving and embarrassment. Despite all this, music and dance never ceased to be important components of Muslim life, and to be molded decisively by the same determining influences arising out of the Islāmic worldview that have molded the other arts of the Muslim peoples. It would seem from this survey that the Muslims of the United States are affected by the same problems of simultaneous attraction and rejection. It should be noted here that, for the purposes of this study, the chanting of the Qur'ān, the *adhān* (call to prayer) and religious poetry have not been included as music, since these forms of sound art have never been regarded as such by Muslims. Responses regarding "music," therefore, should be understood as pertaining only to the other forms of religious and secular music.

While the chanting of the Qur'ān and religious poetry were revealed to be the most highly appreciated and frequently enjoyed aesthetic activities for the immigrants as well as indigenous Muslims of the United States, Figure 1 shows that 64 of the 91 respondents (i.e., 70%) also felt that performing and listening to music *per se* were activities

⁶*Dhikr* includes a wide variety of "remembrance" of God ceremonies practiced by the Ṣūfī (mystical) orders or brotherhoods.

⁷See, for example, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al Ghazālī, *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al Dīn*, section tr. by Duncan B. Macdonald as "Emotional Religion in Islām as Affected by Music and Singing," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1901, Part I, pp. 195-252; Part II, pp. 705-748; 1902, Part III, pp. 1-28; Maḥmūd Shaltūt, *Al Fatāwā* (Cairo: Dār al Shurūq, 1960), pp. 355-359; 'Abd al Ghanī ibn Isma'il al Ḥanafī al Nabulsi, *Idārah al Dalālāt fī Samā' al Ālāt* (Damascus, 1884).

	Not Contrary	Contrary	Uncertain	Depending on Kind	No Answer
Poetry	73	1 (?)	10	1	6
Visual Arts	66	7	16	1	1
Music	64	12	10	2	3
Dance	23	34	24	4	6
Drama	62	7	16	0	6

Figure 1: Conformity of Art with Islamic Teachings According to the 91 Respondents of the Survey

“not contrary” to Islāmic teachings. On the other hand, only 23 of the respondents (25%) were convinced that dance was “not contrary” to Islām. Another 34 respondents (37%) labeled dance as “contrary” to Islāmic teachings and 24 (i.e., 26%) were uncertain. One of the few cases of an obvious influence from the background of a particular ethnic group came in the responses to questions regarding dance. Even here, however, it was a matter of degree rather than complete disparity. When compared with the other arts, the responses dealing with dance were consistently quite negative for Muslims of all backgrounds. Those of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent, however, included a larger percentage of “contrary” responses than those of Muslims from any other region of the world. This may be due in part to the challenging proximity of Hindu religious culture in the homelands of these people. The prominent association of dance with religious thought and practice in Hinduism has perhaps made the Muslims of the subcontinent particularly cautious about the use of dance. For all periods and regions, this art form, which is so closely tied to narrative and emotion portrayal, has played a minor role when compared with the other arts. It was the most difficult of the arts to constrain to the abstract character of Islāmic art. In addition, it too readily, for Muslim tastes, degenerated into sensual stimulus and gratification .

Reactions to the fifth and last category of artistic creation found in Figure 1 concern drama. This medium of aesthetic expression is one which is traditionally alien to Islāmic culture, being found in Muslim countries only as a result of foreign influences — in the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia as a result of proximity to Hinduism, and in the Middle East as a result of European contacts. Yet, among these Muslims of the United States, there was a high rate of acceptance of, and interest in, drama as an art form. We shall see in Section C below that participation in this art was also high.

Many respondents coupled their answers to the questions of artistic preferences and rejections with either solicited or unsolicited stipulations that their response would depend on the nature of the

particular art object or activity under consideration. In other words, it was felt by many respondents that certain art expressions in all five fields might be approved, whereas others in the same fields would be disapproved. This is consistent with the generally held view of Muslims that the dictum of “art for art’s sake” is a falsehood. Art, like every other feature of culture and civilization, is a factor which can be either beneficial or pernicious, depending on its enhancement or its inhibition of the human goal to fulfill God’s will in space and time. Aesthetic expressions which further human progress toward that end are therefore to be encouraged, while those which inhibit it are to be discouraged or even prohibited.

B. REASONS FOR THE PREFERENCES AND REJECTIONS

The second general question which it was hoped would be answered through this investigation pertained to the rationale of the respondents for their artistic preferences and rejections. The answers to questions meant to bring out such information were equally revealing of an underlying ideological correspondence of opinions among the respondents, despite their widely varying backgrounds. Figure 2 contains a graphic representation of the reasons given for classifying some artistic activities as “contrary,” others as “not contrary” to Islamic teachings.




Figure 2: Respondents’ Rationale For Answers in Figure 1

It is obvious that the Qur’ān, the *ḥadīth* and moral issues are the dominant reasons given for preferences and rejections regarding the arts. Actually the Qur’ān contains no pronouncements either for or against any of the arts, and items both for and against can be found in

the *ḥadīth* literature.⁸ Therefore, the importance of the respondents' answers in this regard relate to how they regard the issues, rather than from where their information is actually derived. Not only are the various arts tied inextricably to moral and religious issues in the mind of the American Muslim, but preference or rejection is linked in his/her mind with God's message and the example of the Prophet. American Muslims, like their co-religionists throughout the world, are shown in this survey to claim Islām's relevance not only for religious duties and practices; they maintain that it bears on political, economic, social and even aesthetic factors as well. Thus, to ask the Muslim about his aesthetic preferences is inevitably to become involved in what he feels to be a *proper* aesthetic expression of his Islāmic ideology rather than merely a question of what type of art happens to please him personally. There were repeated indications in the responses of this survey that the arts are considered to be only one facet of the life-complex, all features of which the Muslim would like to relate to the Islāmic pattern revealed in the Holy Scripture — the Qur'ān — and in the *sunnah* ("example") of the Prophet Muḥammad. In this, the immigrant Muslims in the United States, as well as the newly converted indigenous Muslims, follow a pattern which has prevailed throughout Islāmic history.

C. ACTIVE AND SPECTATOR PARTICIPATION IN AESTHETIC ACTIVITIES.

Among immigrant Asian and African Muslims as well as those of American or European background, it was revealed that there is very limited participation in actual artistic performance or creation by respondents. Spectator participation is however much more widespread. Initially this was interpreted as a result of a traditional disregard and even contempt for the professional artisan and the performer classes in many Muslim countries.⁹ This may well have an

⁸This conflicting information does not indicate a vacillation on the part of the Prophet Muhammad nor a forging of evidence by his successors to suit their differing ends. Instead it should be seen as evidence for the varying circumstances both in the type of musical expression itself, and of the context in which it occurred, that caused the Prophet's varying responses to musical performances.

⁹Islāmic law and custom have shown a low regard for the professional musician, whereas the amateur was generally able to void the adverse connotations that full time involvement brought. See Mark Slobin, *Music in the Culture of Northern Afghanistan*, Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 54 (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1976), pp. 29-53; Lorraine Sakata, "The Concept of Musician in Three Persian-Speaking Areas of Afghanistan," *Asian Music*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1976), pp. 1-28; Bruno Nettl, "The Role of Music in Culture: Iran, A Recently Developed Nation," *Contemporary Music and Music Cultures* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), p. 75; Lois Ibsen al Fārūqī, "Music, Musicians and Muslim Law," *The Musician in Muslim Society*, ed. Philip Schyler, forthcoming.

effect. But the fact that an overwhelming majority of respondents indicated they would support the training of Muslim performers and artists — and surprisingly, both as professionals and as amateurs — seems to indicate that the lack of practitioners in the arts must be attributed, at least in part, to other circumstances. Those Muslims who have come to the United States to study or live came seeking knowledge and opportunities in those fields in which America had more to offer than their homelands. For the most part, the people involved in their native arts had more to gain from pursuing those arts at home. Therefore the immigrant respondents are understandably non-artists. As for the native born American Muslims, they are in the process of undergoing a drastic cultural change which not only involves giving up many elements of their former aesthetic culture, but the adoption of a new one. It will take them some time to be creative in that new aesthetic world.

Figures 3,4,5, and 6 record the incidence of active and spectator participation in the arts and reveal some predictable, and other quite surprising results. Among the predictable results are the higher rates of active and spectator participation by immigrant Muslims in the various kinds of music from their native lands (see Figure 5). For ethnic classical music there were 13 active participants and 44 spectator participants; for ethnic folk music, 11 active and 34 spectator participants; for ethnic popular music, 14 and 39 respectively. What is less predictable, and therefore more interesting, is that even the American and European converts often claimed to have adopted the native music of some part of the Muslim world as their own. Another kind of sound art widely appreciated by the respondents, though not considered to be “music,” was religious poetry chanted or sung (see Figure 3). Western music, whether classical, folk, or popular, and all forms of dance had few participants either as performers or spectators (Figures 5 and 6).

	Active	Spectator
Religious poetry	13	47
Non-Religious Poetry	9	36
Drama	15	36

Figure 3: Participation in Poetry and Drama

	Active	Spectator
Calligraphy	12	28
Abstract Design	11	23
Figural Art	9	23

Figure 4: Participation in the Visual Arts

	Active	Spectator
Western Classical	7	27
Western Folk	3	33
Western Popular	4	27
Ethnic Classical	13	44
Ethnic Folk	11	34
Ethnic Popular	14	39

Figure 5: Participation in Music

	Active	Spectator
Western Classical (ballet, modern)	2	29
Western Folk	7	29
Ethnic Dance of Respondent's Home	8	25

Figure 6: Participation in Dance

Most students of Islāmic culture are well aware of the importance of abstract rather than figural art among the Muslim peoples. This fact is exemplified in every period of Islāmic history and in every region of the Muslim world. Figure 4 tabulates the participation of the 91 respondents in three types of visual art: 1) calligraphy, 2) *rasm* or *naqsh* (i.e., abstract Islāmic patterns), and 3) figural drawing or painting. Although participation is on the whole limited in all these visual arts fields, we see a clear preference among American Muslims surveyed for the calligraphic and abstract artistic forms.

The level of active and spectator participation in dramatic art is one of the most surprising pieces of information from this study. Despite its basically alien derivation and nature, drama was the art form with the highest incidence for active participation of any of the arts. It is surmised that "active participation" was misunderstood by many respondents to include the attending of movies and the viewing of dramatic works, a common program feature of the television stations. This conclusion was reached after discovering that respondents known personally to have no present involvement with active participation in dramatic presentations had nevertheless indicated that they were active participants of this art form. The information, therefore, may have little significance except to show the high level of drama spectator participation which is to be found among Muslims of the United States.

Figure 7 presents the results of questions regarding participation of children in artistic activities. The respondents were asked to give information only about those children actually resident with them in an American home. One set of questions was used for children under 12 years of age, another set for those 12 years and older. 44 of the 91 respondents had children of the former age group living with them. Only 17 of them could provide information on the art activities of the 12 years and older child. This is of course due to the fact that most of the Muslims in this country — whether converts or immigrants — are young. The older generations are found, for the most part, only in the communities resulting from the early twentieth century phases of immigration. But these people are from the working classes and have

little contact with the two organizations whose members were contacted for this survey. Most of the more recent, highly educated immigrants have come too recently to have teenage or older children. It is hoped that the Muslims who came during the earlier phases of immigration in this century, as well as their offspring, can be surveyed in the future.

Children under 12 Years (44 total)			Children 12 and Over (17 total)		
Visual Arts					
Calligraphy	2	instances (1 hr. per week)	2	instances (1 hr. each per week)	
Abstract Design	3	instances (1 hr. per week)	3	instances (1 hr. each)	
Figural Art	19	(1 of 10 hr., 1 over 10)	3	(1 over 10 hrs. per week)	
Music					
Western	9	instances (1 hr. or more)	5	instances	
Classical					
Western Folk	11	instances (1 hr. or more)	4	instances	
Western Pop.	13	instances (1 hr. or more)	6	(3 of 5 hr. and 2 more than 10 hours per week)	
All types of Ethnic music (combined)	21	instances (1 hr. or more)	4	instances (2 of 1 hr., 1 of 5 hrs. and 1 of 10 hrs. per wk.)	
There were 13 instances of active participation (singing and playing of musical instruments) among children under 12 years of age, 6 instances among those children 12 years and older.					
Dance					
Any kind	4	instances	4	instances	
<i>Qur'anic Chant</i>					
	15	instances (spectator)	8	instances (spectator)	
	6	instances (active)	6	instances (active)	
Drama					
	0		0		

Figure 7: Children's Participation in Art Activities (Combined Active and Spectator Activities)

Of the 44 sets of responses for children under the age of 12, only 2 recorded involvement of the children in his/her household with any type of calligraphic activities (and those only for about 1 hour per week) and only 3 with abstract art activities (1 hour per week). On the other hand, a much higher number (i.e., 19) reported involvement with figural art activities (with 1 of these estimating 10 hours of participation per week). This reveals a startling weakness in the exposure of these children to examples of the Islāmic visual art heritage and to training in its appreciation and creation. As for musical activities, 9 responses concerning young children showed that they spent one hour or more per week as spectator participants in Western classical music, 11 reported a similar amount of involvement with Western folk music, and 13 with Western popular music, for a total of 33 positive responses. All three categories of native or ethnic musics of the Muslims (classical, folk

and popular), which could be expected to help train the children in the Islāmic musical tradition, achieved, by contrast, a total of only 21 instances of 1 hour or more exposure. The question regarding young children's participation in Qur'ānic chant as spectators brought 15 positive responses out of the total 44. Only 4 of the 44 responses regarding children under the age of 12 revealed an involvement in any type of dance activity. Active participation in music, i.e., in singing or playing of musical instruments, was documented in 13 of the 44 responses, while 6 showed evidence of 1 hour or more of weekly participation in learning to recite or chant the Qur'ān or other religious poetry by children in this age group.

Among children 12 years or older, the 17 sets of responses showed little active or spectator participation in the traditional Islāmic arts. There was only one exception to this trend — that of exposure to Qur'ānic chant. 8 out of the 17 responses indicated children in their households were involved in 1 hour or more of listening to "tuned" recitations of the Qur'ān or religious poetry each week, and 6 responses indicated active participation in such activities. There was an appreciable rise among children of this age group in involvement in Western popular music (e.g., 3 showed 5 hours, and 2 had more than 10 hours of weekly involvement). When the exposure to television is added to these statistics, it is obvious that a massive artistic de-Islāmization influence is being experienced by these children of even the Islāmically committed members of the Muslim community. The non-Islāmic exposure in the homes of less concerned members of the faith must be even much greater.

We are still witnessing the early decades, even the very beginning, of Muslim life in the United States, so it is early to make predictions. It is clear, however, that the present adult Muslims surveyed, regardless of their country of origin or the length of their commitment to that faith, have a marked cultural affinity to certain artistic trends and preferences which have pertained to Muslims generally throughout the centuries. This is a healthy ingredient for perpetuity and creativity of the Islāmic arts in their new North American environment. However, given the limited amount of both active and spectator participation in the Islāmic arts which seems to be offered to the children of these engage Muslims, and given the non-Islāmic environment in which these children live, there is little reason to be optimistic about a continued presence or a creative future for the Islāmic arts in America unless new efforts are exerted by the Muslim community toward that end. Islāmic day schools are now being founded in many of the large urban centers of the United States. It is hoped that these institutions will realize the need for furthering the artistic, as well as the ritual and moral aspects of Islāmic culture.

One might ask: What difference would the continued presence and creative future of the Islāmic arts make for the Muslims themselves or for American society as a whole? Why should Americans, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, be concerned if an Islāmic artistic presence is maintained in this continent or not? First, let us consider the answers to such questions as they relate to the Muslim community itself.

If one investigates the artistic creations of any group of people, one finds a strong correlation between the art products themselves and the deepest convictions, the religious views, of those people. It can even be maintained that aesthetic expression is just another way of expressing the ideas which a people also express in philosophical and theological writings; in social, political and economic institutions; and, if we are to agree with Oswald Spengler, even in the questions asked by the scientist. Art then is no extraneous and dispensible appendage to a society or a religious culture. It is an integral element in that civilization and both an expression and a reinforcement of its views. To deprive Islām in the United States and the Muslims of this country of that expression and reinforcement is to weaken it and them. To add to this deprivation the inevitable substitution of other artistic expressions found in the environment, which may or may not be fitting to their world view, is at the same time to expose the Islāmic minority to determination from non-Islāmic influences in the arts and eventually in other fields of endeavor and thought. This could not only open the door to a separation of religion and daily life which has always been anathema to Islāmic being and ideology; it could even prelude the demise of the minority community or its complete absorption by the dominant culture.

What would be the consequences of a weakening of Islāmic aesthetic consciousness for the non-Muslim Americans? Do they have anything to gain or lose from the presence in this continent of an alive and healthy Islāmic aesthetic presence?

Early America was dominated by the "melting pot" concept as the new nation sought to build a strong union out of diverse elements from various parts of the world. Under such an urge to "Americanize" every foreign element, an Islāmic artistic presence could only have been appreciated as an artifact for museum preservation. In other words, in that period of early development, America functioned under the premise that "a good alien tradition is a dead one," if we were to borrow a phrase from an earlier generation's interaction with the American Indian.

This kind of "dead bodies" school of thought has its protagonists among some contemporary social scientists and students of the ethnic arts. These scholars consider it one of their chief duties to preserve dead artistic traditions in cold storage, or, better, to hook them up to

artificial respirators which prolong life of the tradition in a counterfeit existence. Perhaps one could argue that the very existence of such "cold storage" cultural phenomena in America are a contribution. They afford the same sort of pleasure and interest that one gets from acquiring a beautiful Chinese bronze from the second millenium B.C. to put on a shelf in a museum. But we would be superficial and naive to consider the Chinese bronze or any other frozen artistic remnant of an alien tradition, as an important element of our aesthetic heritage. The same is true for the Islāmic artistic tradition. Unless it becomes a living contributor in its North American environment, it will fail to play the role that Islāmic art played in Moorish Spain, in Muslim Central Asia, in Mughal, India, in the courts of the Sultans of Southeast Asia, and in every other region of the world where Islām and Muslims moved over the centuries.

The United States is no longer worried about survival and political unity, and it is for this reason that ethnicity, religious pluralism and even alien art traditions can now be tolerated without fear. This is a time in which Americans are searching for fresh artistic and ideological perspectives from all corners of the globe. It is the time not only for constructive theology, but for constructive "art-ology," constructive "music-ology," constructive "dance-ology" and constructive "literature-ology." Many historians have noted the cultural impetus that results from the interaction of two alive and active traditions. It is from such contacts that American society can benefit. If the United States is to gain from the presence of the Muslim community in this continent, whether artistically or in any other way, that benefit will come only from an alive and productive community, not from a dead or dying tradition. The latter can only take from, rather than contribute to, the future aesthetic heritage and well-being of the New World.

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF MUSICAL ELEMENTS TO THE IDEALS OF QUR'ĀNIC RECITATION

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The prominence of the recited Qur'ān in the Islāmic world can be explained by the importance of the Qur'ān to the Islāmic community. The Word of God revealed in Arabic, the Qur'ān is the central reality in the Muslim life. As the divine articulation of God's plan for mankind, it is both the generator of Islāmic civilization and its highest authority.

The pervasiveness of the sound of recitation also reflects the essential orality of the Qur'ān: from the rhythm, the rhyme and assonance of the language of the text it is clear that it is meant to sound. The divine command, "Recite the Qur'ān with *tartīl* (*wa rattil al Qur'āna tartīlan* Qur'ān 74:3) is interpreted as a command to recite according to the rules of *tajwīd*. And the science of *tajwīd* codifies what is believed to be the sound of the Qur'ān as it was revealed, carefully preserving not only syntax, vocabulary and meaning, but the timbre, duration and pronunciation of each syllable of the text. Whereas to Western Qur'ānic scholars the Qur'ān has been largely defined by its written tradition, to most Muslims the Qur'ān is equally the written text and its oral rendering, and many have more intimate knowledge of the Qur'ān through hearing it or reciting it than through reading its written text.

Many Muslims have assumed that acceptance of the Egyptian tradition of a melodic recitation of the Qur'ān is basically a compromise of Islāmic principles and a submission to the pressure of its popularity. One might posit several reasons for this, among them the legacy of the *samā'* polemic. The predominant attitudes shaped by this polemic are that, at the most, music is somehow un-Islāmic, and at the least, its power to overwhelm the emotions needs careful control. Also contributing to a censure of melodic recitation is the extent of the overlap of the art of recitation with the art of music, specifically in those

areas that could be called "show business", i.e. the professionalism of the reciters, the personality cult of the superstars, the economics of reciting and the response of listeners in general.

A long scholarly tradition is devoted to defining the ideal recitation experience in terms of its intent and the guidelines governing both the reciter and the listeners' realization of that intent. The basic and unquestioned premise is that the recitation of the Qur'ān is a unique art, based on the primacy of the text and separate from the art of music, whether it be sacred or secular music. But this perception of Qur'ānic recitation does not exclude the use of musical elements: if we examine the ideal recitation as it is presented in both historical and modern sources, we find it is, in fact, defined according to an intent which depends on the melodic element for its fulfillment.

Along with the question of melodic recitation a number of issues are discussed in the context of the ideal recitation, such as how often the complete text of the Qur'ān (*khatm*) should be recited, whether it should be recited in a raised or lowered voice (*bil jahr* or *bil isrār*), and whether it is better to recite from memory or from the written text. What links all of these issues is a concern for the accurate transmission and preservation of the Qur'ān, and equally, for its meaningful and affective recitation. Over and over again it is stressed that going through the motions of fulfilling one's religious duties is not enough, and that the true act of worship involved the believer body and soul. For example, al Suyūṭī relates that when a man boasted to the Prophet that he recited a large portion of the Qur'ān in a short time, the Prophet warned against such glibness, alluding to a people whose recitation "does not go farther than their throats, but if it fell on the heart, then benefit would be rooted there" (on the authority of Ibn Mas'ūd, in al Suyūṭī 1910: 1/107-8). Al Qāri' adds, "...the people whose reciting goes no further than their throats are those who do not contemplate it nor act according to it" (al Qāri', 1948:22). We also read such statements as:

Verily God does not accept an act of anyone until his heart bears witness to what his body bears witness to.

Makkī Naṣr, 1930:236

The intent with regard to listening to the Qur'ān is attendance of the heart, and contemplation and thought.

al Sarraj al Ṭūsī, 1960: 355

Several reciters stressed to me the importance of sincerity and piety on the part of the reciter, especially if he is to reach his listeners, saying, "The Qur'ān when recited from the heart, reaches the heart" (Sh. 'Abd al Bāsiṭ 'Abd al Ṣamad, 1/26/78), and "What comes from the heart penetrates the heart" (Sh. Muḥammad al Ṭablāwī, 11/10/77). There are numerous testimonies of the effect of Sh. Rif'at's reciting on Muslim

and non-Muslim alike, and I was told that the basis of that effect was not his voice, nor his musicality, but his "perfect faith."

In addition to sincerity, thoughtfulness and adherence to the rules of *tajwīd*, certain other elements associated with the art of music are cited as desirable in reciting the Qur'ān. For example, scholars point to a number of *ḥadīths* in praise of the beautiful voice (al ṣawt al ḥasan) in reciting the Qur'ān, among them the following:

Beautify the Qur'ān with your voices. Verily the beautiful voice increases the beauty of the Qur'ān.

Embellish the Qur'ān with your voices (and, vice versa, Embellish your voices with the Qur'ān).

Everything has an ornament and that of the Qur'ān is the beautiful voice.

God does not listen to anything as He listens to a Prophet of beautiful voice.

These *ḥadīths* are cited in most of the works on Qur'ānic recitation, and a number of the reciters I interviewed quoted them to me as well. The works mentioned include not only those of Ṣūfī writers, supporters of the melodic tradition in general, such as al Sarrāj al Ṭūsī, al Qushayrī, al Ghazālī, etc., but also those of al Suyūṭī, al Qurṭubī, Ibn Sa'd, Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyyah, Ibn al Jazarī, Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al Zarkashī, etc., in other words, scholars representing an extensive scope of scholarship. We also find references to the beautiful voice of the Prophet, and stories of the Prophet and his companions listening with pleasure and approval to recitations with beautiful voice (e.g. Ibn Sa'd 1969:1/375-6; al Ḥuṣarī 1966:21, 44-47; al Makkī 1961:126; al Suyūṭī 1910: 1/111, and others).

In connection with the Prophet's statement, "There is none among us who does not sing the Qur'ān." There is a great deal of controversy regarding the meaning of the term *yataḡhannā bi-*, but scholarly consensus favors the translation given, i.e. "sing." The question was asked, "What if one hasn't a beautiful voice?", and answered, "He must beautify as best he can" (al-Qurṭubī 1968: 1/11-12; al Jawziyyah 1970: 1/165).

It is clear from the contexts in which the term, *sawt hasan*, occurs that it refers to more than a pleasant speaking voice quality. At the very least, some sort of heightened speech, if not vocal artistry is involved. In *samā'* works, for example, the beautiful voice is almost clearly synonymous with the pleasant melody. The term *ṣawt* itself denotes not only "voice," and "sound," but is a synonym in the literature for "melody," "song," "verses set to music," and the term, *qurrā' al aṣwāt*, clearly denotes reciters of the melodic style. In Egypt today, a common

expression denoting melodic recitation is *al qirā'ah bil ṣawt*.

The desirability of beauty and art in the ideal recitation may be explained by the association of *ṭarab* with recitation. In addition to the straightforward sense of music, *ṭarab* denotes the effect of music, the stirring of the senses and emotions by music, or, as one music scholar defines it, "the emotional climate in music" (Touma 1975:35). In a much earlier source we read:

There is no escaping the soul's need for *ṭarab*, and its yearning for song, so it has substituted for the *ṭarab* of song the *ṭarab* of the Qur'ān just as it has replaced all of what is forbidden and disapproved of with what is good.

(al Jawziyyah 1970:1/169)

What is acceptable in the concept of *ṭarab* with regard to Qur'ānic recitation, is the sense of stirring and affecting the emotions, of provoking an emotional response. For the ideal recitation is one which stirs and affects the listener, involving him more totally in the experience. Makkī Naṣr (1930:235-6), elaborating a statement of al Ghazālī, declares that the true recitation "is that which the tongue, the mind and the heart share." The tongue and the mind deal with the sound and the meaning respectively; the heart holds the emotional response.

Because the ideal concept of Qur'ānic recitation is an act or an experience of total involvement and awareness on the part of both listener and reciter, and the basis on which acceptance of melody and vocal technique in recitation rests, it is the responsibility of the professional melodic reciter to make his skill the instrument of his understanding in order to bring out the meanings of the text and to evoke a more total response to his listeners.

The correlating of melodic mode (*maqām*) and vocal technique to meaning is termed *taṣwīr al ma'nā* (literally, "picturing the meaning"), and it is considered an essential element of the ideal recitation in Egypt today. A writer responding officially to public criticism of recitation which is too much like singing cites a *ḥadīth* that when the Prophet recited a passage of praise, he would praise, and if it were a verse in which there was a question, he would question, etc., concluding that this "can only mean that the Prophet praised, asked ... with a voice suited to praising, asking ... and that this is the recitation which makes clear the meanings" (Diyāb 1977:11). Elsewhere we read that the recitation must be suited to the meanings (al Makkī 1961:99), that melodic recitation began as a response to the recognition that there must be variety in voice and melody to reflect the text (Anonymous 1974:29), and that "it would not be natural to express all the subjects of the Qur'ān in the same way... what is acceptable is the *tarannum* which suits the meaning and demonstrates it (Al Sa'īd 1967: 319). "Tarannum" has definite musical

connotations here. In yet another work we read a reference to the "descriptive music" of the Qur'ān, and it is defined as "that which pictures the meaning and indicates the idea by means of the melody and the similarity of the voice to the harmony which is between music and the meaning which inspires it" (al Sa'īd 1970:69). (Note that the writer does not ignore the primacy of the text: conventions of the melodic recitation require that melody be improvised and not notated to ensure that in each instance of recitation the music derives from the inspiration of the text.)

The point of this correlation is that it better affects the listener so that "he should become one with the character of the recited verse. Thus, when he hears about threats and the conditional withholding of forgiveness, he shrinks with fear as if he were dying; and when he hears about magnanimity and the promise of forgiveness, he rejoices as if he were flying with joy..." (Anonymous 1974: 28, referring to a passage by al Ghazālī).

Reciters themselves are explicit on the necessity of using melody in this regard:

"Reciting with melody is like giving commentary: he who recites with the correct melody and has a basic idea of the art ... brings the listener close to the Qur'an."

(Sh. 'Alī Ḥajjāj al Suwaysī 6/21/68)

"The basis of the reciter's use of melody is meaning, and not custom or taste. He extracts the meaning for the people according to his understanding."

(Sh. Muḥammad al Ṭablāwī, 11/10/77)

Heaven and Hell, i.e. Joy and Sorrow, are the basic moods which feature in any mention of *taṣwīr al ma'nā*. In fact, the term, *ma'nā* in this context, seems to denote mood or emotion, rather than meaning. Still the more subtle shades of emotion are communicated as well. Basic to the concept of *taṣwīr al ma'nā* is the association of the *maqāmāt* with moods or emotions. Reciters are generally agreed on correlating *Sīka* with joy, *Girka* with awe, and *Ṣabā* with soulful yearning, for example. Sh. Aḥmad al Ruzayqī demonstrated the role of the reciter in bringing out the subtleties of mood of a verse when he recited the same verse in two different *maqāmāt*. He recited, "And Hell, that day is brought (face to face), on that day will man remember, but how will that remembrance profit him? He will say: 'Ah, would that I had sent forth (good deeds) for (this) my (future) life'" (Qur'ān 89: 23-24). The first rendering of this text was in *maqām* *Nahāwand* "which brings out the pain and grief." The second was in *Ṣabā*, "which reflects the self-reproach and repentance" (1/24/78). Sh. Aḥmad claims that the reciter skilled in correlating his technique to his understanding can

convey the meaning of the text to someone who does not understand Arabic.

The clarification and enhancing of the specific meaning of the text is only one aspect of the contribution of music to Qur'ānic recitation. The second aspect acknowledges the power of music to touch the listener's heart and engage him more fully in the meaning of the revelation as a whole. In al Qurṭubī we read that *taḥrīb* (making *ṭarab* or music) in recitation is permitted by some, and that this is because "when the voice is beautified thus, it has greater effect on souls, and hearts are more likely to listen" (al Qurṭubī 1968: 1/11). In a reference to the *ḥadīth*, "He is not one of us who does not sing the Qur'ān," al Jawziyyah cites the opinion of Ibn Jarīr:

"The proof that the meaning of the *ḥadīth* is beautifying the voice and appropriate singing is that the reciter stirs the listener with his reciting just as the appropriate singing in poetry is that which enchants and stirs its listener."

(1970: 1/166)

Al Jawziyyah elaborates with the statement that embellishing and beautifying the voice, and musical enchanting in recitation are more affecting and more stimulating to audition and attentiveness; for by means of these the phrase is carried to the ear, and its meaning to the heart (1970: 1/167). A modern scholar writes that there is a distinction between the music in recitation "that takes the recitation form what it should be and between the beauty of the voice in *tartīl*. This beauty is fixed overwhelmingly on the goal which is the stimulation of audition" (al Sa'īd 1967: 310). Mr. Ḥusayn Rif'at, describing his father's recitation style, told me that Sh. Rif'at felt that everyone has a *maqām* to which they are particularly responsive, so he tried to vary the *maqāmāt* in his recitation in order to touch a wider group. One of the clearest testimonies to the affecting role of music is the following which I heard in the course of my fieldwork: "Sh. Rif'at recites the Qur'ān for the Qur'ān and not for Art. Still there is Art, because he was able to make people weep."

All of the requirements for the ideal recitation point towards the same end: recitation of the Qur'ān should be an engrossing religious experience and not simply a transmission of information, entertainment, or an automatic means of acquiring merit. Thus the command to recite the Qur'ān as it was revealed (i.e. with *tartīl*/*tajwīd*) has as much to do with evoking the moment of revelation and reaffirming its significance as it does with preserving the text. Likewise, both reciter and listener should approach recitation with sincere intent to open themselves up to the experience. The role of the reciter is not only to transmit the meanings of the text, but to stir the hearts of his listeners

with those meanings. It is recognized that the use of musical skills plays an important role in communicating not only the meaning of the text, but the significance of the recitation experience by capturing the emotions, affecting the senses, engaging the total attention and focusing it on the significance of the Qur'ān.

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THE ROLE OF ṢUFĪ BROTHERHOODS IN THE PRESERVATION OF TUNISIAN ART MUSIC

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Throughout the fourteen centuries of Islām, music has flourished in both the secular and religious life of the Believers. Likewise, Islām has exerted a profound influence on the musical practices of peoples who embraced the faith. The impact of Islām on music, however, has always presented Western scholars with an intriguing array of ironies and ambiguities. Prominent factions in the elaboration of Islāmic law have militated vigorously against music and song, and orthodox politicians have often made life very difficult for singers and musicians. Yet some forms of "music" have entered into the most devout regions of Muslim worship. Thus Islām appears on the one hand to be a fierce opponent of music and an agent of its dissolution, while on the other hand, it seems to have functioned as an incubator of musical evolution and a protector of precious musical tradition.

The opposition to music mounted by legalists of both Sunnī and Shī'ī persuasion is amply documented. Scholars of the law were well aware of music's historic role in the ritual of magic and idolatry; they were gravely suspicious of music's ostensible association with moral and social vices; and they sought to eliminate these evils by forbidding or severely restricting the practice of music. Yet within the mosques themselves Qur'ānic recitation and the call to prayer have a long-standing tradition of melodic and rhythmic elaboration. This apparent contradiction has contributed to the throng of misunderstandings between Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, and it poses a fundamental problem for the ethnomusicologist, who is committed to the study of "music" within the context of a non-judgemental understanding of the cultural values involved. Our conception of music covers a broad range of phenomena, quite independent of their moral or spiritual

associations; and we have no difficulty dealing with "religious music" and "secular music" as two aspects of the same thing. Devout Muslims, however, perceive the organization of tone and rhythm in religious contexts as generically different from "music," and the difference is emphasized by a distinct vocabulary of technical terms. Is this a case, as Farmer (1952:62) and others have suggested, of a "fiction," a convenient manipulation of terms, in order to accommodate an unavoidable "leakage" of the profane into the sacred through the all-too-human penchant for clothing the "true" with the beautiful? Or is it a valid perception into the moral order of things that Western intellectuals have a sort of congenital difficulty in grasping? This question is not clearly separable from the technical aims of ethnomusicology. The response, however, seems to depend substantially on whether one is operating from inside or outside the faith. Perhaps the most honest approach for the Western musicologist who is not a theologian, is to endeavor not to lose sight of the problem, but at the same time to remain within the theoretical framework of the discipline and to use its analytic tools in shedding light on the matter. With this significant caveat regarding the mutual dissonance of terminologies and conceptions, we may proceed more carefully with an examination of secular and religious "music" in Islām.

Aside from the orthodox use of tonal and rhythmic patterns in connection with sacred texts, the most copious and enthusiastic practitioners of religious music have been the Ṣūfī brotherhoods. Very early in the Ṣūfī movement, Muslim mystics recognized the spiritual power in music, its conduciveness to medication, enlightenment, and special states of consciousness. Used by itself as *samā'* (listening, audition) or merged with the practices of *dhikr* (remembrancing or "theomnemosis"), both instrumental and vocal music became a significant component of Ṣūfī techniques. Widely revered saints and scholars, such as Jalāl al Dīn al Rūmī and al Ghazālī have left ample testimonials to the indispensable value of music as a companion and psychagogue along the mystic way (*ṭarīqah*). Unfortunately our ability to reconstruct the early music of Islām — both secular and sacred — is severely limited, as is our knowledge of the relationship between musical traditions of the Ṣūfīs and those of the culture at large. Nevertheless, evidence of some shared material has been gleaned from Arabic literature (e.g., Farmer 1952:63 ff). Also, in light of what is known of current musical practices, there seems to be reason to believe in an on-going interaction between the two spheres throughout the centuries of Islām. Owen Wright has recently conjectured: (1978: 12-13).

"...it is likely that the music heard during that period (ca. 1000-

1300 A.D.) at the more intimate *Şūfī* gatherings was, considered solely as an organization of sonorities, substantially the same as that to which the discussions of the philosophers and theorists relate, and since *Şūfīsm* drew its adherents from all strata of society, this may have encouraged a wider familiarity with an idiom formerly the preserve of the urban aristocracy. Furthermore, it may be assumed that this near-identity persisted even after the fraternities developed their own musical forms, for during the fifteenth century, if not before, some of the ternary and *aksak* rhythms characteristic of *Şūfī* dancing began to find their way into the secular repertoire. The 'classical' characteristics of at least some present-day *Şūfī* music suggest that the two have remained closely related."

This suggests a broader geographic and historic range for the phenomenon we shall examine with respect to Tunisia: the role of *Şūfī* brotherhoods as receptors, conservators, and fructifiers for the secular art music traditions.

In Tunisia there has been a particularly fortunate symbiosis between *Şūfī* practices and secular music. Certainly the *Şūfī* brotherhoods and the secular musicians have not always been on the best of terms with the '*ulamā*' but orthodox opposition does not appear to have left a significant mark. And the net results observable in our times seem at least to be salutary. Since we cannot follow the music itself through its various stages of development within the brotherhoods and the secular community, we must rely on a careful examination of these genres as they are available to us in present-day practice. It is, moreover, germane to understanding the record of past interrelationships, that we analyse and compare the musics in their contemporary reality. For this purpose, we shall examine the classical secular tradition, known as *Ma'lūf* (often pronounced and transliterated "Malouf") in Tunisia, and the practices of the '*ʿTsāwiyyah*, a brotherhood that has enjoyed ample popularity for many centuries in Tunisia and has steered a reasonable course between the extremes of doctrinaire rigidity and undisciplined excesses.

Ma'lūf is normally performed in a concert-like setting, with reasonably clear separation between audience and performers, and little audience participation. Performing groups are moderately large, consisting of an orchestra and a chorus of professional or at least "trained" musicians. Musicians tend to dress rather formally, often in western-style clothing. *Ma'lūf* concerts are frequently staged as a musical event, with no other motivation than to hear the music, and admission may be charged.

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Many 'Īsāwiyyah groups have regular get-togethers in the *zāwiyah* (lodge), which may function as a rehearsal or turn into a spontaneous community "happening"; but their "official" performances are always connected with some religious or social event — anniversary of a saint, visit to a sister *zāwiyah* or a variety of family functions involving the community. Weddings and circumcisions are among the family celebrations for which the groups provide entertainment and are generally paid. 'Īsāwiyyah functions are extremely informal, with little spatial distinctions between performers and non-performers. Normally anyone present may participate in any way he feels moved, and from the standpoint of activities and dress it is difficult to distinguish the 'Īsāwiyyah from the rest of the crowd, unless one knows the individuals. 'Īsāwiyyah receive their musical training from older members of the brotherhood. All have a normal occupation in the community and are not professional musicians, with the exception of the *zakkār*, who has usually learned to play *zukrah* (double reed conical aerophone) from his father outside the brotherhood context, and is paid for his services.

As different as the 'Īsāwiyyah and *Ma'lūf* setting are to the eye, their music is likewise so to the ear on casual audition, unless one happens to hear an occasional piece of shared repertoire. The characteristics that lead to this apparent dissimilarity are interesting, for the two genres have many structural and musical features in common, which hark back to their shared moments of history.

The basic units of structure share the same name — *nūbah* — and have essentially the same form, although the *Ma'lūf-nūbah* is more elaborate. Both structures are based on antiphony — musical dialogue between two factions of the ensemble, in this case, between chorus and instrumentalists. The *nūbāt* are divided into subsections, each named after a rhythmic pattern, and these patterns are arranged to give the sense of progressive acceleration. *Ma'lūf* and 'Īsāwiyyah share some of the names for these rhythms, but the respective patterns themselves are not alike. Each *nūbah* is named after a specific melodic mode (*maqām*, called *naghmah* in Tunisia), and all melodic material in the *nūbah* is generally expected to conform to that mode. Here also, *Ma'lūf* and 'Īsāwiyyah share terminology, but in this case the modes are similar, though not identical. The 'Īsāwiyyah repertoire, however, does include folk "modes" that do not easily yield to comparison with the *Ma'lūf* system. There is, in addition, a small amount of shared repertoire, which may have been borrowed in either direction (or have a common origin). Selections in 'Īsāwiyyah that are known to occur in the *Ma'lūf* repertoire and have retained the trappings of literary Arabic are labeled by the 'Īsāwiyyah as "*Ma'lūf*" or "*muwashshah*". Other shared material, however, may be melodic units or fragments, used in different combinations and with different texts in the respective genres.

The near congruence of musical modes, coupled with the correspondence in nomenclature, is significant. This sort of rapport with the classical system does not hold for North African folk music in general, and serves as a further reminder of the close association of Ṣūfī music and *Ma'lūf* over the centuries and their essential relationship with art music of the Arab-Islāmic world in general.

A glance at the respective scales for 'Tsāwiyyah and *Ma'lūf* modes, of which two are illustrated here (Figure 1), reveals their basic parallel



Figure 1. Comparison of Modes

structure and minor dissimilarities. *Ma'lūf* modes operate over a broader range — usually an octave, as opposed to a fifth in 'Tsāwiyyah (but note the extended range of *Asba'īn*). Generally 'Tsāwiyyah tends to remain within the initial pentachord of the mode and adheres to the same assignment of major and auxiliary tones as the classical "model." 'Tsāwiyyah modes violate the classical canon by beginning on a different note than their classical counterparts, but this is of minor significance to the comparative study. More interesting is the relative sparsity of quarter-tone intervals in 'Tsāwiyyah, particularly in the case of *Asba'īn* (which corresponds to the oriental *Hijāz*). This is striking since quartertones are often billed as a distinctive "stamp" of oriental music. Anomalous micro-intervals (though not precisely "quarter-tones") do, in fact, occur in 'Tsāwiyyah music, but not with great regularity and not necessarily in the places they are "supposed" to. Thus it is difficult to consider them an essential feature of 'Tsāwiyyah modes. One wonders if their presence in *Ma'lūf* is truly historical, or perhaps a result of the "restoration" efforts in this century.

A significant divergence between the two genres appears in their rhythmic modes (figures 2 and 3). As noted, rhythmic modulation is a structural feature of both *nūbāi* and some terms are shared. Also, in




Figure 2. *Isāwīyah* Rhythms.




Figure 3. *Ma'lūf* Rhythms.

both cases the *darbūkah* (vase-shaped membranophone) sets the rhythmic pattern, and both create the sense of progressive acceleration. There are fewer rhythmic modulations in 'Isāwiyyah and they are less systematic. Without the larger series of transitional rhythms to achieve tempo change, 'Isāwiyyah must accomodate considerable acceleration within a single rhythmic pattern (particularly the *barwal*). This may account for the relative simplicity of 'Isāwiyyah rhythms. It is clear, at any rate, that the rhythmic materials of the two genres are not easily comparable. Future analysis may devise a method for abstracting 'Isāwiyyah rhythms from the *Ma'lūf* patterns, but for the present, we must regard the two genres as rhythmically independent.

A more ear-striking contrast lies in the instrumentation and, to an extent, in the vocal timbre of the two musics. *Ma'lūf* ensembles consist largely of strings (violins, qānūn, 'ūd) and the relatively subdued tones of the *nāy* (end-blown, cylindrical aerophone), which is an innovation of this century (Rizqī 1967:59, n. 3). The chorus is mixed male-female, and rhythm is maintained by a single *darbūkah* of set of *naqqārāt* (small kettle drums). The 'Isāwayyah use a larger variety of drums and a single melodic instrument: the *zukah*, whose strong and strident tone provides perhaps the greatest contrast of the *Ma'lūf* ensemble, and places 'Isāwiyyah music clearly in the company of other folk genres. In addition, the singers are normally male only, with a vocal quality much closer to that used in folk music. This accounts in large part for the perceived dissimilarity of *Ma'lūf* and 'Isāwiyyah, which, to the untrained ear, outweighs the underlying homogeneity we have noted. Thus 'Isāwiyyah music, though immensely popular among the urban masses, is regarded somewhat condescendingly as a piece of popular folklore by Tunisian intellectuals; and it does not benefit from the elevated status of Arabic "cultural heritage" enjoyed by *Ma'lūf*. Its humble position is only accentuated by the fact that most texts used with 'Isāwiyyah music, though of religious content, are in the spoken dialect rather than classical Arabic.

To gain at least an aural "glimpse" of these genres, we may listen to a brief example from each. The examples constitute a piece of shared melodic material in the mode Ḥṣīn, functioning in each case as a *barwal*. The texts, of course, are different. Example 1 from *Ma'lūf* uses an Andalusian *muwashshah* "*Al-Kawn ilā jamālikum*," and Example 2 is a simple 'Isāwiyyah devotional poem, "*Awwal mā nabdā*." The melodic similarity of these selections is easy to recognize, and should provide a background for perceiving the contrastive features sketched above.

Tunisian *Ma'lūf* belongs to a broader Arab-Andalusian musical tradition that dates back to the Umawī caliphate at Baghdād and has left remnants throughout the cities of the Maghrib. Its "invention" is credited to Ziryāb (cf. d'Erlanger 1949:388-91) & Maqarri: 1967: III, 122-



♦ الكون الى جمالكم ♦

الْكَوْنُ إِلَى جَمَالِكُمْ مُشْتَقٌّ وَالْعَالَمُ كُلُّهُ لَكُمْ عَشَاقٌ
 مِنْ أَيْنَ يَا سَادِي تَرَى طَيْسَكُمْ مَا أَجْمَلَهَا تَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ الْخَلَّاقُ
 يَا مَالِكُ مُهْجَتِي تَرَفَّقْ بِاللَّهِ لَا بُدَّ لِكُلِّ عَاشِقٍ مِنْ زَلَّةٍ
 رُوحِي أُمْسَتْ وَأَصْبَحْتُ فِي ذِلَّةٍ لَا حَوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ

Musical Example No. 1 "Al Kawn ilā jamālīkum"



♦ أوّل ما نبدا ♦

أوّل ما نبدا نسبح باسم الله > باسم الله <
 ثاني ما نبدا نقول الله الله
 ألف صلاة على الحبيب رسول الله > رسول الله <
 سيّد الاسياد الحبيب > الله الله <

Musical Example No. 2 "Awwal mā nabdā"

133), a musician from the illustrious court of Hārūn al Rashīd, who migrated to Cordova in 822. He spend a few years in Tunisia on his way to Spain, but his musical innovations were to develop first in Arab Andalusia, before their impact could be felt decisively in Tunisia. In about 1100, Umayyah Ibn 'Abd al 'Azīz Abū al Ṣalt, a musical scholar from Seville, opened a school of music in Tunisia, which remained in

operation for at least fifty years and began a trend of Andalusian arts and tastes that was reinforced by periodic waves of refugees from Spain. During this period, the Andalusian tradition that was to become *Ma'lūf* emerged as the dominant form of urban art music in Tunisia.

At that time of Abū al Ṣalt, the Ṣūfī movement was also gaining momentum in the Maghrib and extending its influence to broad segments of the population. Prominent early masters who established the significant precedents for North African Ṣūfism were Abū Madyan and Abū al Ḥasan al Shādhilī. Al Shādhilī, born in Morocco at the end of the twelfth century, established Ṣūfī groups throughout the Maghrib, including a strong following in Tunis. In our day, Tunis remains a stronghold of the Shādhiliyyah tradition, and the large *zāwīyah* overlooking the city accommodates hundreds of worshipers during its weekly summer devotionals. Shādhiliyyah music today is distinctively conservative and executed without instruments or drums. Out of reverence for this great saint, other brotherhoods, such as the 'Tsāwiyyah have customarily incorporated Shādhiliyyah selections in their own performances (Snoussi n.d : I, 107). Nevertheless, it is not known what musical practices al Shādhilī himself may have initiated. The first clearly musical Ṣūfī was Abū al Ḥasan 'Alī al Shushtarī (al Nawayāl 1965: 386-90, al Shustarī: 1960), born in Spain in 1213, during the lifetime of al Shādhilī. In his wanderings he sampled a variety of Ṣūfī movements and eventually established a following of his own, including a lodge in the southern Tunisian city of Gabès. He was a prolific writer of mystical *muwashshaḥāt* and *azjāl*, which he taught to his disciples with melodic line and drum accompaniment. His music was apparently similar to the secular art music of his day, and with al Shushtarī we have the first documented convergence of the Ṣūfī and *Ma'lūf* traditions. Later brotherhoods developed a musical repertoire called "*shishtrī*" which is said to have differed little from its *Ma'lūf* counterpart. (Snoussi n.d.: I, 110)

An important Ṣūfī of the 14th century was Sidi Ḍrif, who had a following on the outskirts of Tunis. He distinguished himself not only as a Ṣūfī shaykh, but also as a religious scholar, a musician and a poet. He led his brotherhood in musical devotions, but also maintained good relations with the '*ulamā*', bringing to both Ṣūfism and its musical practices a greater respectability. (Ka'k 1938:29, al Nawayāl 1965: 268). How close his music was to *Ma'lūf* is now known: however, the fact that he himself was a connoisseur of the Andalusian art is apparent from a *qaṣīdah* into which he wove the names of the fourteen classical melodic modes. The poem became known as Nā'ūrah al Ṭubū' (the water-wheel of modes) and gained wide currency (Rizqī 1967:193). A similar but simpler poem exists today in the oral tradition of *zukah* players. It is

possible that Sidi Drif's Ṣūfī disciples performed music in these modes; and, if so, the Ṣūfī music of that day may have been as fully elaborated as its secular counterpart.

The 16th and 17th centuries were pivotal in many ways for Tunisia. They brought the beginning of Turkish occupation and the greatest influx of Muslim refugees from Spain. They also saw broader popularization of the Ṣūfī movement and the establishment of many new brotherhoods, including the 'Tsāwīyyah. The Andalusian immigrants had an immense impact on Tunisian urban cultures, as well as on the economy and the social structures. They were attached to the traditional art music of their lost homeland; and they injected new life and new material into Tunisian *Ma'lūf*, to the extent that to this day, Testour, a town in the Mijardah valley settled by Andalusians, is considered the "hometown" of *Ma'lūf*. Andalusians were also devoted to Ṣūfism, and many urban brotherhoods became dominated by the Andalusian element. Sidi Qashshāsh was a typical Ṣūfī figure of this period in Tunis. No doubt under the influence of the immigrants, he became an extremely active promoter of Andalusian-Shishtrī music in his *zāwīyah* and members of other brotherhoods came to learn his techniques and his repertoire (Al Nayyāl 1965). Other important brotherhoods sprang up at this time, such as the Sulāmiyyah and 'Awānriyyah, and all seem to have tapped Shishtrī and *Ma'lūf* musical material.

From the period of Qashshāsh's popularization of Andalusian music in the *zāwīyah* until this century, Ṣūfī and secular *Ma'lūf* music grew very close together, to the extent that the Ṣūfī *zawāyā* became "veritable conservatories" of *Ma'lūf* music ('Abdul Wahhāb 1918: 16, Snoussi n.d.: I: 110). At times it was possible to learn *ma'lūf* for a fee at shops set up in the cities ('Abdul Wahhāb 1966:261). At other times, however — perhaps more generally — those who wished to learn *Ma'lūf* did so through the brotherhoods (d'Erlanger 1949:381-2, Turāth 5:6-15). It is not clear to what extent these Ṣūfī brotherhoods *qua* music conservatories kept sacred and secular repertoires distinct, nor can we account specifically for the musical divergence of the two genres in our day. Nevertheless, the Ṣūfīs assumed a vital function, not only in transmitting the *Ma'lūf* tradition when it was not maintained elsewhere, but also in preserving its purity, particularly in the nineteenth century, when vogues of secular music from the East and the West began threatening to force *Ma'lūf* into decline. Those who were immediately responsible for making the *Ma'lūf* repertoire available for codification and transcription at the beginning of this century, such as Aḥmad al Wāfī, had learned their art under the aegis of Ṣūfī brotherhoods.

From the early years of the twentieth century, considerable effort has

been expended to revive, record, and "retouch" *Ma'lūf* music. Spearheading this movement, with generous application of both funds and labor was the Baron Rodolphe d'Erlanger, who also lent his name to a monumental 6-volume opus on Arabic music. In 1934 the work was taken up by the Rashīdī Institute and later (1938) by the national radio station. These activities effected for our century a renewed separation of *Ma'lūf* and *Ṣūfī* music, for all the attentions were devoted to the classical art music, and the religious repertoire of the brotherhoods were allowed to continue untouched in the domain of the "folk". When, in the wake of the national independence movement, the *Ṣūfī* brotherhoods fell into political disrepute, their apparent decline was accelerated; and their separation from the concerns of the educated urban elite became more pronounced, as did that of their musical repertoire, from the recently restored and reformed *Ma'lūf*.

Since independence (1957), a national music conservatory has been established and charged, in connection with the public schools, with the preservation and teaching of *Ma'lūf*. At the beginning of 1980 the Ministry of Culture completed publication (in Western musical notation) of the complete corpus of traditional Tunisian *Ma'lūf*, a project which the conservatory, under Salāḥ al Mahdī, had been working on ever since its inception.

Ṣūfī brotherhoods, such as the *ʿĪsāwīyyah*, are assuming more the role of folklore groups. Their repertoire, largely untouched by government officials and scholars, has assimilated music from various sources into its traditional core, and through this adaptability has remained very much alive in the hearts of the people. *Ma'lūf* has grown to be a symbol of national pride in the Tunisian cultural heritage.

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Note: The musical and historical analysis presented in this paper is the result of ethnomusicological field work conducted in Tunisia over the past six years, the initial phase of which was under a Fulbright-Hays grant from 1974-76 and led to a Doctoral dissertation. This work (Jones 1977) may be consulted for a fuller musical analysis and for further documentary sources.

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